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Abstract
This thesis consists of three chapters. Chapter 1 studies the role of marketing
in the economy. Using aggregate and firm-level data, I find that aggregate
marketing intensity in the US increased sharply around the mid-1990s, which
coincides with a rapid rise of elasticity between firm-level Marketing Produc-
tion Cost Ratio and markup. To explain these facts, I develop a model with
heterogeneous firms and endogenous markups in which firms engage in market-
ing to signal their quality. I use a calibrated version of the model to quantify
the impact of information frictions and marketing on aggregate productivity.
I find that quality information revealed by marketing is valuable and access to
marketing cannot undo the information frictions completely.
Chapter 2 examines the impact of zombie firms on resource allocation. Using
firm-level data in China, I show that zombie firms are larger, less productive,
and receive a higher subsidy rate on average. The difference in average subsidy
rate between zombies and non-zombies reflects both the selection criterion of
zombies and the underlying joint distribution of subsidy rate and productivity.
I develop a model with heterogeneous firms to quantify the impact of zombies
on aggregate productivity. Quantitative exercise shows that reducing the dis-
persion in subsidy rate across firms can lead to significant productivity gains,
while policies that increase the exit rate of zombies have limited productivity
effects.
Chapter 3 establishes two facts along with the rise of information technol-
ogy: (i) the output from the information sector is more intensively used as an
intermediate input; (ii) the wage of information workers and their total em-
ployment increase relative to those of non-information workers. To understand
the causes, we develop a two-sector accounting framework with sector-factor
specific technical changes. We find that labor-augmenting technical change is
important in explaining the observed change in wage premium and intermedi-
ate shares.
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Chapter 1
Marketing, Market Power, and
Aggregate Productivity
1.1 Introduction
Firms spend substantial resources on marketing. In 2012, around $140 billion
was spent on media advertising in the US. This represents 0.9% of US GDP
and $444 per capita.1 As Bagwell (2007) noted, marketing is a “prominent
feature of economic life”.2 The massive spending creates information for con-
sumers, provides a channel for firms to differentiate from their competitors
and gain market power. Despite the prominence of marketing, at the aggre-
gate level, there is little empirical evidence on the magnitude and trend of
this spending, and how the marketing spending correlates with market power.
Quantitatively, few attempts have been made to quantify the impact of mar-
keting on aggregate productivity by accounting for both the positive effect of
marketing through information revelation and the negative effect of marketing
via markup dispersion.
In this chapter, I estimate aggregate marketing intensity in the US, which
is defined as the ratio of aggregate marketing spending to GDP. Using firm-
level data, a positive correlation between Marketing Production Cost Ratio
(MPCR) and market power is documented. Moreover, the cross-sectional
MPCR-markup elasticity co-moves closely with aggregate marketing inten-
sity. To explain these facts, I develop a model with heterogeneous firms and
1Belleflamme and Peitz (2015).
2The original phrase refers to advertising. Since advertising is a major component of
marketing, I adopt the quote here.
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endogenous markups where firms engage in marketing to signal their quality.
The existence of information frictions could explain both the level of elasticity
and its co-movement with aggregate marketing intensity. I then use the model
to evaluate the impact of information frictions and marketing on aggregate
productivity. Although access to marketing cannot restore the complete in-
formation allocation, marketing generates significant productivity gains by re-
vealing valuable information to consumers. The gain from quality information
revealed by marketing tends to dominate the loss due to markup dispersion.
I begin by estimating the aggregate marketing intensity in the US. The aggre-
gate marketing expenditure contains three components: advertising expenses,
purchased marketing services, and own-account marketing labor compensa-
tion. It is observed that since the mid-1990s — the beginning of the Internet
era — aggregate marketing intensity in the US increased by about 20% un-
til 2000. From 2000 onwards, the aggregate marketing intensity flattened out.
The further decomposition shows that the rise of aggregate marketing intensity
is a within-industry phenomenon. The within-industry component continues
to rise until the financial crisis. Therefore, it is the reallocation of output be-
tween industries that results in a flattened aggregate marketing intensity since
the 2000s. One possible explanation of rising marketing intensity is that the
rise of information and communications technology expands the marketing op-
portunities and provides more channels for the interaction between firms and
consumers.
I then investigate whether marketing spending is related to the market power
of the firm. Using Compustat data, I document that marketing is positively
correlated with the markup. Firms with high markups tend to spend more on
marketing relative to production, and thus have high MPCR. In addition, the
cross-sectional MPCR-markup elasticity increases sharply around mid-1990s
which co-moves with aggregate marketing intensity closely .
To explain the findings in the data, I develop a model with heterogeneous
firms and endogenous variable markups where firms engage in marketing to
signal their quality. The demand of a firm depends on its taste shifter, which
is assumed to be a geometric average of the exogenous quality and endogenous
appeal of the firm. Each firm has access to a marketing technology, where they
can increase appeal using labor inputs. I assume it is less costly for high-quality
firms to increase the appeal. Thus, when quality of the firm is unobservable,
firms can credibly convey quality information via appeal. In the presence of
information frictions, I use the notion of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE)
16
to solve the model. One drawback of PBE is the multiplicity of equilibria due
to the flexibility of off-equilibrium beliefs. I focus on the least-cost separating
equilibrium (LCSE) in this chapter.
In the model, quality is the only source of heterogeneity between firms. Markup
is positively correlated with firm size and quality. When there are no informa-
tion frictions, firms would still spend on marketing to increase appeal as it is
complementary to consumption. The MPCR is constant across firms within
the same industry and independent of the markup. However, with informa-
tion frictions, the signaling competition between firms generates a positive
correlation between MPCR and markup. Technical changes that increase the
returns to marketing fuel the signaling competition, which would increase the
MPCR-markup elasticity and aggregate marketing intensity simultaneously.
The intuition is that higher returns to marketing lower the cost for low-quality
firms to mimic high-quality firms. Thus, more intense signaling competition
between firms generates a larger dispersion of MPCR for given amount of
markup dispersion.
I calibrate the model to match the industry-level distribution on marketing
intensity and firm size. There are two sources of heterogeneity across indus-
tries. The first difference is the weight of appeal in consumers’ utility function.
For instance, the weight could be higher for some goods such as cosmetics and
clothing. The second source of heterogeneity is the level of quality differenti-
ation within an industry, which is measured by the tail parameter of quality
distribution. The tail parameter captures the extent of signaling competi-
tion. These two sources of heterogeneity determine the marketing intensity
and firm size distribution within an industry. The calibrated model implies
an MPCR-markup elasticity similar to the data, and a rise in the returns
to marketing generates a co-movement between MPCR-markup elasticity and
aggregate marketing intensity.
The calibrated model allows us to quantify the effects of marketing and infor-
mation frictions on aggregate productivity. I begin by asking to what extent
access to marketing can undo the information frictions. Compared to the com-
plete information allocation, the productivity loss from information frictions is
around 3 percent. I decompose the loss into two channels: (i) a between-firm
component that summarizes the misallocation between firms due to markup
and information distortion, and (ii) a between-activity component that sum-
marizes the misallocation of labor between production and marketing in the
aggregate. I find that between-activity channel accounts for almost all the
17
losses from information frictions. Moreover, the recent technical changes that
induce higher returns to marketing, such as the Internet and search engines,
would increase the loss from information frictions.
Next, I move on to study the aggregate impact of marketing, which has been
debated at length in the theoretical economic literature. Using the calibrated
model, I attempt to study this question quantitatively. On the one hand, mar-
keting is informative as it conveys valuable quality information to consumers.
On the other hand, the information revealed by marketing would result in
markup dispersion and hence resource misallocation between firms. I restrict
a firm’s ability to signal its quality via appeal and compare the LCSE with
a no-information allocation. I find the productivity gains from information
revealed by marketing can be substantial. However, the result comes with
caveats. Firstly, LCSE implies a minimum loss in the process of information
revelation. The deviation from LCSE would lower the gains from marketing.
Secondly, as in Edmond et al. (2018), markup is related only to firm size in the
model. If marketing generates dispersion in the markup which is not related
to size, then it would involve a larger loss from misallocation. Furthermore,
the model presumes each sector faces the same information frictions, whereas
in reality quality information could be observable for some industries even
without marketing.3
Related literature
This chapter is related to several strands of literature. Firstly, the measure-
ment of marketing spending is related to those of intangible capital. Corrado
et al. (2005) and Corrado and Hao (2014a) measure brand equity as a compo-
nent of intangible capital by capitalizing several items of marketing spending.
In this chapter, I estimate marketing spending directly and show its trend
since 1987 in the US. The technological interpretation of the rising marketing
intensity is consistent with Haskel and Westlake (2018).
In the model, firms spend on marketing to signal their quality, increase the ap-
peal, and gain market power. The variation in firm size is driven by the quality
information revealed by marketing, which is related to the recent literature on
3Beyond the mechanism in the model, there are many other ways that marketing could
affect aggregate productivity. Some of them focus on the positive role of marketing, and
others focus on the detrimental role of marketing. It is not possible to account for all
those channels into a single framework. Nevertheless, the result remains as one of the first
attempts to quantify the aggregate impact of marketing.
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the determinants of firm performance (Hottman et al., 2016). Besides, the
revealed information induces dispersion in markup and lowers the aggregate
productivity as in Edmond et al. (2018) and Baqaee and Farhi (2018). Other
theoretical papers discuss different ways of how marketing affects demand,
such as reaching more customers (Arkolakis, 2010) and forming new customer-
relationships (Gourio and Rudanko, 2014). Nevo (2001) studies the pricing
behavior in the ready-to-eat cereal industry and discovers that the observed
high price-cost margins can be partly attributed to the fact firms spend a large
number of resources on marketing to influence the perceived quality.
The positive correlation between MPCR and markup in this chapter is related
to Traina (2018) and De Loecker et al. (2018). They document that markup
is positively correlated with “Selling, General and Administrative Expenses”
(SGA) expenses of firms. However, as noted by Ptok et al. (2018), SGA is not
a measure of marketing expenditure. SGA-based marketing spending mea-
surement fails to generate the co-movement pattern with aggregate marketing
intensity.
Lastly, this chapter is also related to the discussion of marketing and welfare.
The idea of using marketing spending to signal quality is first proposed by
Nelson (1974), which highlights the informative role of marketing. The model
could entertain the other two views on marketing as documented by Bagwell
(2007) — complementary view and persuasive view. Results show that the
gains from information tend to dominate the loss due to markup dispersion,
and the aggregate effects of marketing are welfare-enhancing. Rauch (2013)
investigates the effect of a change in the marginal costs of advertising on con-
sumer prices. He posits the aggregate effect of advertising to be informative
since advertising tends to decease consumer price.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 introduces the data and mea-
surement of marketing spending and markup. Section 1.3 presents the empiri-
cal facts regarding marketing intensity and MPCR-markup elasticity. Section
1.4 illustrates the model. Section 1.5 explains how we calibrate the model to
match cross-industry marketing intensity distribution and concentration facts.
Section 1.6 presents the quantitative results. Section 1.7 discusses the impli-
cations of the model. Section 1.8 concludes.
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1.2 Data and Measurement
1.2.1 Aggregate data on marketing spending
Firms spend substantial resources on marketing to attract consumers and gen-
erate revenues. As noted by Corrado and Hao (2014a), marketing spending is
“outlays designed to augment the demand for a firm’s products and services —
that is, to shift its price-quantity demand schedules upward, so that more will
be sold at a given price.” Following the literature, I estimate the marketing
spending in the US using data from different sources.4
The marketing expenditure consists of three components. The first compo-
nent is the advertising expense. Advertising is one important part of market-
ing which is used to raise awareness and convey information concerning the
products to the consumer. Beyond advertising, firms also purchase market-
ing research and marketing consulting services. Those services help them to
create and develop a successful marketing strategy. Lastly, there is an ad-
ditional in-house component where firms hire employees, such as marketing
managers and public relation specialists, to conduct marketing activities. I
estimate these three components separately and add them up to get the total
marketing spending in the US.
Advertising expenses. I extract advertising expense data from IRS tax
data, both at the industry-level and aggregate level. Firms report advertising
expenses to the IRS for the tax deduction purpose. The data are reported by
legal forms of organization, major industry, and ownership.
The advertising expense includes all the direct costs of advertising. For ex-
ample, it would cover the advertising expenses via different media channels
(including newspapers, TV, Internet, etc) and public relations expenses (e.g.
sponsorship of sports teams, publicity campaign or events), and cost of pro-
ducing promotional items like t-shirts and mugs.
4The measurement of marketing spending is related to the literature on the measurement
of intangible capital. Corrado et al. (2005) summarize the intangible capital into three cate-
gories: computerized information, innovative property, and economic competencies. Within
the category of economic competencies, they capitalize several spending on marketing and
label it as brand equity. Due to the process of capitalization, only a fraction of marketing
spending is accounted as an investment in the brand and the level of the fraction varies
across different items of marketing. Thus, the resulting trend of brand equity may be differ-
ent compared to the total marketing spending itself. In this chapter, I estimate directly the
magnitude and trend of marketing spending in the US. For details on the measurement of
brand equity, see Corrado and Hao (2014a).
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Marketing research and consulting. The second component of market-
ing spending is purchased marketing research and marketing consulting ser-
vices. I estimate the total spending on those activities using the revenue of the
corresponding industries, specifically NAICS 541613 for marketing consulting
services and NAICS 541910 for marketing research.5 For the industry-level
purchase of the output from these two industries, I use the 2002 benchmark
input-output table.
Marketing labor compensation. The last component of marketing spend-
ing is the own-account component, where the own-account component is mea-
sured by the wage compensation to marketing workers. Specifically, I first
identify a list of marketing occupations and then estimate the labor compen-
sation associated with those marketing occupations for each industry.6
Notice that the marketing labor compensation in the media and marketing
related industries may already be part of purchased advertising expenses for
other industries. To avoid this double counting problem, I only estimate the
marketing labor compensation for the private, non-agricultural, non-media,
non-marketing related industries. Besides, I do not estimate the capital spend-
ing in the marketing department for two reasons. Firstly, to my knowledge,
there is no data available that separately report the capital investment for
different function departments within the firm. Secondly, the measurement of
marketing spending is recorded as operating expenses in the income statement,
which would be consistent with the firm-level data.
1.2.2 Firm level data
For the firm-level data, I use the Compustat Fundamental Annual file, where
I observe sales, capital stock information, operating expenses, and industry
classification. The choice of data is driven by two reasons. Firstly, Compustat
covers a wide range of industries over a substantial period of time. Additionally,
it reports detailed components of a firm’s operating expenses, which allows for
the estimation of markup and marketing spending.
Following De Loecker and Warzynski (2012), I apply the production-based
estimate of markup to the Compustat data. Markup is measured as a ratio
5The survey-based measures are available from the Service Annual Survey (SAS).
6See section 1.9.1 in Appendix for the list of occupation that is marketing related and
the method to estimate the marketing labor compensation.
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between output elasticity of variable input and revenue share of variable input
µit = θV
PitQit
P Vit Vit
In Compustat data, I use “Cost of Goods Sold” (COGS) as a measure of variable
input and assume an industry-specific production function to estimate θV .7
Marketing spending is measured using advertising expenses (XAD). Marketing-
Production Cost Ratio (MPCR) is measured as the ratio of marketing spending
to production cost (COGS).8 For each year, I define the cross-sectional MPCR-
markup elasticity as coefficient ρ from the following regression
log (MPCRis) = ρ log(µis) + δs + is
where δs is the industry fixed effect.9
It is worth noting that “Selling, General and Administrative Expenses” (SGA)
is not a valid measure of firms’ marketing spending. Among 29 items that
constitute SGA, only 2 items — advertising expenses and marketing expenses
— relate directly to marketing spending. Ptok et al. (2018) show that advertis-
ing expenses reported by Compustat is highly correlated with total marketing
spending of the firm.10,11 To this end, I view the advertising expenses as a
valid proxy of the marketing spending of the firm.
7The lack of firm-specific deflator for input and output may lead to a biased estimate of
θv. But it will not affect the variation of markup across firms in a given year or over time.
See Brandt et al. (2017), De Loecker et al. (2018) for details.
8Both components are part of the operating expenses of the firm. COGS could be viewed
as the total variable cost of production.
9The COGS appears in the denominator of both the dependent variable and regres-
sor. In section 1.9.4 of Appendix, I implement an alternative specification log (XADis) =
ρ0 log(µis) + ρ1log(COGSis) + δs + is and find the estimated ρ0 is similar to the estimated
ρ in the main regression.
10Ptok et al. (2018) collect marketing data from an alternative source Advertising Age
and compare it to SGA based marketing estimates. As they mention in the paper, “ADV
offers a good measure of advertising spending and a partial measure of total marketing
spending, but SGA fails to capture marketing spending or any of its subconstructs.”
11In section 1.9.6 of Appendix, I estimate the marketing spending using SGA expenses.
The SGA-based marketing measure fails to generate the co-movement pattern in section 1.3.
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Figure 1.1: Aggregate marketing trend in the US
Notes: This figure plots the ratio of marketing expenditure to GDP in the US since 1987.
1.3 Empirical Findings
1.3.1 Aggregate trend of marketing intensity
Figure 1.1 shows the aggregate marketing intensity in the US. Since the mid-
1990s, there is an upward trend in marketing spending in the US from about
3.3 percent of GDP to 4 percent. The rising trend vanishes after the 2000s.12
Aggregate marketing intensity is output weighted industry-level marketing in-
tensity,
Mt
Yt
=
∑
s
Mst
Yt
=
∑
s
Yst
Yt
Mst
Yst
where Mst and Yst are marketing spending and output for industry s at year
t. The change in aggregate marketing intensity could be driven by either
within-industry change in marketing intensity or between-industry reallocation
of output. To understand the source of the change, I decompose the aggregate
marketing intensity into a between and within component. For the between
component, I fix the marketing intensity of each industry as in 1987 and allow
12In section 1.9.1 of Appendix, I plot the decomposition of marketing intensity into three
components— advertising, marketing service, and own-account marketing labor compensa-
tion. In the mid-1990s, all three components of marketing spending were rising. However,
since 2000, advertising intensity was declining while marketing service and own-account
components were rising. This reflects the shift from outbound marketing towards inbound
marketing.
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Figure 1.2: Marketing expenditure decomposition
Notes: This figure decomposes the aggregate marketing intensity into two components:
between-industry component and within-industry component. The solid line shows the
aggregate marketing trend in the US. The within component shows the aggregate marketing
intensity when fixing the industry value added share as in 1987. The between component
shows the aggregate marketing intensity if I fix industry marketing intensity as in 1987.
for reallocation of output. On the other hand, for the within component, I keep
the output share as in 1987 and allow for change of within-industry marketing
intensity.
Figure 1.2 shows the result of this decomposition. The rise in the aggregate
marketing intensity is driven by the within component. The within compo-
nent follows closely the aggregate marketing intensity before 2000. After 2000,
there is a growing discrepancy between the two. The within component keeps
rising until the burst of financial crisis whereas the aggregate marketing inten-
sity flattens out. The discrepancy can be explained by the change of between
component. Before 2000, the change of this component is negligible. However,
it is on a decreasing trend after 2000. As a result, the stagnation of aggregate
marketing intensity since 2000 is due to between-industry reallocation.
Returns to marketing in the Internet era. Thus far, I show that since
the mid-1990s, there is an increasing trend in marketing intensity in the US.
The reason behind this change could be due to technology. According to the
Wikipedia page on the history of marketing, the key innovation in the mid-
1990s that influenced marketing practice is the rise of customer relationship
management (CRM) technology and search engines. These innovations expand
the marketing opportunities for the firms and increase the returns to market-
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Figure 1.3: Employment shares of marketing-related activities in the US
Notes: This figure plots the employment shares of marketing services industry (left axis) and
marketing-related workers (right axis). The marketing-related workers contain marketing
labor in own-account component and workers in the marketing services industry.
ing spending. For instance, CRM software digitizes processes and automates
tasks to improve the effectiveness of customer relationship management. A
recent survey by CMO shows that in the year 2018, more than 40% of the
marketing spending is on digital marketing. Besides, the availability of a vast
stream of digital data presents opportunities for firms to identify customers
who would be potentially interested in the product and hence increases the
effectiveness of marketing. Goldfarb and Tucker (2011) find that the effective-
ness of marketing depends on the advertiser’s ability to collect data on web
users.13 Consistent with the technological interpretation of the rise in market-
ing intensity, Haskel and Westlake (2018) also argue that the current wave of
digital technologies has made production more scalable.14 Higher returns to
marketing should reallocate labor towards marketing activities. In Figure 1.3,
I plot the employment shares of marketing services industry and marketing-
related occupations. The result implies there is a significant reallocation of
labor towards marketing-related activities.
13See Goldfarb (2014) for a review of online marketing literature.
14In Table 1.14 of Appendix, I classify the industries into two groups: IT-intensive and
non IT-intensive. I show that there is a larger increase in the marketing intensity for IT-
intensive sector.
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1.3.2 Marketing-production cost ratio and markup
In this section, I show that marketing spending at the firm level is related
to market power.15 Figure 1.4 is a binscatter plot between the logarithm of
MPCR and the logarithm of markup. The figure implies a positive relationship
between the markup and the MPCR of a firm. Firms with higher markups
tend to spend more on marketing relative to production. This is consistent
with the view that firms spend on marketing to differentiate from competitors
and gain market power.
What is striking is that the MPCR-markup elasticity is co-moving with aggre-
gate marketing intensity. Figure 1.5 presents the same binscatter plot but for
two periods: before 1995 and after 1995. Comparing two sub-periods, the elas-
ticity is higher after 1995. Indeed the elasticity between MPCR and markup
increases by about 25 percent after 1995 as shown in the left panel of Fig-
ure 1.6. In the right panel of Figure 1.6, I plot the regression coefficient from
year-on-year regressions. The level of cross-sectional elasticity between MPCR
and markup co-moves almost perfectly with aggregate marketing intensity as
in Figure 1.1. In the section below, I propose a model that could explain
not only the correlation between MPCR and markup but more importantly
the co-movement pattern between the MPCR-markup elasticity and aggregate
marketing intensity.
1.4 Model
In this section, I present the model with heterogeneous firms and variable
markups where firms engage in marketing to signal their quality. Section 1.4.1
and 1.4.2 discuss the model setup and resource allocation with complete infor-
mation. In section 1.4.3, I show that, in the presence of information frictions,
signaling competition between firms generates the positive correlation between
MPCR and markup. More importantly, technical changes that induce higher
returns to marketing generate co-movement between aggregate marketing in-
tensity and MPCR-markup elasticity. Finally, section 1.4.4 characterizes how
does the information frictions and markup dispersion affect aggregate produc-
tivity in the model.
15In the main text, I estimate the markup by assuming an industry-specific Cobb-Douglas
production function. In section 1.9.5 of Appendix, I show the results using Translog pro-
duction function. The choice of production function does not change the empirical patterns
documented in this section.
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Figure 1.4: Binscatter plot between log(MPCR) and log(markup)
Notes: This binscatter plot shows the correlation between markup and marketing-production
cost ratio. Both variables are residualized using industry-year fixed effects. Marketing cost
is measured by advertising expense and production cost is measured by COGS.
Figure 1.5: Binscatter plot between log(MPCR) and log(markup): before
and after mid 1990s
(a) Before 1995 (b) After 1995
Notes: The left (right) panel shows a binscatter plot between markup and marketing-
production cost ratio before (after) 1995. Both variables are residualized using industry-year
fixed effects. Marketing cost is measured by advertising expenditure and production cost is
measured by COGS.
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Figure 1.6: MPCR-markup elasticity
Notes: This figure shows the elasticity between log(MPCR) and log(markup). The elasticity
is obtained from a regression where I regress log(MPCR) on log(markup) and industry-year
fixed effects. The left panel shows the result for two separate regressions: before 1995 and
after 1995. The right panel shows the result for year-on-year regressions. For each year, I
conduct the regression by combining data within a three-year moving window.
1.4.1 Setup
The economy has K industries. A representative consumer chooses consump-
tion goods from all industries and all intermediate producers and supplies L
units of labor inelastically. Intermediate firms are selling differentiated prod-
ucts with heterogeneous quality. The representative agent chooses consump-
tion across all intermediate goods {Ck(ω)}k,ω to maximize the aggregate con-
sumption
C =
K∏
k=1
(Ck)
1
K (1.1)
subject to
ˆ
ω
Υ
(
Ak(ω)Ck(ω)
Ck
)
dω = 1 (1.2)∑
k
ˆ
ω
Pk(ω)Ck(ω)dω = WL+ Π. (1.3)
The aggregate consumption C depends on the industry-level consumption good
Ck, which is created by combining the varieties within each industry using the
Kimball aggregator as in equation 1.2. Ak(ω) is the taste shifter of variety ω.
Aggregator Υ is strictly increasing (Υ′ > 0) and concave (Υ′′ < 0) and satisfies
Υ(1) = 1.16 The budget constraint, equation 1.3, shows that total spending
on consumption should be equal to aggregate labor incomeWL plus aggregate
profit Π from producers. W is the nominal wage rate and C is normalized as
16The aggregator nests the standard CES aggregator, i.e., Υ(q) = q
σ−1
σ .
28
the numeraire good.
The taste shifter Ak(ω) determines the attractiveness of each variety. I assume
it is a weighted-average of quality Qk(ω) and appeal Φk(ω) of variety ω,
Ak(ω) = Qk(ω)
ukΦk(ω)
1−uk . (1.4)
For each variety ω, Qk(ω) is exogenously drawn from some quality distribution,
while the appeal Φk(ω) is endogenous where intermediate firms can spend on
marketing to increase the appeal. I allow the weight uk ∈ [0, 1] to be industry-
specific. For some industries like cosmetics and clothing, uk would be lower,
i.e., the agent cares more about the appeal component in the taste shifter,
which in turns provides incentives for firms to spend more on marketing. In
addition to the endogenous nature of the appeal, I assume appeal has an
information advantage. Consumers cannot observe quality Qk(ω) of a firm,
but they can observe appeal Φk(ω) instead. Thus, it is possible for firms to
signal their quality using appeal.17
Following Klenow and Willis (2016), Gopinath and Itskhoki (2010), Edmond
et al. (2018), I consider the following specification of function Υ(q)
Υ(q) = 1 + (σ − 1)exp
(
1

)

σ

−1
[
Γ
(
σ

,
1

)
− Γ
(
σ

,
q

σ

)]
(1.5)
where σ > 1,  > 0 and Γ is upper incomplete gamma function
Γ(s, x) =
ˆ ∞
x
ts−1e−tdt. (1.6)
This specification permits a simple characterization of the dependence between
demand elasticity and firm size. Suppose there is no information friction, i.e.,
both quality and appeal are observable. The FOC of the consumer implies the
following demand function for intermediate good producers
Pk(ω) = Υ
′(qk(ω))Ak(ω)D−1k Pk (1.7)
where qk(ω) = Ak(ω)Ck(ω)Ck is related to the size of a firm with variety ω and
Dk =
´
Υ′(qk(ω))qk(ω)dω is a demand shifter for varieties within industry k.18
Firms spend on marketing to increase the appeal, which in turns shifts up the
17In the absence of information frictions, marketing can be interpreted as a generic type
of quality improvement using labor inputs.
18The relative size of a firm with variety ω is Pk(ω)Ck(ω)PkCk = Υ
′(qk(ω))qk(ω)D−1k .
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demand schedule for the firm. The demand elasticity for variety ω is
εk(ω) = −∂log(Ck(ω))
∂log(Pk(ω))
= − Υ
′(qk(ω))
Υ′′(qk(ω))qk(ω)
= σqk(ω)
− 
σ . (1.8)
The ratio 
σ
is referred as superelasticity in the literature. It implies that the
demand elasticity is decreasing with firm size. When  = 0, Kimball aggre-
gator corresponds to CES production function with Υ(q) = q
σ−1
σ . Atkeson
and Burstein (2008) proposes an alternative way to generate variable demand
elasticity. Their model features oligopoly competition with nested CES de-
mand. In the robustness section of Appendix, I show that the results could be
extended to the model of oligopolistic competition.
For intermediate firms, each firm produces one variety and draws quality Qk(ω)
from a distribution Gk. Labor is the only input of production. A firm in indus-
try k with variety ω uses production labor Lkp(ω) produce output according
to Yk(ω) = Lkp(ω)α.19 All the demand of a firm’s output comes from the
representative consumer, implying that Yk(ω) = Ck(ω). The firm also hires
marketing labor Lka(ω) to increase the appeal according to
Φk(ω) = Qk(ω)Lka(ω)
β (1.9)
where β measures the returns to scale of marketing.
There are two determinants of firm appeal Φk(ω), which is product quality
Qk(ω) and marketing labor input Lka(ω). As documented by Bagwell (2007),
marketing helps the firms to attract the consumers and increase the firm ap-
peal, i.e., β > 0, but its effectiveness is diminishing, i.e., β < 1. With the
rise of information and communication technology, there are more channels for
firms to reach consumers. As I will discuss below, an increase in β would gener-
ate co-movement between MPCR-markup elasticity and aggregate marketing
intensity.
I assume the marginal product of marketing labor is higher for high Qk(ω)
firms. For a given level of appeal Φ, it is less costly for high-quality firms to
achieve. This assumption is crucial as firms can credibly signal their unob-
served quality via appeal.
In the model, firms engage in marketing for three reasons. Firstly, as consumers
cannot observe the quality of firms, firms engage in marketing to signal their
19In the model, the heterogeneity of firms comes from the quality variation instead of
productivity. This is consistent with recent literature that studies the sources of firm het-
erogeneity, see Hottman et al. (2016) for example.
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quality Qk(ω). Marketing provides information about the quality of the firms
which is consistent with the informative view of marketing.20 Secondly, even
without information frictions, marketing would increase the firm appeal Φk(ω)
as consumers prefer to consume a more appealing product. This corresponds to
the complementary view of marketing, where marketing enters utility directly
in a fashion that is complementary with the consumption of advertised prod-
uct.21 Lastly, spending on marketing helps the firm gain market power. Since
marketing conveys direct information about firm quality, it will determine the
firm size and hence markup distribution in the model.22
1.4.2 Complete information
Before analyzing the model with information frictions, I first solve the complete
information allocation. The intermediate firm in industry k with variety ω
maximizes the profit by choosing Φk(ω) and Pk(ω)
Πk(ω) = Pk(ω)Ck(ω)−WCk(ω) 1α −W
(
Φk(ω)
QK(ω)
) 1
β
(1.10)
subject to equation 1.7. The FOC implies
WCk(ω)
1
α
Pk(ω)Ck(ω)
=
WLkp(ω)
Pk(ω)Ck(ω)
=
α
µk(ω)
(1.11)
W
(
Φk(ω)
Qk(ω)
) 1
β
Pk(ω)Ck(ω)
=
WLka(ω)
Pk(ω)Ck(ω)
=
β(1− uk)
µk(ω)
(1.12)
where µk(ω) = εk(ω)εk(ω)−1 =
σ
σ−qk(ω)

σ
is markup for variety ω. The revenue share
of production labor for a firm in industry k with variety ω is the ratio between
output elasticity of production labor α and markup of the firm. On the other
hand, the revenue share of marketing labor also depends on the industry-
specific taste parameter uk. In industries where consumers value more of the
appeal of a product, the revenue share of marketing labor is higher. Combining
20The idea is first presented by Nelson (1974).
21As Stigler and Becker (1977) put it, when a firm advertises more, its product becomes
more attractive to the consumer, since “the household is made to believe - correctly or
incorrectly - that it gets a greater output of the commodity from a given input of the
advertised product.”
22Another view of marketing is the persuasive view, where marketing alters consumers’
tastes and creates spurious product differentiation. Bertrand et al. (2010) implement a field
experiment where a consumer lender sends direct-mail with randomized advertising content.
They find that the advertising content which contains no information, including a photo of
an attractive woman for instance, can significantly increase demand.
31
Figure 1.7: Quality, Firm Size and Markup
the two conditions, we can find that MPCR is not correlated with markup
within each industry
WLka(ω)
WLkp(ω)
=
β(1− uk)
α
. (1.13)
I summarize the results in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. When there is no information friction, within each industry,
the MPCR is a constant across firms and the MPCR-markup correlation is
zero.
Figure 1.7 illustrates the relationship between quality, firm size and markup
in the model. Within each industry, a higher quality firm would have a larger
relative size and higher markup. There is no misallocation of labor across ac-
tivities (between production and marketing). The only source of misallocation
comes from the markup dispersion as in the static model of Edmond et al.
(2018), where they use the same Kimball aggregator to study the welfare cost
of markup.23
1.4.3 Incomplete information
In an environment with incomplete information, higher quality firms are willing
to increase appeal in order to differentiate from low quality firms. The equi-
librium concept would be a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE). Intermediate
producers try to signal the quality of their products by using the joint signals
of price and appeal {Pk(ω),Φk(ω)}.24 Consumers cannot observe the quality
23In their setting, there is no information frictions in the product market and no role for
marketing. However, this chapter studies the role of marketing in a world with information
frictions.
24In addition to the appeal, I assume consumers observe firms’ prices, and the prices
will be used as an additional signal. Equivalently, firms can choose signals of quantity and
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of a variety, but could only observe the joint signals {Pk(ω),Φk(ω)}. They
form beliefs b (Pk(ω),Φk(ω)) and demand C (Pk(ω),Φk(ω)) units of output.25
Formally,
Definition 1. A PBE is a set of strategies for the consumers {C (Pk(ω),Φk(ω))}k,ω
and firms {Pk(ω),Φk(ω)}k,ω, and posterior beliefs {b (Pk(ω),Φk(ω))}k,ω such
that:
1. Intermediate firms choose joint signals {Pk(ω),Φk(ω)}k,ω to maximize
their profit,
2. Consumers choose demand {C (Pk(ω),Φk(ω))}k,ω to maximize aggregate
consumption,
3. b(Pk(ω),Φk(ω)) is derived from the equilibrium strategies using Bayes’
rule whenever possible.26
In the model, firms can credibly signal quality information since the single-
crossing property of profit function holds.27 Higher quality firms are willing to
increase marketing spending to signal their quality.
Lemma 1. With information frictions, the marginal rate of substitution of
signal Φk(ω) for demand Ck(ω) is strictly decreasing with quality of firms when
Pk(ω) >
1
α
WCk(ω)
1
α
−1.
Lemma 1 shows the slope of iso-profit curve is lower for high-quality firms in
the space of signal Φk(ω) and demand Ck(ω).28 Thus, it is possible for higher
quality firms to differentiate from lower quality firms by increasing appeal Φ
in return for an expansion of demand.
One drawback of PBE is flexibility in choosing the off-equilibrium beliefs, which
would result in multiplicity of equilibria. Thus, I focus on the least-cost sep-
arating equilibrium (LCSE). The LCSE is of particular interest because it is
appeal {Yk(ω),Φk(ω)}. Consumers form belief b (Yk(ω),Φk(ω)) after observing quantity and
appeal, and generate inverse demand function P (Yk(ω),Φk(ω)). Following the argument in
this section, the same LCSE can be established. Therefore, the allocation of resources across
firms and activities remain unchanged.
25The approach is drawn from Bagwell and Ramey (1988) and Bagwell (2007), where they
study a similar signaling game with multiple signals. However, their models are analytical
as there are only two types of firms, and they do not specify the demand side of the model.
26Beliefs are updated for signals on the equilibrium path.
27With multiple signals, the single-crossing condition will hold as long as the MRS of one
signal for response is strictly decreasing with quality. See Ramey (1996) for details.
28Since each firm produces one differentiated variety and exhibits some market power, a
profit-maximizing firm will always set price above marginal cost.
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unique and also the one selected when we use standard refinement tool.29,30
Suppose each firm draws their quality Qk(ω) from a quality grid Qn = exp(n∆)
for integers n ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}. In the LCSE, the lowest quality Q1 type firm
in each industry is “found out”. They would select signal {Pk(Q1),Φk(Q1)} to
maximize profit
Πk(Pk(Q1),Φk(Q1), b = Q1, Q1) (1.14)
The FOC implies same labor allocation as in equation 1.11 and 1.12.
Suppose {Pk(Qi),Φk(Qi)} have been specified for typeQi firms for i = 2, ..., n−
1. For type Qn firms, they will choose {Pk(Qn),Φk(Qn)} to maximize profit
Πk(Pk(Qn),Φk(Qn), b = Qn, Qn) (1.15)
subject to the incentive compatibility (IC) condition
Πk(Pk(Qi),Φk(Qi), b = Qi, Qi) ≥ Πk(Pk(Qn),Φk(Qn), b = Qn, Qi) (1.16)
where i ∈ {2, ...n − 1}. Given the cost structure of the model, the only IC
condition could potentially bind is the one for quality Qn−1. The intuition is
that if mimicking Qn firm is too costly for Qn−1 type, then it would be even
more costly to do so for lower quality firms.
The solution of LCSE gives rise to the following allocation
WCk(Qn)
1
α
Pk(Qn)Ck(Qn)
=
WLkp(Qn)
Pk(Qn)Ck(Qn)
=
α
µk(Qn)
(1.17)
W
(
Φk(Qn)
Qn
) 1
β
Pk(Qn)Ck(Qn)
=
WLka(Qn)
Pk(Qn)Ck(Qn)
=
β(1− uk)
µk(Qn)
Xk(Qn) (1.18)
where information distortion Xk(Qn) =
(
Q?kn
Qn
) 1
β ≥ 1 and Q?kn is the virtual
type of Qn in industry k. When the IC condition is binding for quality Qn
firms in industry k, they would choose an allocation that exactly as if there
were no information frictions, but her quality is higher. To see this point, we
rearrange equation 1.18 and find
W
(
Φk(Qn)
Q?kn
) 1
β
Pk(Qn)Ck(Qn)
=
β(1− uk)
µk(Qn)
(1.19)
29See Cho and Kreps (1987), Cho and Sobel (1990), and Ramey (1996) for example.
30LCSE also has a constrained efficiency property: among all the separating equilibria, it
involves the least separation cost due to signaling. Given the quality distribution of firms,
LCSE provides lower bound for the productivity losses due to information frictions.
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where Q?kn > Qn. Thus, the allocation is also refered as complete-information
distortion allocation in the literature.31 Comparing equation 1.18 and equation
1.12, the presence of information frictions distorts the labor allocation and
reallocate labor towards marketing. On the other hand, when the IC condition
is not binding for Qn firms, the virtual type would be the same as the quality
of the firm, i.e., the Qn firms allocate labor efficiently between activities.
Whether information frictions change the labor allocation depends on the value
of quality information for the consumers. Consider the case when uk is small.
Recall uk is the weight on the firm’s quality in taste shifter. In this case,
conditional on knowing the appeal Φ of each firm, quality information is of
little value to the consumer. Thus, even with information frictions, complete
information allocation is also LCSE. On the other hand, suppose uk is rela-
tively large, and quality information becomes valuable. Complete information
allocation would no longer be incentive-compatible, thus information frictions
lead to misallocation. Following lemma summarizes the results.32,33
Lemma 2. When quality gap ∆ is small, within each industry k, the complete
information allocation would (not) be incentive-compatible when the weight of
quality information uk is small (large).
Combining equation 1.17 and 1.18, the MPCR depends on the information
distortion
WLka(Qn)
WLkp(Qn)
=
β(1− uk)
α
Xk(Qn).
As demand becomes more and more inelastic for higher quality firms, the
incentive to mimic higher quality firms would be higher. Thus, for a given
industry, if the IC conditions are binding for lower quality firms, then they
will also be binding for higher quality firms, and information distortion X
increases with quality. Therefore, the MPCR would be positively correlated
with markup.
Proposition 2. Within each industry k, demand is less elastic for higher
quality firms. If Xk(Qi) > 1 and Qj > Qi, then Xk(Qj) > Xk(Qi) > 1. Thus,
31In Appendix, I show the derivation that LCSE has the feature of a complete-information
distortion allocation. Also see Ramey (1996) for complete-information distortion equilib-
rium.
32The proof of the lemma is established in Appendix.
33Size of ∆ is another determinant of whether the complete information allocation is
incentive-compatible. As ∆ becomes larger, the quality gap between the two types of firms
becomes larger. Mimicking a firm with much higher quality is too costly for the low-quality
firms. Thus, complete information allocation would be incentive-compatible.
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Figure 1.8: MPCR and markup: different returns to marketing
MPCR is positively correlated with markup
MPCRk(Qn) =
β(1− uk)
α
Xk(Qn) ∝ µk(Qn).
The positive MPCR-markup correlation established in Proposition 2 only de-
pends on fact that demand becomes less elastic for higher quality firms. Thus,
it is robust to alternative specifications of Kimball aggregator and other de-
mand systems such as the model with oligopolistic competition in Atkeson and
Burstein (2008).34
Figure 1.8 plots the MPCR and markup across firms within an industry con-
ditional on binding IC conditions. Firms with higher markup tend to spend
more on marketing, and the MPCR-markup elasticity is increasing with the re-
turns to marketing. The intuition is that when returns to marketing is higher,
mimicking higher quality firms becomes less costly. More intense signaling
competition among firms generates a larger dispersion of MPCR across firms
and thus a larger MPCR-markup elasticity.35
To sum up, when there are information frictions, firms spend on marketing to
signal their quality, which generates the positive correlation between MPCR
and markup. Technical changes that increase the returns to marketing would
lead to a rise of MPCR-markup elasticity and aggregate marketing intensity.
34The proof of Proposition 2 is established in Appendix.
35Since marketing spending is small compared to production cost, higher returns to mar-
keting only generate a small variation in markup dispersion.
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Besides, the existence of information frictions results in misallocation of la-
bor between activities compared to complete information allocation. Both the
MPCR-markup elasticity and the extent of misallocation depend on whether
the quality information is valuable for the consumer or not. If the consumer
only cares about the appeal of a product, then spending on marketing would
be efficient. However, if consumer cares about quality information, signaling
would result in misallocation of resources and generate co-movement between
MPCR-markup elasticity and returns to marketing technology. In the cal-
ibration section below, I use the distribution of marketing intensity across
industries to determine the size and variation of the importance of quality
information uk.
1.4.4 Resource allocation and aggregation productivity
So far I characterize the optimality conditions for each intermediate producer
in the LCSE. I can now derive an aggregate production function for this econ-
omy to show how the markup and information distortion determine aggregate
productivity. I will proceed in two steps: (i) within each industry k, combining
cross-sectional distribution of firm size qk(Qn) and the extent of information
frictions Xk(Qn) yields an industry-level production function, (ii) then I ag-
gregate industry-level production function to derive an aggregate production
function.
Suppose the joint distribution of {qk(Qn), Xk(Qn)} for each industry has been
solved. Let Mk(Qn) be the mass of firms with quality Qn in industry k.
Combining each intermediate firm’s choices yields an industry-level produc-
tion function which transforms industry-level labor input into industry-level
consumption Ck
Ck = ZkL
α
kpL
β(1−uk)
ka (1.20)
where Zk is industry-level efficiency, Lkp =
∑
n Lkp(Qn)Mk(Qn) is the industry-
level production labor input and Lka =
∑
n Lka(Qn)Mk(Qn) is the industry-
level marketing labor input. Let µk be industry-level markup and Xk is the
industry-level information distortion. Both of them are implicitly defined by
WLkp
PkCk
=
α
µk
(1.21)
WLka
PkCk
=
β(1− uk)Xk
µk
(1.22)
Some algebra shows industry-level markup µk and information distortion Xk
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are the production cost-weighted average of of firm level markup and informa-
tion distortion in industry k.36
µk =
∑
n
µk(Qn)
WLkp(Qn)
WLkp
Mk(Qn) (1.23)
Xk =
∑
n
Xk(Qn)
WLkp(Qn)
WLkp
Mk(Qn) (1.24)
Recall that qk(Qn) =
QnLka(Qn)
β(1−uk)Lkp(Qn)α
Ck
. Together with the optimality
condition of intermediate firms 1.17 and 1.18, industry-level efficiency is a
weighted firm level quality
Zk =
∑
n
(
qk(Qn)
Qn
) 1
α+β(1−uk)
(
Xk
Xk(Qn)
) β(1−uk)
α+β(1−uk)
Mk(Qn)
−(α+β(1−uk)) .
(1.25)
The weight on quailty Qn firms depends on relative size qk(Qn) and the disper-
sion of information distortion Xk(Qn). Given the industry-level labor input
Lkp and Lka, Zk summarizes how these inputs are allocated across produc-
ers. In a world with complete information, Xk
Xk(Qn)
= 1. Then industry-level
efficiency Zk only depends on the distribution of qk(Qn).
Then we move on to study the cross-industry allocation of labor. Given L
units of aggregate labor supply, together with equation 1.21 and 1.22, the
labor allocation follows
Lkp =
αµ−1k∑
k µ
−1
k (α + β(1− uk)Xk)
L = ψkpL (1.26)
Lka =
β(1− uk)Xkµ−1k∑
k µ
−1
k (α + β(1− uk)Xk)
L = ψkaL (1.27)
where industry-level labor allocation {ψkp, ψka} depends on markup µk, infor-
mation distortion Xk, and preference parameter uk. Compared to complete
information allocation, the existence of information frictions Xk results in mis-
allocation of labor across activities.
Combining industry-level production function and labor allocation rule, the
aggregate consumption is given as
C = ZLα+β(1−u) (1.28)
36Equivalently, the sales-weighted harmonic average of firm level markup and information
distortion.
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where u is the average weight of quality information for consumer, and 1− u
is the average weight of appeal. Aggregate returns to labor input, α + β(1 −
u), is the sum of returns to production labor (α) and returns to marketing
labor (β(1− u)). Z is aggregate productivity in the model which translates the
aggregate labor input L into aggregate consumption C
Z =
K∏
k=1
(
Zk(ψkp)
α(ψka)
β(1−uk)) 1K (1.29)
=
{
K∏
k=1
(Zk)
1
K
}{
K∏
k=1
(
(ψkp)
α(ψka)
β(1−uk)) 1K} . (1.30)
The aggregate productivity Z depends on two components. The first term
{∏Kk=1(Zk) 1K } is a geometric average of industry-level efficiency Zk. It sum-
marizes the between-firm allocative efficiency in the model. The second compo-
nent {∏Kk=1((ψkp)α(ψka)β(1−uk)) 1K } is also a geometirc average of industry-level
between-activity allocative efficiency. In the numerical section, I normalize
L = 1, then aggregate consumption would be identical to aggregate produc-
tivity.
Solution algorithm. From the aggregation results, the main challenge is to
find the joint distribution {qk(Qn), Xk(Qn)}. Once the within-industry alloca-
tion is solved, the cross-industry aggregation is straightforward.
Within each industry k, I first compute the complete information allocation
qCIk (Qn). From equation 1.11 and 1.12, together with the definition of qCIk (Qn),
we can find
Υ′(qCIk (Qn))q
CI
k (Qn)
µ(qCIk (Qn))
=
(
1
α
) α
α+β(1−uk)
(
1
β(1− uk)
) β(1−uk)
α+β(1−uk)
Bk
(
qCIk (Qn)
Qn
) 1
α+β(1−uk)
(1.31)
where Bk is an industry statistic
Bk =
W
PkD
−1
k
C
1
α+β(1−uk)
−1
k . (1.32)
Note in equation 1.31, Bk is the only unknown variable. Together with the
following Kimball aggregator, we can solve for Bk and hence qCIk (Qn)∑
n
Υ(qk(Qn))Mk(Qn) = 1. (1.33)
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With the complete information allocation, we move on to check whether this
allocation satisfies all the IC conditions. We start from the lowest quality Q1
with qCIk (Q1) and Xk(Q1) = 1. For n > 1, if Qn−1 has no incentives to mimic
Qn, then I let qk(Qn) = qCIk (Qn) and Xk(Qn) = 1. However, if instead Qn−1
has incentives to mimic Qn, then I compute qk(Qn) and Xk(Qn) using the
following conditions
Υ′(qk(Qn))qk(Qn)
µ(qk(Qn))
=
(
1
α
) α
α+β(1−uk)
(
1
β(1− uk)
) β(1−uk)
α+β(1−uk)
Bk
·
(
1
Xk(Qn)
) β(1−uk)
α+β(1−uk)
(
qk(Qn)
Qn
) 1
α+β(1−uk)
(1.34)
1 =
Υ′(qk(Qn))qk(Qn)
Υ′(qk(Qn−1))qk(Qn−1)
·
1− αµ(qk(Qn))−1 − β(1− uk)Xk(Qn)exp
(
∆
β
)
µ(qk(Qn))
−1
1− αµ(qk(Qn−1))−1 − β(1− uk)Xk(Qn−1)µ(qk(Qn−1))−1 (1.35)
Equation 1.34 is the counterpart of 1.31 when there are information frictions.
Equation 1.35 indicates a binding IC condition for two consecutive types. No-
tice the solution to this procedure will result in an incentive-compatible al-
location. We would repeat this procedure until we find an Bk that satisfies
1.33. With the joint distribution of {qk(Qn), Xk(Qn)}, we could compute all
the industry-level statistic µk, Xk, ψka and ψkp and hence the aggregate pro-
ductivity Z.
1.5 Calibration
In the model, the extent of information distortion depends on three sets of
parameters: (i) returns to scale of marketing technology β, (ii) the relative
importance of quality uk and (iii) the amount of quality dispersion in each
industry k. Following the literature, I assume the quality distribution Gk
follows a power-law distribution with tail parameter ξk.37
37Using the quality grid Qn = exp(n∆), I assume the probability density function of Gk
is given by gk(Qn) = Q
−(1+ξK )
n∑
nQ
−(1+ξK )
n
.
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In the data, I observe industry-level marketing intensity. Thus, if returns to
marketing β varies with uk across industries, we cannot separately estimate the
two. To this end, I impose one identification assumption: different industries
have access to a marketing technology with the same returns to scale, i.e., β is
constant across industries. Intuitively, in reality, firms in different industries
can use similar tools to do marketing. For instance, they could advertise their
products via TV or on the Internet.38 Then industry-level marketing intensity
depends on the nature of industry uk and the competitive environment within
the industry ξk.
1.5.1 Assigned parameters
Panel A of Table 1.1 reports the choices of assigned parameters. I first set
the returns to scale of production labor α = 0.9.39 For the superelasticity
parameter 
σ
, I use the benchmark estimate in Edmond et al. (2018), i.e.,

σ
= 0.14. To be consistent with the data on marketing, I assume there are 47
industries in the economy. Finally, I assume there is unit mass of firms within
each industry Mk =
∑
nMk(Qn) = 1. Then the only source of heterogeneity
across industries is the dispersion of {uk, ξk}.
1.5.2 Calibrated parameters
The remaining parameters are calibrated to match the data on marketing in-
tensity and firm size distribution in the mid-1990s.40 Specifically, I assume
the weight of quality information uk in each industry k is drawn from a Beta
distribution with shape parameter {ua, ub}, and the tail parameter of qual-
ity distribution ξk is drawn from a Log-normal distribution with parameter
{ξµ, ξσ}. Then I jointly estimate the parameters {β, ua, ub, ξµ, ξσ, σ} to match
a set of moment conditions documented in the data.41
38There are exceptions. For instance, legal restrictions are im-
posed on the marketing practice of tobacco products. See https://
truthinitiative.org/research-resources/tobacco-industry-marketing/
what-do-tobacco-advertising-restrictions-look-today. This concern is miti-
gated as our industry classification is broad. For example, tobacco belongs to industry
Food, beverage, and tobacco products.
39The model generates a profit rate of 19% for the benchmark calibration. In the mid-
1990s, the profit share measured by the ratio of net operating surplus to net value added is
around 18% for the US corporate sector.
40For the data on firm size distribution, I use earliest available data in 1998. See https:
//www.sba.gov/advocacy/firm-size-data.
41I set the step size of quality ladder ∆ = 0.02 in the calibration. In Appendix, I show
that a joint estimation of ∆ yields similar results.
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Table 1.1: Parameterization
Panel A: Assigned parameters
α returns to scale of production labor 0.9
ε
σ
superelasticity of Kimball aggregator 0.14
Panel B: Calibrated parameters
benchmark high µ high β
σ average elasticity 13.52 7.48 13.83
β returns to scale of marketing 0.054 0.056 0.071
ua shape parameter of Beta distr. uk 0.047 0.060 0.042
ub shape parameter of Beta distr. uk 0.009 0.012 0.010
ξµ location parameter of Lognormal distr. ξk 0.28 0.19 0.31
ξσ shape parameter of Lognormal distr. ξk 2.21 2.09 2.09
selected moments
marketing spending/GDP 0.03 0.03 0.04
aggregate markup, µ 1.15 1.25 1.15
Aggregate markup. First, the average elasticity σ is calibrated to aggregate
markup in the US. In the benchmark calibration, I set the aggregate markup
to 1.15, which is consistent with estimates in recent literature on markup.42
Distribution of relative payroll. The second set of moment conditions
involves the average and standard deviation of industry-level distribution of
relative payroll. For each 6-digit sector s, we have information for the firms in
about 4 employment-based size classes, which contains total payroll, number
of firms and total employment. Within the sector s, I define the relative payroll
as the ratio of the average payroll of firms in a given size class c to the average
payroll of all firms in the industry
rel_payrollc,s =
payrollc,s
Nc,s∑
c payrollc,s∑
cNc,s
where payrollc,s and Nc,s are the total payroll and number of firms for size
class c in industry s. I pool this statistic within the industry k.43 Then the
distribution of relative payroll within industry k is given as
Gk(rel_payroll < a) =
∑
c,s∈kNc,s · I(rel_payrollc,s < a)∑
c,s∈kNc,s
,
which corresponds to the fraction of firms within industry k with relative
42I choose the midpoint of estimates in recent literature on markup. See De Loecker et al.
(2018), Edmond et al. (2018) and Barkai (2017) for example.
43The industry-level corresponds to approximately 3 digit NAICS sector.
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payroll smaller than a. The distribution of relative payroll Gk is a measure
of firm size distribution for industry k. Intuitively, larger firms tend to have
larger relative payroll. Besides, if there is no size heterogeneity across firms
within each sector s, relative payroll would be one for all firms.
Panel A of Table 1.2 reports the average and standard deviation of industry-
level distribution of relative payroll in the data. On average, about 66% of
firms have relative payroll smaller than 0.5. About 82% of firms have payroll
less than the industry average payroll. A little more than 1% of firms have
payroll more than 10 times the industry average.44
Marketing intensity. The last set of moment conditions includes the aggre-
gate marketing intensity and dispersion of marketing intensity across indus-
tries. The aggregate marketing intensity is around 3 percent of GDP before
mid-1990s. Besides, Panel B of Table 1.2 shows that there is a large disper-
sion of marketing intensity across industries. For instance, the industry at 90
percentile of the distribution has a marketing intensity 80% higher than the
median. Additionally, there is more dispersion in the bottom half of the dis-
tribution. Median-to-bottom ratio p50
p10
is 40% higher than the top-to-median
ratio p90
p50
.
In the model, given the returns to scale of marketing technology, the dispersion
of marketing intensity is driven by the preference parameter uk and the quality
differentiation ξk. Figure 1.9 plots marketing intensity against uk and ξk. Two
observations can be made. Firstly, for the industry where the appeal is more
important (uk is smaller), marketing intensity is higher. Secondly, the impact
of ξk on marketing intensity depends on the level of uk. When uk is small,
complete information allocation would be incentive-compatible. Thus, there
is no signaling competition between firms and ξk affects marketing intensity
only through aggregate markup. A higher ξk implies fewer high-quality firms,
which would lower the aggregate markup, and hence marketing intensity is
higher. However, the magnitude of this channel is small. On the other hand,
when uk becomes larger, IC conditions become binding and the amount of
quality differentiation ξk matters. A higher ξk indicates an industry with more
homogeneous products, thus a lower level of marketing intensity.
Model fit. In Panel B of Table 1.1, I report the choices of calibrated param-
eters for the benchmark calibration. The average elasticity σ is 13.52 which
matches the aggregate markup of 1.15 exactly. The returns to scale of mar-
44In Edmond et al. (2018), they report the firm size distribution based on relative sales
in 2012 and find a similar pattern.
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Table 1.2: Moments
Panel A: Distribution of relative payroll
data benchmark high µ high β
avg fraction of firms with rel payroll
< 0.5 0.662 0.694 0.603 0.705
< 1 0.819 0.895 0.842 0.894
< 5 0.962 0.985 0.976 0.985
< 10 0.987 0.990 0.986 0.991
< 100 1 0.998 1 0.998
dispersion of firm size distr. across industry
< 1 0.133 0.110 0.112 0.116
< 5 0.019 0.009 0.014 0.009
< 10 0.008 0.006 0.010 0.006
Panel B: Dispersion of marketing intensity
data benchmark high µ high β
std dev 0.017 0.011 0.010 0.014
p50/p10 2.56 2.39 2.08 2.37
p90/p50 1.79 1.42 1.32 1.42
(p50/p10)/(p90/p50) 1.43 1.68 1.57 1.67
Figure 1.9: Illustration: uk, ξk and marketing intensity
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keting is equal to 0.054 which reproduces aggregate marketing intensity of 3
percent.
For the Lognormal distribution of ξk, the location parameter ξµ and shape
parameter ξσ are calibrated to 0.28 and 2.21. Panel A of Table 1.2 shows that
the model could match the average and dispersion of industry-level distribution
of relative payroll in the data. For example, in the benchmark calibration, on
average about 1% of firms have payroll larger than 10 times of industry average.
Across industries, the standard deviation of fraction of firms with relative
payroll smaller than industry average is 0.11. In the data, the corresponding
moments are 1.3% and 0.133 respectively.
The shape parameters of Beta distribution are calibrated to ua = 0.047 and
ub = 0.009, which implies the average of uk is close to 1 and there is large
dispersion in uk across industries.45 Panel B of Table 1.2 compares the model-
generated dispersion of marketing intensity across industries with the data.
The model can capture the large dispersion of marketing intensity across indus-
tries. For instance, in the model, marketing intensity of the median industry is
about 2.4 times of the industry at 10 percentile, where the median-to-bottom
ratio is 2.56 in the data.
Finally, in Table 1.1 and 1.2, two alternative sets of calibration results are
reported. I re-calibrate the model to match an aggregate markup of 1.25 and an
aggregate marketing intensity of 4% separately. Compared to the benchmark
calibration, the high-markup calibration generates larger dispersion in firm size
distribution and smaller variation in marketing intensity.
1.6 Results
In this section, I present the main quantitative results. Section 1.6.1 compares
the model-generated elasticity between MPCR and markup with the data. The
calibrated model can generate a similar level of MPCR-markup elasticity and
its co-movement with aggregate marketing intensity.
In section 1.6.2, I evaluate to what extent access to marketing can undo the in-
formation frictions. Compared to complete information allocation, information
frictions reduce productivity by about 3 percent. Higher returns to marketing
45For Beta distribution, E[u] = uaua+ub and var[u] =
k
(k+1)2[(k+1)ub+1]
where k = uaub .
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Table 1.3: MPCR-markup elasticity
Data benchmark high µ high β
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log( XAD
COGS
) log(WLa
WLp
) log(WLa
WLp
) log(WLa
WLp
)
log(markup) 1.393*** 1.673*** 1.171*** 1.751***
(0.079) (0.117) (0.073) (0.116)
Notes: First column reports the regression results from the Compustat data for the data be-
fore 1995. For second column onwards, I report the regression results from model-generated
data, where I randomly draw 470 industries. I apply industry-year FE for the Compus-
tat data and industry FE for the model-generated data. Standard errors are clustered at
industry-year or industry level and listed in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, ***
p < 0.001.
Table 1.4: Co-movement between MPCR-markup elasticity and aggregate
marekting intensity
Change in β 0 ↑ 10% ↑ 20% ↑ 30%
MPCR-markup elasticity
benchmark 1.67 1.73 1.79 1.84
high µ 1.17 1.22 1.26 1.30
high β 1.75 1.81 1.87 1.93
implied marketing intensity, percentage
benchmark 3.00 3.29 3.58 3.86
high µ 3.02 3.32 3.62 3.90
high β 4.04 4.41 4.77 5.11
fuel the signaling competition and generate larger losses.46 In section 1.6.3,
I discuss the impact of marketing on aggregate productivity. The gains from
quality information revealed by marketing tend to dominate the loss due to
markup dispersion.
1.6.1 MPCR-markup elasticity
I begin with MPCR-markup elasticity. Since information concerning the elas-
ticity pattern is not utilized in the calibration process, we could compare the
model-generated MPCR-markup elasticity with the data.
The first column of Table 1.3 shows the correlation pattern between MPCR
and markup in the data. If markup increases by one percent, MPCR would
rise by approximately 1.4 percent. From the second column onwards, I report
46I compare the allocation in LCSE with complete information allocation for different
levels of returns to marketing β. Technical changes that increase returns to marketing can
generate positive welfare impact by reallocating resources towards higher quality firms.
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the regression results from model-generated data. The level of elasticity varies
across different calibrations. A one percent increase in markup is associated
with a 1.17 to 1.75 percent increase in MPCR. The calibrated model with
higher returns to marketing tends to have a higher elasticity. When marketing
is less costly, high-quality firms would spend more on marketing to differentiate
from lower-quality firms. This channel would result in a larger dispersion in
MPCR for a given amount of markup dispersion. On the other hand, the
calibrated model with higher markup tends to have a lower elasticity. The
level of information distortion is not sensitive to the change in average markup
whereas the markup dispersion is. Thus, with a larger dispersion in markup,
the MPCR-markup elasticity becomes smaller.
Then I investigate whether the model could generate the co-movement between
MPCR-markup elasticity and aggregate marketing intensity as in the data.
In Table 1.4, I illustrate how the aggregate marketing intensity and MPCR-
markup elasticity evolve with changes in returns to marketing β. Across three
parameterizations of the model, higher returns to marketing increase the mar-
keting intensity and MPCR-markup elasticity simultaneously. Therefore, the
model could generate the co-movement pattern shown in the data. However,
the model cannot match the level of increase in the MPCR-markup elasticity.
A 30 percent increase in returns of marketing technology increases the MPCR-
markup elasticity by about 10 percent in the model, whereas the increase is
about 25 percent in the data.47
1.6.2 Can access to marketing undo information frictions?
I next evaluate the productivity losses due to information frictions by compar-
ing the allocation in LCSE and corresponding complete information allocation.
In Table 1.5, I show the percentage losses in aggregate productivity due to in-
formation frictions. In the benchmark calibration, the existence of information
frictions results in a 2.7 percent loss in productivity. This figure becomes larger
for the alternative set of calibrations.
In the model, aggregate productivity could be decomposed into two compo-
nents — a between-firm component and a between-activity component. The
between-firm component summarizes the allocative efficiency of marketing la-
bor and production labor across firms, whereas the between-activity component
summarizes the allocative efficiency of marketing labor and production labor in
47This is from comparing the elasticity before and after 1995.
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Table 1.5: Percentage losses of aggregate productivity
benchmark high µ high β
compared to complete information
log(Z/ZCI) ∗ 100 -2.669 -2.990 -3.345
between-activity -2.668 -2.988 -3.343
between-firm -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
compared to first best
log(Z/Z?) ∗ 100 -3.093 -3.806 -3.790
Table 1.6: Decomposition of between-firm component
benchmark high µ high β
compared to complete information
between-firm -0.0018 -0.0024 -0.002
change qk(Qn) 0.0003 0.0004 0.0006
change Xk(Qn) -0.0021 -0.0028 -0.0027
the aggregate. Across all sets of calibration, we find the loss is almost entirely
driven by the between-activity component. As equation 1.25 and 1.29 show,
the between-firm component is a geometric mean of industry efficiency which
depends on joint distribution of firm size and information distortion. Then I
could further decompose the between-firm component into the change in rela-
tive size and the change in information distortion. Conceptually, the presence
of information frictions would have two counteracting effects on the between-
firm component. The first effect is that it will reallocate market share towards
high-quality firms and increase industry-level efficiency Zk. On the other hand,
it will also imply a dispersion of Xk
Xk(Qn)
and hence lower the industry-level ef-
ficiency. The small loss could be a result of these two opposite forces.
Table 1.6 illustrates the results of the decomposition. In the first row of the
table, I report the same productivity losses due to between-firm component
as in Table 1.5. In the second and third row, I compute the hypothetical
between-firm component of aggregate productivity by changing Xk
Xk(Qn)
and
qk(Qn) separately. We can find that both of these two channels have small
impact on productivity compared to complete information allocation. Since
markup is a deterministic function of qk(Qn), the low level of reallocation also
suggests that the presence of information frictions cannot lead to a sizable
change in the markup distribution.
Given that information frictions lead to sizable productivity losses, how does
the loss depend on returns to marketing? The upper panel of Table 1.7 shows
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Table 1.7: Productivity losses and rising returns of marketing
Change in β 0 ↑ 10% ↑ 20% ↑ 30%
productivity loss compared to complete info
benchmark -2.669 -2.928 -3.178 -3.418
high µ -2.990 -3.283 -3.567 -3.841
high β -3.345 -3.637 -3.916 -4.183
implied marketing intensity, percentage
benchmark 3.00 3.29 3.58 3.86
high µ 3.00 3.30 3.59 3.88
high β 4.04 4.41 4.77 5.11
that the productivity losses become larger with higher β. A 30% increase in
β leads to more than 20% increase in productivity losses. Intuitively, higher
returns to marketing imply that it is easier for lower quality firms to mimic
high-quality firms. Therefore, high-quality firms would spend more on market-
ing to differentiate themselves, which results in more resource misallocation.
One thing to note is that I evaluate the productivity losses from information
frictions by comparing the allocation in LCSE with complete information al-
location for different returns to marketing β. However, technical changes that
increase returns to marketing can generate positive impact on productivity by
reallocating resources to higher quality firms.48
1.6.3 The impact of marketing on aggregate productivity
So far, I compare the LCSE with the complete information allocation and
find that information frictions result in a sizable loss in productivity. In this
section, I study the impact of marketing on aggregate productivity where I
compare the LCSE with an allocation that quality information is not revealed.
The model suggests that in a world without marketing, the channel to convey
the quality information is not available. The excessive spending on market-
ing, however, provides useful information concerning the firm’s quality to the
consumer. Thus, this channel is usually interpreted as signalling-efficiency
channel (Bagwell, 2007). On the other hand, the revealed information results
in markup dispersion and hence resource misallocation between firms. To this
48Higher returns to marketing also generate a negative productivity effect on between-
activity component. Consider a one-industry model with no information frictions, the
between-activity component is
(
α
α+β(1−u)
)α (
β(1−u)
α+β(1−u)
)β(1−u)
, which is decreasing with β.
Besides, there is an additional scale effect Lα+β(1−u). The gains from scale effect would
dominate the loss from the between-activity component when L is large enough.
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Table 1.8: Productivity gains from marketing
benchmark high µ high β
compared to no information allocation
log(Z/ZNI) ∗ 100 98.85 71.57 102.86
end, I consider an alternative allocation when quality information is not avail-
able. Specifically, within each industry, I impose the restriction that all firms
have to deliver the same level of appeal. The consumer infers that each variety
is of industry-average level quality. I label this allocation as no-information
allocation.49
Table 1.8 presents the comparison between the benchmark calibration with
the no-information allocation. The gains from marketing are huge — almost
100 percentage points. It becomes larger if it involves a larger firm size dis-
persion when information reveals. Consider a CES aggregator ( = 0) for
an intuition. Firm sales are proportionate to Q
1−1/σ
1−(1−1/σ)(α+β(1−u)) when there is
complete information. Higher returns to marketing generate more dispersion
in firm size. Thus the no-information allocation that equates size for different
quality firms is more costly. On the contrary, higher markup (lower σ) reduces
the size dispersion and hence the no-information allocation is less costly.
Quality information also generates a negative impact on productivity, which
is resource misallocation due to markup dispersion. However, as shown in the
last row of Table 1.5, loss from markup dispersion is small. The gains from
quality information dominate the loss from markup dispersion.
The model could over-estimate the gains from marketing for many reasons.
Firstly, it assumes there is no quality information available for every indus-
try. As Nelson (1974) noted, industries are different in terms of the nature of
goods/services produced. For some industries (search goods), the quality of
a good can be determined before purchase. For other industries (experience
goods), the quality can only be evaluated after consumption. Thus, we should
expect different industries to have different degrees of information frictions.
For industries with low extent of information frictions, access to marketing
49When the appeal Φ?k is fixed within each industry, each firm would produce the same
amount of output Y ?k . The quality of each variety reveals only after consumption. Prior
to consumption, there is no source of quality information for consumers and consumers
infer each variety is of industry-average quality. I consider the no-information allocation as
the allocation that maximizes the prior-consumption utility of consumer and participation
constraints of firms hold. Note this may not be a pooling equilibrium in our setting. A
pooling equilibrium also needs to satisfy the IC condition for the lowest quality firms.
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provides no additional quality information to the consumers. Then the gains
from marketing would become lower. Secondly, LCSE implies a minimum loss
in the process of information revelation. The deviation from LCSE would lower
the gains from marketing. Thirdly, as in Edmond et al. (2018), markup is only
related to firm size (quality) in the model. If marketing generates dispersion
in the markup which is not related to size (quality) then it would involve a
larger loss from misallocation.
There are many other channels that marketing could increase productivity be-
yond the mechanism in the model. For example, marketing could allow firms
to reach customers and inform them of the existence of a firm (Arkolakis,
2010). It is not possible to study all of them within a single framework. Nev-
ertheless, the result remains as one of the first attempts to study the question
quantitatively.
1.7 Implication and Discussion
In this section, I discuss some of the model’s implications. First of all, the
model sheds light on the recent debate of the rise of aggregate markup in the
economy. If I estimate the aggregate markup as the cost-weighted one in the
model, the aggregate markup is virtually flat since the late 1980s. The same
is true for the markup distribution. Consistent with data, a rise of returns to
marketing cannot generate sizable changes in the markup distribution in the
model.
Secondly, using cross-country data on marketing spending, Corrado and Hao
(2014a) document a positive correlation between media advertising intensity
and the level of economic development. Besides, for a given level of advertising
intensity, there is a considerable variation of income per capita across countries.
Our model provides a framework to understand these two phenomena.
Lastly, I show that the MPCR-markup elasticity only depends on the aggregate
returns of marketing technology. Thus, using a fraction of marketing spending
to measure MPCR would generate identical results in terms of level of the
elasticity and its co-movement with aggregate marketing intensity.
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1.7.1 Trend of market power in the data
In the model, aggregate markup that matters for resource allocation and pro-
ductivity is production-cost weighted firm-level markup
µ =
∑
k,n
µk(Qn)
WLkp(Qn)
WLp
Mk(Qn).
I then examine how a rise in returns to marketing affects aggregate markup
and markup distribution in the economy.
Table 1.9 shows the aggregate markup and distribution of markup in the model.
The rising returns to marketing alone cannot generate a sizable change in the
markup distribution. Figure 1.10 shows the trend of market power in the US
since 1980. Two aggregate markups are reported. We can see that the sales-
weighted one keeps increasing since 1980 whereas the cost-weighted one flattens
out. Thus, whether there is a rise in the aggregate markup since late 1980s
crucially depends on the way we aggregate firm-level markup. Figure 1.11
presents the cost-weighted markup distribution. A similar trend is observed
that since the late 1980s, the markup distribution becomes stable.
The model cannot generate the rapid rise of sales-weighted markup. De Loecker
et al. (2018) decompose the rise of sales-weighted markup and find that the
rise of sales-weighted markup is driven by reallocation component since late
1980s.50 This observation poses a challenge on using the models with variable
markups to explain the rise of markup since reallocation of sales generally
indicates a reallocation of production cost as well. Thus, sales-weighted and
cost-weighted markup tend to move in the same direction.
1.7.2 Marketing and economic development
Marketing spending is correlated with the level of economic development. Fig-
ure 1.12 plots the media advertising intensity against GDP per capita for
multiple countries from 1981 to 2011. Two observations can be made from the
figure. Firstly, advertising intensity is positively correlated with income level
across countries, and for a given country, it increases along the path of eco-
nomic development. Secondly, there is a considerable variation in the income
level for a given level of advertising intensity.
50Using Census data in the US, Autor et al. (2017) document the rise of aggregate markup
if firm-level markups are aggregated using value-added as weights.
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Figure 1.10: Aggregate markup trend in Compustat data
Figure 1.11: Markup dispersion in Compustat data
Table 1.9: Aggregate markup and markup distribution
Increase in β 0 ↑ 10% ↑ 20% ↑ 30%
cost-weighted markup distribution
aggregate markup 1.1522 1.1525 1.1528 1.1530
p25 markup 1.0856 1.0857 1.0858 1.0860
p50 markup 1.1462 1.1465 1.1468 1.1471
p75 markup 1.1939 1.1941 1.1943 1.1946
p90 markup 1.2429 1.2434 1.2439 1.2445
sales-weighted markup distribution
aggregate markup 1.1566 1.1569 1.1572 1.1575
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Figure 1.12: Advertising and economic development
Source: Figure 5 in Corrado and Hao (2014b).
In the model, aggregate marketing intensity is given by
WLa
PC
=
∑
k β(1− uk)Xk WLkpWLp
µ
,
which depends on four elements. The first one is the returns to scale of market-
ing β. Along the process of economic development and technology adoption,
new channels and platforms for marketing emerge, which increase the returns
to marketing activities. The second component is production-cost share of each
industry WLkp
WLp
. Since appeal tends to be more important for service industries,
structural transformation that reallocates resources towards services would
increase the aggregate marketing intensity. Thirdly, aggregate marketing in-
tensity is negatively correlated with aggregate markup in the economy. Lastly,
the country with more intense signaling competition, i.e., higher Xk, tends to
spend more on marketing. Therefore, given the returns to marketing activi-
ties, a high-income country that produces high-quality products could have a
relatively low level of marketing intensity due to a higher level of markup or
lack of competition among firms.
1.7.3 Marketing vs Advertising
In the firm-level data, I use advertising expenses to measure the marketing ex-
pense of the firm. Given there is a shift of marketing practices from Outbound
marketing towards Inbound marketing, the advertising intensity is actually de-
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creasing since 2000. In this section, I show that using a fraction of marketing
spending to measure MPCR would generate exactly the same cross-sectional
elasticity pattern with markup. Thus, this measurement issue will not affect
the results on the MPCR-markup elasticity and its co-movement with aggre-
gate marketing intensity.
Suppose appeal is produced by combining two elements of marketing input
using a Cobb-Douglas production function: Φ = QMβ where M = Lχa1L
1−χ
a2 .51
Then the cost function of appeal is given by C(Φ) = W
χχ(1−χ)1−χ
(
Φ
Q
) 1
β
=
WLa1 + WLa2 = WLa. The presence of two components within marketing
function implies a level shift in the cost function of Φ. If we re-do the algebra
in the modeling section, this shift has no impact on the distribution of firm
size q and the extent of information distortion X. Intuitively, the level shift
of the cost function of appeal will not change either the dispersion of sales
across firms or the incentive to mimic other firms. Even if we use a fraction of
marketing spending to measure MPCR, the MPCR-markup elasticity depends
only on the information distortion X, which is determined by the aggregate
returns of marketing technology β. Thus, measuring MPCR using advertising
expense would result in an identical level of MPCR-markup elasticity
WLa1(Qn)
WLp(Qn)
=
χβ(1− u)
α
X(Qn).
Similarly, for the co-movement pattern, the change of χ within marketing
technology is irrelevant for both the MPCR-markup elasticity and aggregate
marketing intensity.
1.8 Conclusion
Empirically, this chapter documents that (i) aggregate marketing intensity in
the US increased sharply around the mid-1990s, (ii) there is a positive corre-
lation between firm-level MPCR and markup, (iii) the cross-sectional MPCR-
markup elasticity co-moves closely with aggregate marketing intensity.
To explain these facts, I develop a model with heterogeneous firms and en-
dogenous variable markups where firms engage in marketing to signal their
quality. The existence of information frictions generates a positive correlation
between MPCR and markup. Technical changes that increase the returns to
51Same argument goes through with CES production function.
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marketing fuel the signaling competition and generate co-movement between
MPCR-markup elasticity and aggregate marketing intensity. I use the cali-
brated model to quantify the impact of marketing and information frictions on
aggregate productivity. Firstly, I find that access to marketing cannot undo
the information frictions completely. Compared to complete information allo-
cation, information frictions reduce the productivity by about 3 percent, and
the loss increases with returns to marketing. Moreover, the quality information
revealed by marketing can generate substantial gains in productivity.
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1.9 Appendix
1.9.1 Measurement of marketing spending
I estimate marketing spending in the US since 1987 using data from different
sources. The marketing expenditure consists of three components: advertising
expenses, purchased marketing research and marketing consulting services, and
marketing labor compensation. I estimate these three components separately
and add them up to estimate the total marketing spending in the US.
Advertising expenses. Advertising expense data are extracted from IRS
tax data, both at the industry-level and aggregate level. For the aggregate
level, the advertising expenses are reported by the legal form of organizations,
including corporations, sole proprietors and partnerships. For partnerships,
there is no advertising data available and it is estimated using data on business
receipts. I take a conservative view to estimate the advertising expense for the
partnerships using the advertising intensity of sole proprietors, which is lower
than that of corporations.
IRS also reports the advertising expense at the major industry-level, approx-
imately 3-digit NAICS level. The data before 1998 are reported using SIC
code. I harmonize the industry code by using the SIC and NAICS crosswalk.52
Marketing research and consulting. The second component of marketing
spending is purchased marketing research and marketing consulting services.
The total spending on those activities is estimated using the revenue of the
corresponding industries, specifically NAICS 541613 for marketing consulting
services and NAICS 541910 for marketing research. The aggregate revenue
of these two industries are estimated using survey-based measures from the
Service Annual Survey (SAS).
Note that SAS only reports the estimated revenue for the management con-
sulting sector (NAICS 54161) as a whole. The revenue of marketing consulting
services is estimated using the employment share of NAICS 541613, which is
available from County Business Patterns (CBP) from 1998 onwards.53 Ad-
ditionally, the SAS data after 1998 is based on employer firms, whereas the
data before 1998 covers both employer and nonemployer firms. The revenue of
52I construct the SIC-NAICS crosswalk using https://www.bls.gov/ces/sic2tonaics.
htm and https://www.bls.gov/cew/datatoc.htm.
53Available at https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cbp/data/datasets.
html.
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nonemployer firms is estimated using employment share from CBP and receipts
from Nonemployer statistics program.54 Finally, to estimate the industry-level
purchase of the output from these two industries, I use the 2002 benchmark
input-output table.
Marketing labor compensation. The last component of marketing spend-
ing is the own-account component, where the own-account component is mea-
sured by the compensation of marketing workers. I first identify a list of
marketing occupations and then estimate the labor compensation associated
with those marketing occupations for each industry.
Specifically, the labor compensation is estimated using a two-step approach.
In the first step, I use the RAS method to estimate the employment by occu-
pation and industry, where I treat CPS employment data by occupation as row
totals and BEA/BLS industry employment as column totals.55 Then I convert
the employment by industry and occupation to compensation using relative
CPS wage by occupation controlled by industry-level compensation data. As
a result, the aggregate compensation I compute is consistent with the data
published by BEA.
Table 1.10 shows the list of occupations that is marketing related. The oc-
cupations code is based on OCC2010 from IPUMS CPS. Figure 1.13 breaks
down three components of the marketing expenditure. Although advertising
expenses are the largest among all three components, its importance is dimin-
ishing over time. The increase of marketing labor compensation and marketing
service contribute to most of the rise since the mid-1990s. The diminishing
importance of advertising reflects the shift in the marketing practices of the
firms — from Outbound towards Inbound.
I follow the approach in Corrado and Hao (2014a) to construct marketing
spending by aggregating data from different sources. I discuss the potential
double-counting problem and how I deal with it in my measure. The advertis-
ing expenses available from IRS contain only direct promotional expenses that
are purchased from other firms and industries. It will include the purchased
services by the advertising industries (NAICS 5418). The IRS advertising
expenses should not include the purchased marketing consulting and market
research services as they are not direct promotional expenses and should be
recorded elsewhere in the tax returns.60 In addition, despite the fast growth
54https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/nonemployer-statistics/data/
datasets.html. For the data before 1998 with SIC code, I construct the comparable series.
55I use the IPUMS-CPS data as the initial value for each cell.
60See the discussion of tax breaks on market research at https://smallbusiness.chron.
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Table 1.10: Marketing occupations
Occupations occ2010
managers in marketing, advertising, and public relations 30
meeting and convention planners 72056
market research analysts and marketing specialists 73057
web developers 100058
database administrators 1060
market researchers 180059
public relations specialists 2825
technical writers 2840
writers and authors 2850
media and communication workers, nec 2860
broadcast and sound engineering technicians and radio operators,
and media and communication equipment workers, all other 2900
photographers 2910
television, video, and motion picture camera operators and editors 2920
customer service representatives 5240
Notes: The marketing occupation listed is primarily adopted from Corrado and Hao (2014a).
Occupations are based on OCC2010 from Ipums CPS data. I estimate the marketing com-
pensation for the private, non-media and non-marketing related industries, which exclude
BEA industry 38, 39, 50, 59. For occupation 720, 730, 1000, 1800, those occupation groups
contain non-marketing occupations. Specifically, fundraiser is a sub-category of occupation
720; market research analysts and marketing specialists is a sub-category of occupation 730;
web developers is a sub-category of occupation 1000; market researchers is a sub-category
of occupation 1800. I estimate the share of marketing related compensation within these
groups using the BLS/OES data from 2012 to 2017 where data for those sub-categories are
available.
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Figure 1.13: Marketing expenditure decomposition since 1987
Notes: This figure shows a decomposition of aggregate marketing intensity in US since
1987, where aggregate marketing expenditure is the sum of advertising expense, purchased
marketing service and marketing labor compensation
of the marketing consulting and marketing research component, Figure 1.13
shows its contribution to the rising aggregate marketing intensity is limited.
Besides, the IRS advertising expenses do not include own-account market-
ing labor compensation as it is recorded as salaries of employees in the tax
records. However, there is a potential double-counting problem as market-
ing labor compensation in the media and marketing related industries may
already be counted as purchased advertising expenses for other industries. To
avoid this double-counting problem, I only estimate the marketing labor com-
pensation for the private, non-agricultural, non-media, non-marketing related
industries.
In Figure 1.14, I show the aggregate marketing intensity and its within-industry
component for both IT-intensive and non IT-intensive industries. For the IT-
intensive industries, the within-industry component of aggregate marketing
intensity increased by about 25% from 1994 to 2007. On the other hand, the
same intensity only increased by about 15% for non IT-intensive industries.
Thus, the result suggests the rise of aggregate marketing intensity is related
to the information technology.
com/tax-breaks-market-research-34403.html.
60
Figure 1.14: Aggregate marketing intensity: IT intensive vs non IT-intensive
(a) IT-intensive (b) non IT-intensive
Notes: The left (right) panel shows aggregate marketing intensity and its within-industry
component for IT-intensive (non IT-intensive) industries. The IT intensity of each industry
is measured by the ratio between IT investment and total investment. I take the yearly
average of the IT investment ratio in the 1980s and classify industries according to this
measure. Industry-level investment data is available through BEA.
1.9.2 Firm-level data and markup estimation
I use the Compustat Fundamental Annual file for the firm-level data, where I
observe sales, capital stock information, operating expenses, and industry clas-
sification. The choice of data is driven by two reasons. First, the Compustat
data covers a wide range of sectors over a substantial period of time. Besides,
it reports detailed components of the firm’s operating expenses, which allows
for the estimation of markup and marketing spending.
Markup estimation. I use the production-based approach in De Loecker
and Warzynski (2012) to identify markups. The advantage of the production
approach is that we only have to assume cost minimization for each firms. It
does not require researchers to specify how the firms are competing and make
assumptions on demand structure.
µit = θ
v
it · (αvit)−1 (1.36)
where µit is the markup, θvit is the output elasticity of variable input, and αvit is
the revenue share of variable input. The revenue share αvit is readily available
from the data, and we have to estimate the output elasticity of variable input
θvit. Following De Loecker et al. (2018), I consider COGS as the variable input.
To estimate the θvit, we consider an industry-specific production function
qit = f(kit, vit; θ) + ωit + it (1.37)
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where qit measures the logarithm of firm’s output, vit is the logarithm of COGS,
kit is the logarithm of capital stock, ωit is the logarithm of productivity, and it
is the unanticipated shock or classical measurement error in output. Then out-
put elasticity is measured as θvit =
∂f(kit,vit;θ)
∂v
. I consider two production func-
tion specifications. For the benchmark results, I consider an industry-specific
Cobb-Douglas production function, i.e., f = θkkit + θvvit. I also estimate an
industry-specific translog production function as a robustness check.61
Since the productivity ωit is unobserved, OLS estimation involves the endo-
geneity of regressors. I use the standard two-stage approach to estimate the
production function. In the first stage, the measurement error and unantici-
pated shocks to output are purged. Specifically, I calculate predicted real sales
qˆit using a non-parametric regression
qit = φ(kit, vit) + it
where φ = f+h(k, v) and h is the control function.62 Suppose the productivity
follows an AR(1) process ωit = ρωit−1 + ζit, where residual ζit captures con-
temporaneous productivity shock. In the second stage, I estimate coefficient
of production function θ using moment conditions:
E[ζit(θ)Zit] = 0
where ζit(θ) is obtained as the residual when projecting ωit(θ) on its lag
ωit−1(θ), ωit = qˆit − f(kit, vit; θ), and Zit includes kit, vit−1 and all its in-
teraction terms. The identifying assumption is that lagged input choice (vit−1)
and predetermined capital stock (kit) are independent to the contemporaneous
productivity shock ζit.
To estimate the production function, I download the Fundamental Annual
Compustat file from WRDS for the period between 1950 and 2017. I exclude
observations with negative or missing values in sales, COGS, operating ex-
penses, or gross plants, property, and equipment (PPE). I use NAICS code
reported in the data to generate the industry classification that is consistent
with BEA 65 industry classification.63 Firms with missing industry codes are
61I also consider a three-input version of production function where I add SGA as an input
of production function. The empirical facts are also robust to this three-input production
function.
62We could use the control function h to control for the endogeneity of productivity under
the assumption that a firm’s demand for variable input is an invertible function of the firm’s
productivity and capital stock.
63The industry code is at 3-digit NAICS level, which is available at https://apps.bea.
gov/national/FA2004/Details/xls/detailnonres_stk1.xlsx.
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dropped. All financial variables are deflated with the appropriate deflators.64
The resulting sample contains 227,287 observations that span from 1951 to
2017. I use this sample to estimate the industry-level production function and
markup of firms.
Advertising spending. I use the advertising spending reported by Compus-
tat as a proxy for firm-level marketing spending. Ptok et al. (2018) document
that the advertising spending reported by the Compustat is highly correlated
with total marketing spending of firms.65 Therefore, I consider the advertising
spending as a valid proxy to study the cross-sectional relationship between
markup and MPCR. To be consistent with the data on aggregate marketing
spending, I consider the sample between 1987 and 2013, which leaves 141,092
observations in the sample. I further restrict the sample by keeping obser-
vations with non-missing values in advertising spending, which leaves 46,260
observations. It is the sample that I use to establish the relationship between
markup and MPCR.66
1.9.3 Marketing as a fixed cost
Marketing spending is counted as a fixed cost in this chapter. I document
two empirical facts regarding the relationship between MPCR and markup.
Firstly, I find that firms with higher markups tend to have higher MPCR, i.e.,
they spend more on marketing relative to production. Secondly, I find the
cross-sectional elasticity between MPCR and markup becomes larger since the
mid-1990s, which co-moves with aggregate marketing intensity closely.
During the sample period, we also observe a rise of fixed cost, where fixed
cost is measured by SGA expenses.67 Figure 1.19 shows the trend of elasticity
between SGA-production cost ratio and markup over time. Although firms
with higher markup tend to have a higher fixed cost share, the SGA-production
cost ratio does not become more sensitive to changes in markup.
64Following Traina (2018), I deflate the sales and COGS using the GDP deflator and
construct real capital stock using the perpetual inventory method. In addition, within a
given firm, missing observations of sales, COGS, operating expenses, gross PPE, and net
PPE are interpolated using their neighboring values.
65Ptok et al. (2018) acquire firm-level total marketing spending from an alternative data
source (Advertising Age), and find that the correlation between advertising spending re-
ported by the Compustat and the total marketing spending is about 0.8.
66Among the observations with non-missing values in advertising spending, 45,502 obser-
vations have positive advertising spending.
67The rise of SGA’s share in sales and operating expenses are documented by many
researchers. See De Loecker et al. (2018) and Traina (2018) for example. Marketing spending
is only a small fraction of SGA expenses of firms. See section 1.9.6.
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Intuitively, if technology has changed over time to induce a higher fixed cost
of operation, firms will increase the markup to avoid making losses. However,
this only implies a positive correlation between fixed cost share and markup
and does not necessarily induce a stronger elasticity between fixed cost share
and markup. In addition, Figure 1.6 and 1.19 highlight the difference between
marketing spending and total fixed cost, and suggest that the model used to
explain the co-movement pattern should work for marketing but not fixed cost
as a whole.
I develop a model where firms spend on marketing to signal their quality.
Technical changes that increase the returns to scale of marketing technology
will lower the cost of producing appeal, which intensifies the signaling compe-
tition and generates the co-movement between aggregate marketing intensity
and MPCR-markup elasticity. This mechanism is less likely to work for the
fixed cost as a whole since most components of fixed cost do not have a signal-
ing role. In section 1.4.2, I show that, with complete information, there is no
signaling competition between firms, and higher returns to marketing do not
affect the MPCR-markup elasticity.
1.9.4 MPCR-markup elasticity: alternative regression
In the main text, I run the regression of logarithm of MPCR on logarithm
of markup. However, the COGS appears in the denominator of both the
dependent variable and regressor. Thus, if advertising spending and sales
are noise information across firms, the regression would generate a positive
MPCR-markup elasticity as well. In this section, I consider an alternative
specification
log (XADis) = ρ0 log(µis) + ρ1log(COGSis) + δs + is
and compare the estimated ρ0 from this specification to the estimated ρ in the
main regression.
Table 1.11 shows the regression results from the alternative specification. The
estimated ρ0 is similar to the estimated ρ in the main regression. Furthermore,
in Figure 1.15, the estimated ρ0 from the alternative specification also increased
sharply around the mid-1990s, which results in same co-movement pattern with
aggregate marketing intensity.
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Table 1.11: MPCR-markup elasticity: alternative regression specification
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(XAD) log( XAD
COGS
) log(XAD) log( XAD
COGS
)
log(COGS) 1.084*** 1.043***
(0.0103) (0.0116)
log(markupCD) 1.815*** 1.720***
(0.0562) (0.0556)
log(markupTranslog) 1.363*** 1.333***
(0.0959) (0.0942)
N 41983 41983 41713 41713
Notes: This table compares the MPCR-markup elasticity estimated from two specifications.
I apply industry-year FE and standard errors are clustered at industry-year level and listed
in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Figure 1.15: MPCR-markup elasticity: alternative specification
Notes: The left (right) panel shows the estimated ρ0 for year-on-year regressions. For
each year, I conduct the regression by combining data within a three-year moving window.
Markup is estimated using an industry-specific Cobb-Douglas production function in the
left panel or Translog production function in the right panel.
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Figure 1.16: Binscatter plot between log(MPCR) and log(markup) with
Translog production function
Notes: This binscatter plot shows the correlation between markup and marketing-production
cost ratio. Both variables are residualized using industry-year fixed effects. Marketing cost
is measured by advertising expense and production cost is measured by COGS. Markup is
estimated using industry-specific Translog production function.
1.9.5 MPCR-markup elasticity: Translog production func-
tion
In the main text, I show the positive correlation between MPCR and markup
and the co-movement between MPCR-markup elasticity and aggregate market-
ing intensity using markup estimated from an industry-specific Cobb-Douglas
production function. In this section, I conduct the same exercise using industry-
specific translog production. As shown in Figure 1.16, 1.17 and 1.18, the choice
of production function in the markup estimation does not change the empirical
findings.
1.9.6 SGA-production cost ratio vs markup
De Loecker et al. (2018) and Traina (2018) give evidence of a positive corre-
lation between SGA expenses and markup. However, as emphasized by Ptok
et al. (2018), SGA is not a measure of marketing spending of the firms. Specif-
ically, only 2 out of 29 items that constitute SGA relate directly to the mar-
keting spending. Thus, we should expect the co-movement between MPCR-
markup elasticity and aggregate marketing intensity not happen if we measure
the marketing using SGA expenses.
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Figure 1.17: Binscatter plot between log(MPCR) and log(markup) with
Translog production function: before and after mid 1990s
(a) Before 1995 (b) After 1995
Notes: The left (right) panel shows a binscatter plot between markup and marketing-
production cost raio before (after) 1995. Both variables are residualized using industry-year
fixed effects. Marketing cost is measured by advertising expenditure and production cost
is measured by COGS. Markup is estimated using industry-specific Translog production
function.
Figure 1.18: MPCR-markup elasticity with Translog production function
Notes: This figure shows the elasticity between log(MPCR) and log(markup), where the
elasticity is obtained from a regression where I regress log(MPCR) on log(markup) and
industry-year fixed effects. The left panel shows the result for two separate regressions:
before 1995 and 1995. The right panel shows the result for year-on-year regressions. For
each year, I conduct the regression by combining data within a three-year moving window.
Markup is estimated using industry-specific Translog production function.
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Figure 1.19: MPCR-markup elasticity: SGA as a measure of marketing
spending
Notes: This figure shows the elasticity between log(MPCR) and log(markup), where the
elasticity is obtained from a regression where I regress log(MPCR) on log(markup) and
industry-year fixed effects. The left panel shows the result for two separate regressions:
before 1995 and after 1995. The right panel shows the result for year-on-year regressions. For
each year, I conduct the regression by combining data within a three-year moving window.
Marketing spending for each firm is measured using SGA expenses.
Figure 1.19 shows the MPCR-markup elasticity where I use SGA to measure
marketing spending. Consistent with the expectation, there is no significant
trend in the MPCR-markup elasticity. The level of cross-sectional MPCR-
markup elasticity does not co-move with aggregate marketing intensity.
1.9.7 Proof of Propositions and Lemmas
1.9.7.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. The profit function of a firm in industry k with variety ω is given as
Πk(ω) = Pk(ω)Ck(ω)−WCk(ω) 1α −W
(
Φk(ω)
Qk(ω)
) 1
β
(1.38)
Then the marginal rate of substitution of signal Φk(ω) for demand Ck(ω) is
given as
−∂Πk(ω)
∂Φk(ω)
∂Πk(ω)
∂Ck(ω)
=
1
β
W
(
Φk(ω)
Qk(ω)
) 1
β
−1
1
Qk(ω)
Pk(ω)− 1αWCk(ω)
1
α
−1 (1.39)
which is decreasing with quality of firms for given point in the space of signals
and demand when Pk(ω) > 1αWCk(ω)
1
α
−1.
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1.9.7.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. I prove the Lemma 2 in two steps. In the first step, I show analytically
that the extent of information distortion depends on the level of u in a world
with no markup dispersion. In the second step, I show the same logic applies
to the model with Kimball aggregator.
When there is no markup dispersion, the complete information allocation is
incentive-compatible when all types have no incentives to mimic the others.
Specifically, it implies the following inequality holds
1 ≥ exp((j−i)∆)
(1− 1σ )
1−(α+β(1−u))(1− 1σ ) 1− α
(
1− 1
σ
)− (1− 1
σ
)
β(1− u)exp ((j − i)∆) 1β
1− α (1− 1
σ
)− (1− 1
σ
)
β(1− u)
(1.40)
where i, j ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}. Intuitively, the gain from mimicking other types
should be lower compared to truthtelling. I denote the right hand side of the
inequality as f(x) where x = j − i, and study the maximum of f(x).
Some algebra shows that f has following properties: (i) f(0) = 1, (ii) f achieves
maximum when x = x? and (iii) f ′(x) > 0 if x < x? and f ′(x) < 0 if x > x?.
The maximum value of f is given by
f(x?) =
[
1− α (1− 1
σ
)
1− α (1− 1
σ
)
+ βu
(
1− 1
σ
)]
(1− 1σ )β
1−(α+β(1−u))(1− 1σ )
+1 [
1
1− u
] (1− 1σ )β
1−(α+β(1−u))(1− 1σ )
(1.41)
where x? = β
∆
ln
(
1−α(1− 1σ )
[(1−(α+β(1−u)(1− 1σ ))+β(1− 1σ )](1−u)
)
. We can see f(1) > 1
when u is large. It implies that IC conditions will not satisfy when u is large
enough. On the other hand, when u −→ 0, f(x?) −→ 1 and x? −→ 0. Thus,
IC condtions will statisfy when u is small enough.
For Kimball aggregator, the incentive to mimic higher quality firms depends
on the level of quality. At each level of quality Qn, the gain from mimicing
Qn+1 type of firms compared to the truthtelling is given as
Π(Qn+1;Qn)
Π(Qn;Qn)
=
Υ′(q(Qn))q(Qn)
Υ′(q(Qn−1))q(Qn−1)
·
1− αµ(q(Qn))−1 − β(1− u)exp
(
∆
β
)
µ(q(Qn))
−1
1− αµ(q(Qn−1))−1 − β(1− u)µ(q(Qn−1))−1 (1.42)
where I denote Π(Qi;Qj) as profit of type Qj mimicing type Qi. Given ∆ is
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small,
Π(Qn+1;Qn)
Π(Qn;Qn)
≈ exp(∆)ρn
1− α
(
1− 1
σn
)
−
(
1− 1
σn
)
β(1− u)exp
(
∆
β
)
1− α
(
1− 1
σn
)
−
(
1− 1
σn
)
β(1− u)
(1.43)
where σn is the demand elasticity for typeQn firms and ρn =
(1− 1σn )
1−(α+β(1−u))(1− 1σn )
.
The right hand side of equation 1.43 can be further approximated as
Π(Qn+1;Qn)
Π(Qn;Qn)
≈ 1 + u∆ρn − ρn∆2
(
1− u
4β
+
(
3
4
− u
)
ρn
)
. (1.44)
Given a small ∆, the complete information allocation would (not) be incentive
compatible when u is small (large).
1.9.7.3 Solving the LCSE
In this section, I establish the argument that LCSE has a simple complete-
information distortion feature. I start by looking at the maximization problem
of quality Q2
max Πk(P (Q2),Φ(Q2), b = Q2, Q2)
subject to the incentive compatibility (IC) condition
Πk(P (Q1),Φ(Q1), b = Q1, Q1) ≥ Πk(P (Q2),Φ(Q2), b = Q2, Q1)
Setting up the Lagrangian for type Q2 in industry k
Lk2 = Πk(Q2;Q2) + λk2(Πk(Q1;Q1)− Πk(Q2;Q1)) (1.45)
The optimality condition of P (Q2) implies
∂Πk(Q2;Q2)
∂P (Q2)
= λk2
∂Πk(Q2;Q1)
∂P (Q2)
(1.46)
Since the marginal returns of P (Q2) does not depends on types of firms, thus
∂Πk(Q2;Q2)
∂P (Q2)
= 0. The optimality condition of Φ(Q2) implies
∂Πk(Q2;Q2)
∂Φ(Q2)
− ∂Πk(Q2;Q1)
∂Φ(Q2)
= (λk2 − 1)∂Πk(Q2;Q1)
∂Φ(Q2)
(1.47)
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The left hand side of the above equation is positive. Then I further show
that λk2 ∈ (0, 1), which is equivalent to show ∂Πk(Q2;Q1)∂Φ(Q2) < 0. I prove this
by contradiction. Suppose ∂Πk(Q2;Q1)
∂Φ(Q2)
> 0. Then there exists a new pair of
allocation that makes Q1 indifferent but Q2 strictly better off. Thus, ∂Πk(Q2;Q1)∂Φ(Q2)
can not be positive at optimal. Similarly, when ∂Πk(Q2;Q1)
∂Φ(Q2)
= 0, an increase in
Φ(Q2) will be a profitable move for Q2, and Q1 has no incentive to mimic.
Thus, ∂Πk(Q2;Q1)
∂Φ(Q2)
< 0 and λk2 ∈ (0, 1). We can rewrite the Lagrangian as
Lk2 = Πk(Q2;Q2)− λk2Πk(Q2;Q1) + λk2Πk(Q1;Q1)
= (1− λk2)
(
P (Q2)C(Q2)−WC(Q2) 1α −W
(
Φ(Q2)
Q?k2
) 1
β
)
+ λk2Πk (Q1;Q1)
(1.48)
Thus, Q2 firms would maximize the profits as in the complete information case
but with a higher quality Q?k2, where Q?k2 is given as
λk2
[(
1
Q2
) 1
β
−
(
1
Q1
) 1
β
]
= (1− λk2)
[(
1
Q?k2
) 1
β
−
(
1
Q2
) 1
β
]
.
Thus, Q?k2 > Q2 and
WLka(Q2)
Pk(Q2)Ck(Q2)
= β(1−uk)
µk(Q2)
Xk(Q2).
For general Qn and Qn+1, the same argument follows. The difference is that for
n > 1, the incentive to mimic higher quality firm is larger due to the curvature
of Kimball aggregator. Let Xk(Qn) =
(
Q?Kn
Qn
) 1
β be the information distortion
of quality Qn, then Xk(Qn) is positively correlated with Lagrangian multiplier
λkn [
1− 1
Xk(Qn)
]
=
λkn
1− λkn
[
e
∆
β − 1
]
(1.49)
As the incentives to mimic higher quality firms increase with quality type Qn,
λkn will be higher which translates into a rising Xk(Qn). I prove this result in
Proposition 2.
1.9.7.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. I prove the Proposition 2 in two steps. In the first step, I show that
if Π(Qi+1;Qi)
Π(Qi;Qi)
> 1, then Π(Qi+m+1;Qi+m)
Π(Qi+m;Qi+m)
> 1 where m is an integer and m > 1.
Namely, if type Qi firms have incentive to mimic Qi+1 firms, then type Qi+m
firms have incentive to mimic Qi+m+1 firms. In the second step, I show that if
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X(Qi) > 1 and Qj > Qi, then X(Qj) > X(Qi) > 1.
First, when ∆ is small, I study the dynamics of Π(Qi+1;Qi)
Π(Qi;Qi)
using the approxi-
mation result in 1.44. I denote the right hand side of equation 1.44 as RHSn
and then differentiate it with respect to Qn. The dynamics of RHSn depends
on the level of u
∂RHSn
∂Qn
=
∂RHSn
∂ρn
∂ρn
∂Qn
∝ −
(
∆u−∆2 1− u
4β
− 2ρn∆2
(
3
4
− u
))
. (1.50)
First, when u ≤ ∆
4β+∆
, ∂RHSn
∂ρn
< 0 and RHSn < 1. Thus, IC conditions will
not be binding when u is small. When ∆
4β+∆
< u < 3
4
, there could be a ρ? > 0
such that ∂RHSn
∂ρn
|ρ? = 0 and RHS|ρ? > 1.68 RHSn is increasing with Qn
when Qn < Q? and decreasing towards one when Qn > Q?.69 When u ≥ 34 ,
RHSn > 1 and RHSn is decreasing towards one. Thus, if RHSi > 1, then
RHSi+m > 1 for a finite m > 0.
I prove the second step by contradiction. From the results in the first step,
if X(Qi) > 1, then X(Qi+m) > 1. Suppose there is an integer m > 0 such
that X(Qi+m) = 1. Without loss of generality, suppose X(Qi+m−1) > 1, then
RHSi+m−1 > 1 which contradicts with X(Qi+m) = 1. Therefore, IC conditions
are binding for all firms with Q > Qi. Combining the results in equation 1.34
and 1.35, it implies
1 =
Π(Qn+1;Qn)
Π(Qn;Qn)
≈ exp(∆)ρn
(
X(Qn+1)
X(Qn)
)β(1−u)ρn
·
1− α
(
1− 1
σn
)
−
(
1− 1
σn
)
β(1− u)exp
(
∆
β
)
X(Qn+1)
1− α
(
1− 1
σn
)
−
(
1− 1
σn
)
β(1− u)X(Qn)
. (1.51)
Equation 1.51 implicitly determines X(Qn+1) as a function of X(Qn) and
X(Qn+1) is increasing in X(Qn), i.e., ∂X(Qn+1)∂X(Qn) > 0. Denote the function
X(Qn+1) = F (X(Qn)). Suppose the graph of F is not always above 45-degree
line in the space of X(Qn) and X(Qn+1). Then there exists a steady state X?
such that X? = F (X?), which implies
1 =
Π(Qn+1;Qn)
Π(Qn;Qn)
≈ exp(∆)ρn
1− α
(
1− 1
σn
)
−
(
1− 1
σn
)
β(1− u)exp
(
∆
β
)
X?
1− α
(
1− 1
σn
)
−
(
1− 1
σn
)
β(1− u)X?
.
(1.52)
However, as I show in the first step, RHSn decreases with quality of firms, the
68When ρ? > ρmax, RHSn > 1 and RHSn is decreasing towards one.
69Q? is implicitly determined by ρ?. When Qn −→∞, RHSn −→ 1.
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right hand side of 1.52 can not be a constant as Q −→∞. Thus, the graph of
F is above 45-degree line which implies X(Qn+1) > X(Qn).
1.9.8 Robustness check
1.9.8.1 Importance of u and ξ
In this section, I study the role of u and ξ in shaping the results. To illus-
trate this, consider an one-industry version of the model which highlights the
mechanism of the model. Specifically, I calibrate β, u, ξ and σ to match the ag-
gregate marketing intensity, average firm size distribution, aggregate markup
and the productivity losses from information frictions as in the benchmark cal-
ibration. Starting from this allocation, I change u and ξ separately to evaluate
the importance of these two parameters in driving the results.
Table 1.12 reports the productivity loss from information frictions for different
u and ξ. The first column reports the productivity loss from this calibrated
one-industry model. Recall that 1− u determines how much consumers value
the appeal in the utility function. It is clear that as appeal becomes more
important, the productivity loss becomes smaller. When u is small enough,
the quality information is no longer valuable for the consumer. Thus, complete
information allocation would also be incentive-compatible. Similarly, the tail
parameter ξ determines the amount of differentiation in the industry. As ξ
becomes larger, the amount of differentiation becomes lower and hence the loss
from signaling is lower. Besides, the MPCR-markup elasticity also depends on
the level of u and quality differentiation between firms. An increase in u or ξ
tends to increase the MPCR-markup elasticity.
73
Table 1.12: Importance of u and ξ
productivity loss compared to complete info
u u = 0.963 u = 0.5 u = 0.9
-2.66 -0.23 -1.97
ξ ξ = 3.51 ξ = 2 ξ = 5
-2.66 -2.86 -2.47
MPCR-markup elasticity
u u = 0.963 u = 0.5 u = 0.9
1.858 0.436 1.371
ξ ξ = 3.51 ξ = 2 ξ = 5
1.858 0.552 5.498
1.9.8.2 Step size of quality ladder ∆
In the calibration section, I set the step size of the quality ladder ∆ = 0.02.
In this subsection, I re-calibrate the model and jointly estimate ∆ along with
parameters {β, ua, ub, ξµ, ξσ, σ}. Table 1.13 shows that the parameterization
with calibrated ∆ yields similar results.
1.9.8.3 Oligopolistic competition
An alternative specification with variable demand elasticity is the model of
oligopolistic competition with nested CES demand as in Atkeson and Burstein
(2008). This section presents the results using this demand system and show
that the result is robust to this alternative specification.
In the model, a representative consumer derives utility from the aggregate
consumption C, which combines a continuum of sectoral consumption good
Cs using a CES preference with elasticity θ 70
C =
(ˆ 1
0
C
θ−1
θ
s ds
) θ
θ−1
(1.53)
The sectoral consumption good Cs is produced by aggregating the finite num-
70The sector in this model corresponds narrowly-defined industries, thus γ > θ > 1. For
more details of this model, please refer to Atkeson and Burstein (2008) and Edmond et al.
(2015).
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Table 1.13: Results with calibrated ∆
Panel A: Calibrated parameters
benchmark calibrated ∆
σ average elasticity 13.52 13.30
β returns to scale of marketing 0.054 0.052
ua shape parameter of Beta distr. uk 0.047 0.052
ub shape parameter of Beta distr. uk 0.009 0.016
ξµ location parameter of Lognormal distr. ξk 0.28 0.27
ξσ shape parameter of Lognormal distr. ξk 2.21 2.48
∆ step size of quality ladder 0.020 0.019
Panel B: Results
Increase in β 0 ↑ 10% ↑ 20% ↑ 30%
productivity loss compared to complete info
benchmark -2.67 -2.93 -3.18 -3.42
calibrated ∆ -2.24 -2.45 -2.66 -2.86
implied marketing intensity, percentage
benchmark 3.00 3.29 3.58 3.86
calibrated ∆ 3.05 3.35 3.64 3.93
MPCR-markup elasticity
benchmark 1.67 1.73 1.79 1.84
calibrated ∆ 1.43 1.48 1.53 1.57
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ber of varieties with each sector using a CES preference with elasticity γ
Cs =
(
n∑
i=1
(Qs(i)
uΦs(i)
1−uCs(i))
γ−1
γ
) γ
γ−1
(1.54)
where Φs(i) is the firm appeal of firm i in sector s, and Cs(i) is the consumption
from the firm.
Each firm in the sector s competes on quantity (Cournot competition), chooses
quantity Cs(i) and appeal Φs(i) to maximize the profit. They internalize the
impact of their decisions on sectoral consumption Cs. The FOC associated
with LCSE resembles the one in the model with Kimball aggregator
WLsp(Qs(i))
Ps(i)Ys(i)
=
α
µs(i)
(1.55)
WLsa(Qs(i))
Ps(i)Ys(i)
=
β(1− u)
µs(i)
X(Qs(i)) (1.56)
where X(Qs(i)) =
(
Qs(i)?
Qs(i)
) 1
β . Compared to the monopolistic competition
model, the difference lies in how markup depends on firm size. In the oligopoil-
stic competition model, markup is determined by the within-sector sales share
ωs(i)
µs(i) =
1
1−
[
1
γ
(1− ωs(i)) + 1θωs(i)
] (1.57)
On the other hand, with monopolistic competition, markup is determined by
the relative size qk(Q). Nevertheless, they both capture the same idea that
demand is less elastic for larger firms.
In this environment, LCSE allocation can still be solved by starting the com-
plete information allocation. Specifically, I begin with the sales share of lowest
quality firms ωs(Q1) and Xs(Q1) = 1, and solve {ωs(Qn), Xs(Qn)} iteratively.
We repeat the procedure until
∑
ω(Qn)M(Qn) = 1.
Calibration. I first set the number of industries to be 1000 and the number of
firms within each industry to be Ns = 910.71 I choose θ = 1.03 and γ = 8.86.
I set u = 0.963 which corresponds to the calibration of one-sector model and
choose β = 0.046 and ξ = 5.8 to match the aggregate marketing intensity and
average distribution of firm size.
Panel A of Table 1.14 compares the firm size distribution in this model with
71It corresponds the number of 6-digit sectors and median number of firms within each
sector in the mid-1990s.
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Table 1.14: Oligopolistic competition
Panel A: Moments
data benchmark oligopoly
avg fraction of firms with rel payroll
< 0.5 0.662 0.694 0.685
< 1 0.819 0.895 0.873
< 5 0.962 0.985 0.984
< 10 0.987 0.990 0.993
< 100 1 0.998 0.999
Panel B: Results
Increase in β 0 ↑ 10% ↑ 20% ↑ 30%
productivity loss compared to complete info
benchmark -2.67 -2.93 -3.18 -3.42
oligopoly -3.00 -3.31 -3.63 -3.94
implied marketing intensity, percentage
benchmark 3.00 3.29 3.58 3.86
oligopoly 3.00 3.28 3.59 3.90
MPCR-markup elasticity
benchmark 1.67 1.73 1.79 1.84
oligopoly 2.18 2.21 2.24 2.27
the data and benchmark calibration. The oligopoly model implies a firm size
distribution close to the benchmark calibration. Panel B of Table 1.14 reports
the productivity loss compared to complete information allocation. The loss
from information frictions is slightly higher compared to the level in the bench-
mark calibration, and the loss from information frictions is increasing with
returns to marketing technology. The model also implies a positive MPCR-
markup elasticity and its co-movement with aggregate marketing intensity.
The main difference is that the oligopolistic competition involves a level of
elasticity higher than the benchmark. Since the level of information distortion
remains roughly the same, the reason for this difference is the lack of variation
in markup. Given µi(s) = 11−[ 1γ (1−ωi(s))+ 1θωi(s)]
, for an average industry, the
variation in markup is lower compared to the model with monopolistic com-
petition. Since there is a finite number of firms within each sector, the same
level of markup dispersion as in the monopolistic competition model would
generate an aggregate markup which is too large.
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Chapter 2
Zombie Firms, State Subsidies,
and Resource Misallocation
2.1 Introduction
Resource misallocation lowers aggregate productivity (Hsieh and Klenow, 2009).
A growing body of recent research focuses on one particular channel that results
in resource misallocation — zombie congestion.1 The existence of zombie firms
not only distorts resource allocation across operating firms but also changes
the composition of the operating firms through the entry selection. Given the
low productivity nature of zombie firms, the excessive resource employed by
zombie firms seems puzzling. In this chapter, I investigate the role of gov-
ernment subsidies in explaining this phenomenon and quantitatively examine
the effectiveness of different policies in resolving zombie problem and boosting
aggregate productivity.
I use the firm-level data from the manufacturing sector in China between 1998
and 2007. Following the literature, I classify a firm as a zombie if its profit
net of government subsidy is negative for two consecutive periods and its age
is greater than five years.2 The measure intends to identify those firms with
persistent problems in making positive profits without the help of government.
During the sample period, zombie firms are prevalent, but the share of zombie
firms is diminishing. Zombie rate declines from 16% in 1999 to 5% in 2007,
and about half of the decline can be attributed to the rise of the private sector
1See Blattner et al. (2018), Kwon et al. (2015), and McGowan et al. (2018) for example.
2The zombie measure used in this paper follows recent literature on zombie firms. See
McGowan et al. (2018) and Chang et al. (2020) for example.
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in the economy. Besides, zombie firms are larger in terms of inputs employed
but less productive. In 1999, an average zombie firm used 40% more labor
inputs than a non-zombie firm, but its TFP is more than 50% lower than that
of non-zombie. The magnitude of gaps in size and productivity remains even
after controlling for ownership, industries, and provinces.
Using the unique subsidy information in the dataset, I provide direct evidence
on the existence of tax-like wedges that reallocate resources towards zombie
firms. A zombie firm is ten percentage points more likely to receive a positive
subsidy from the government, and the average subsidy rate for zombie firms is
much higher than that of non-zombie firms. In fact, rescuing firms in financial
distress is one explicit goal of the state subsidies in China, especially for large
firms which are vital in terms of local employment and social stability (Lee
et al., 2014; Chen et al., 2008).
The difference in the average subsidy rate between zombie and non-zombie
firms not only reflects the underlying joint distribution of subsidy rate and
productivity, but also the measure I use to identify zombies. In the data, firms
with lower productivity tend to receive a higher subsidy rate. This negative
correlation increases the average subsidy rate for a group of low productivity
firms. In addition, the zombie measure based on profit net of subsidy would
also disproportionately identify firms with low productivity and high subsidy
rate as zombies. These forces together result in a large gap in subsidy rate
between zombies and non-zombies.
Motivated by the features of zombies, I develop a model with heterogeneous
firms to account for these features, and then use the model to quantify the
impact of zombies on aggregate productivity. The model resembles the one in
Restuccia and Rogerson (2008), where the firm draws a joint pair of produc-
tivity and subsidy rate upon entry. The existence of subsidy rate generates
the dispersion of marginal products across firms and allows us to capture the
fact that zombie firms are larger yet less productive. Besides, zombie measure
based on profit net of subsidy endogenously identifies firms with low produc-
tivity and high subsidy rate as zombies. Following Yang (2019), I assume
productivity and subsidy rate are jointly normally distributed, and calibrate
the model to match the moments regarding zombie rate, relative mean size,
and size dispersion of zombie firms in 1999.
With the calibrated model, I conduct three quantitative exercises. Firstly, I
study the productivity gain from removing dispersion in subsidy rate com-
pletely. The aggregate productivity can increase by more than 280% if we
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move to a frictionless economy. This number tends to be larger than the one
estimated in Hsieh and Klenow (2009). The reason is that they conservatively
choose a low value of elasticity of substitution between firms, which results in
a lower gain from reallocation. Besides, I find that the gain in productivity is
primarily driven by the reduction of intensive margin misallocation. On the
extensive margin, the positive selection effect that increases average produc-
tivity of operating firms is almost fully counteracted by the negative variety
effect. As noted by Fattal Jaef (2018), in the model with frictions, negative
correlation between subsidy rate and productivity reduces the labor demand
for high productivity firms and hence wage rate in the economy, which makes
entry profitable for more firms.
Empirically, the rising share of the private sector reduces the dispersion of
the subsidy rate. I then use the model to evaluate the gain in productivity
associated with the rise of private sector. Reducing the dispersion of subsidy
to match half of the decline in the zombie rate, the aggregate productivity
increases by about 40%. This quantitative exercise illustrates that the rise
of private sector can induce a large productivity gain even when there is no
productivity gap between private firms and SOEs.
Lastly, I use the model to evaluate the effectiveness of policies that increase
the exit rate of zombies. This exercise is of particular interest given that the
Chinese government recently took the initiative to deal with zombie problem
by closing those firms.3 Increasing the zombie exit rate can significantly reduce
the zombie rate in the economy, while its productivity effect is limited. Com-
pared with the large productivity gain from reducing the dispersion of subsidy,
this result implies that policies should tackle the resource misallocation in the
economy directly.
Related literature
This chapter belongs to a large growing body of literature on resource mis-
allocation, including seminal papers such as Hsieh and Klenow (2009) and
Restuccia and Rogerson (2008). The correlation between size and productiv-
ity I stress in this chapter has been shown by Bartelsman et al. (2013) as a
robust measure for resource misallocation across countries. They assume tax-
like wedges to explain the observed level of correlation between productivity
3See the recent report from Xinhua News: http://english.www.gov.cn/
statecouncil/ministries/201910/18/content_WS5da91079c6d0bcf8c4c15556.html.
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and size. I contribute to this literature by providing direct evidence on the
existence of such wedges — state subsidy. In addition, I show that the empiri-
cal distribution between productivity and subsidy rate differs for zombies and
non-zombies. It offers direct support for the model where each firm draws a
pair of productivity and subsidy rate to enter the market, e.g., Restuccia and
Rogerson (2008) and Yang (2019).
The majority of existing literature that studies zombie firms focuses on the
effects of zombie congestion in Japan during the 1990s. Caballero et al. (2008)
find that zombie congestion reduces both investment and employment growth
for healthy firms in the industry. Kwon et al. (2015) show that without zombie
lending, the aggregate productivity would have grown about one percentage
point faster annually during the 1990s. This paper examines the effectiveness
of policies that increase the zombie exit rate, and finds a relatively limited
productivity effect.
Recent empirical studies on zombie firms in China stress the role of state
subsidy in the formation of zombie firms (He et al., 2018; Chang et al., 2020).
I quantitatively assess the productivity effect of dispersion in subsidy rate.
In addition, I document that the rising share of private firms reduces the
dispersion of subsidy rate across firms, which could lead to sizable productivity
gains. This complements the existing studies focusing on the productivity gap
between SOEs and private firms, such as Song et al. (2011).
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 shows empirical findings.
Section 2.3 presents the model, which is calibrated in section 2.4. Section 2.5
discusses the results from numerical exercises. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Empirical findings
2.2.1 Data and measurement
I use firm-level data from the manufacturing sector in China. It contains all
non-state-owned firms (non-SOEs) with more than 5 million yuan in revenue
and all state-owned firms (SOEs) from 1998 to 2007.4 From the data, I extract
detailed information on firm operations, including asset, interest payment,
short-term and long-term liability, profit, and subsidy.
4See Appendix for the detailed discussion of the data set.
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I combine information on reported value of output, intermediate input, and
employment to estimate firms’ TFP, which is calculated using the index ap-
proach following Brandt et al. (2012)
ln TFPit = qit − qt − S˜it(lit − lt)− (1− S˜it)(kit − kt)
where qit, lit and kit are the logarithms of real value added, employment and
real capital stock of firm i at year t. The overlined variables correspond to the
industry average. The weight on the labor input is S˜it = (Sit + St)/2, where
Sit is the labor share of firm i and St is the industry average labor share. This
approach allows us to compare each firm with a hypothetical industry average
firm. The advantage of this approach is that it allows technological differences
across firms within the same industry.5
Past studies of zombie firms used different measurements to identify zombies.
Broadly, those measures can be classified into two categories. The first ap-
proach focuses on the lending aspect of zombies. It involves the construction
of a hypothetical minimum interest payment and compares it with actual in-
terest payment of the firm (Caballero et al., 2008), or earnings of the firm
(Fukuda and Nakamura, 2011). The second approach is to identify zombies as
firms with persistent financial difficulties using profitability measures, such as
measures proposed by McGowan et al. (2018) and the Chinese government.
I follow the second approach and classify a firm as a zombie if (i) its profit net
of subsidy is negative for two consecutive periods, and (ii) its age is greater
than five years. The first requirement detects whether firms have persistent
problems in making positive profits without the help of government. As em-
phasized by recent papers that study zombie firms in China, state subsidy is an
important friction that helps low productivity firms to survive (Chang et al.,
2020; He et al., 2018). Using profit net of subsidy can better identify those
firms that rely on the government to make profits. The second restriction rules
out young firms at the start of their life cycle as it can take a while to make
profits. The choice of measurement is driven by data availability. Section 2.2.4
discusses alternative measures of zombie firms in details.
In theory, zombie firms should be those firms that cannot survive in a friction-
5Given I do not observe firm-level price, the measure of TFP is revenue-based. Relying
on a very restrictive model specification, Hsieh and Klenow (2009) (HK) interpret the dis-
persion in revenue-based TFP (TFPR) as firm-level distortions. However, as emphasized by
Haltiwanger et al. (2018), the strict assumptions underlying HK’s method do not hold in
the data. Besides, empirical literature finds that physical TFP (TFPQ) is highly correlated
with TFPR (Foster et al., 2008, 2016; Eslava et al., 2013).
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Figure 2.1: Zombie rate in China
Notes: This figure plots the zombie rate in China during the sample period. Labor (capital)
zombie rate is calculated as the fraction of total amount of labor (real capital stock) employed
by zombie firms.
less environment. The measure is admittedly imperfect. In principle, I would
commit two types of classification errors. Some firms with poor performance
will be categorized as non-zombies if they receive debt forgiveness or subsidized
loans from the bank or government. Thus, the measure would underestimate
the extent of zombies in the economy. On the other hand, I may also poten-
tially misclassify a healthy firm as a zombie. However, given the fast growth of
the Chinese economy during the sample period, the probability that a healthy
firm suffering persistent profitability problems is low. Therefore, the measure
is more likely to underestimate the extent of zombies in China.
2.2.2 Characteristics of zombie firms
Figure 2.1 illustrates the zombie rate in China during the sample period. Since
zombie firms must have negative net of subsidy profits for two consecutive
periods, the measurement starts from 1999. Three measures are presented
in the figure: zombie rate, labor zombie rate, and capital zombie rate. The
zombie rate is calculated as the fraction of firms that are zombies according
to our measure. Labor (capital) zombie rate is calculated as the share of the
total amount of workers (real capital stock) employed by zombie firms. Several
facts arise from the figure.
Firstly, zombie firms are prevalent. In 1999, the fraction of zombie firms is
about 16%. Zombie firms are not just SOEs. The left panel of Figure 2.2
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Figure 2.2: Zombie rate: SOEs vs Non-SOEs
Notes: The left panel of the figure plots the zombie rate for SOEs and non-SOEs in China
during the sample period. The right panel of the figure conducts the between-group and
within-group decomposition for aggregate zombie rate, where firms are classified into two
groups based on SOE status.
Figure 2.3: Zombie rate by industry groups in 1999
reports the zombie rate for SOEs and non-SOEs. Although the zombie rate is
higher for SOEs, the zombie rate for non-SOEs still exceeds 8% in 1999. The
high zombie rate is not driven by a few industries or a few regions. Figure
2.3 presents the zombie rate by industry groups in 1999. Food, tobacco and
beverage sector tends to have a relatively higher zombie rate. Figure 2.4 depicts
the geographic variation of zombie rates. The zombie rate is higher (lower) in
inland (coastal) areas.
Secondly, across all three measures of zombie rate shown in Figure 2.1, the
extent of zombies in the economy is diminishing. The share of zombie firms
declines from 16% in 1999 to 5% in 2007. The left panel of Figure 2.2 shows
that the zombie rates for both SOEs and non-SOEs are decreasing over time.
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Figure 2.4: Zombie rate by provinces in 1999
The right panel of Figure 2.2 decomposes the decline of zombie rate into within-
group and between-group components. The within-group component keeps the
fraction of SOEs fixed as in 1999 and allows the zombie rate for SOEs and non-
SOEs to evolve. The between-group component keeps the zombie rate for two
groups fixed as in 1999 and allows the fraction of SOEs to change. The decom-
position illustrates that, by the year 2007, about half of the decline in zombie
rate is driven by the rapid rise of non-SOE sector.6 Similar decompositions are
conducted across industries and provinces, where I find the decline of zombie
rate is almost entirely driven by the within-industry (province) component.7
Lastly, Figure 2.1 shows that zombie firms are larger since zombie firms employ
more labor and capital inputs than non-zombies. In 1999, the fraction of
labor utilized by zombie firms is about 21%, which implies that an average
zombie firm is 40% larger than a non-zombie firm in terms of workforce. The
average size difference is not driven by a few outliers. Figure 2.5 plots the size
distribution of zombies and non-zombies in terms of employment and capital
stock. Across different quartiles, zombie firms are larger than non-zombies.
In Appendix, I report the regression-based size gap between the zombie and
non-zombie firms, a size gap of similar magnitude remains even if I control for
ownership, industries, and provinces.8
6In the sample, the fraction of non-SOEs increases from 33% in 1999 to more than 90%
in 2007. See Figure 2.20 in Appendix.
7See Figure 2.21 in Appendix.
8See Figure 2.22 in Appendix.
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Figure 2.5: Size distribution: zombies vs non-zombies
Notes: This figure plots different quartiles in the size distribution of zombie and non-zombie
firms, where size is measured by employment (real capital) in the left (right) panel.
Figure 2.6: Output and productivity: zombies vs non-zombies
Notes: This figure plots different quartiles in the output and productivity distribution of
zombie and non-zombie firms, where output (productivity) is measured by value added
(logarithm of TFP).
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Zombie firms employ more resources, yet they produce much less output com-
pared to non-zombie firms. The left panel of Figure 2.6 reports the size dis-
tribution in terms of value added. In contrast with Figure 2.5, non-zombie
firms are larger in terms of value added across quartiles. The right panel of
Figure 2.6 further plots the distribution of productivity. In 1999, the median
productivity of non-zombies is more than 100% higher than that of zombies. A
productivity gap of similar magnitude remains even if I control for ownership,
industries, and provinces.
2.2.3 Zombies and state subsidies
Zombie firms are larger yet less productive than non-zombies. A frictionless
model where size and productivity are perfectly correlated cannot explain this
fact. In the literature, researchers assume tax-like wedges to explain the ob-
served level of correlation between productivity and size (Bartelsman et al.,
2013). However, there is little evidence on the existence of such wedges. The
unique feature of Chinese data is that I observe the amount of state subsidy
each firm receives. I calculate the firm-level subsidy rate as the ratio of subsidy
to value added.
The left panel of Figure 2.7 reports the fraction of firms that receive the sub-
sidy. Zombie firms are more likely to receive subsidies. In the right panel, I plot
the value added weighted average of firm-level subsidy rate. The subsidy rate
for zombie firms is about six percentage points higher than that of non-zombies
in 1999. The subsidy is not intended to rescue SOEs or a few industries only.
The left panel of Figure 2.8 shows that zombie firms are ten percentage points
more likely to receive subsidy after controlling for ownership, industries, and
provinces. Conditional on receiving a subsidy, the subsidy rate of zombie firms
is 50% higher than non-zombie firms in 1999 (the right panel of Figure 2.8).
With the firm-level data on subsidy rate and productivity, I could further
explore the underlying relationship between these two variables. The left panel
of Figure 2.9 shows a binscatter plot between subsidy rate and TFP in 2000,
where both variables are residualized by ownership, industry and province
dummies.9 It is clear that subsidy rate and TFP are negatively correlated at
the firm level. The dispersion of subsidy rates will reallocate resources from
high productivity firms to low productivity firms, resulting in the fact that low
9I report the result for the year 2000 to facilitate comparison with alternative zombie
measures in section 2.2.4. The similar pattern is documented across all sample periods.
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Figure 2.7: Subsidy: zombies vs non-zombies
Notes: The left panel of this figure plots the fraction of firms receiving positive subsidy for
zombie and non-zombie firms. The right panel shows the value added weighted average of
subsidy rate for zombie and non-zombie firms.
Figure 2.8: Regression-based subsidy gap for zombie firms
Notes: The left panel of this figure plots the additional likelihood of zombie firms receiving
positive subsidy. I obtain the estimates as β1 from the regression DSi = β1DZi + FEs+ i,
where DSi is the dummy for receiving positive subsidy and DZi is the dummy for zombie
firms. Fixed effects are included to control for ownership, industries and provinces. The
right panel shows the magnitude of subsidy rate difference for zombie and non-zombie firms
conditional on receiving positive subsidy. I obtain the estimates as β1 from the regression
Si
V Ai
= β1D
Z
i + FEs+ i, where
Si
V Ai
is subsidy rate. Both the point estimate and its 95%
confidence interval are reported.
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Figure 2.9: Subsidy rate and productivity
Notes: The left panel of this figure shows the binscatter plot between logarithm of subsidy
rate and TFP, where both variables are residualized by ownership, industry and province
dummies. Subsidy rate is calculated as the ratio between subsidy and value added of the
firm. The right panel plots these two residuals separately for zombie and non-zombie firms.
Both panels are produced by using the data in 2000.
productivity firms could employ more inputs into production.
In the right panel of Figure 2.9, I plot these residualized variables separately
for zombie and non-zombie firms. Similar to previous findings, zombie firms
tend to have higher subsidy rates and lower productivity. Given the negative
correlation between subsidy rate and TFP shown in the left panel of Figure
2.9, a group of low productivity firms would have a higher average subsidy
rate. However, this does not explain the difference in the level of subsidy rate
residuals across two groups of firms. The measure based on the profit net of
subsidy tends to disproportionately identify firms with low productivity and
high subsidy rate as zombies. As I will discuss in section 2.3.2, this pattern is
consistent with a model where firm simultaneously draws a pair of productivity
and subsidy rate to enter the market.
The subsidy rate reported in Figure 2.7 is likely to be an underestimate of the
extent of subsidy in China since it mainly involves the transfer of monetary
assets from the government to firms directly. Some other forms of subsidy
that do not imply a direct transfer of resources are not included, such as tax-
breaks and low-interest loans. Aghion et al. (2015) find that more than 40%
of firms receive a tax holiday between 1998 and 2007, i.e., they paid less than
the statutory corporate income tax rate or statutory value added tax rate.
In addition, subsidies may not come from the government directly. During
the sample period, almost all the banks are state-owned, the zombie lending
channel is an alternative way to rescue firms. A report by the government
official Xinhua news agency reveals that up to 88% of Chinese listed firms
were granted state subsidies in 2014.
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2.2.4 Alternative measures of zombies
In this section, I contrast my measure of zombie firms with two alternative
measures in the literature.10 The first measure is the one proposed by the
Chinese government, where firms with negative profit for three consecutive
years are classified as zombie firms. The second measure is proposed by Fukuda
and Nakamura (2011) (FN hereafter), where a zombie firm at period t needs
to satisfy both “profitability criterion” and “evergreen lending criterion”.
The “profitability criterion” means the earnings before interests and taxes
(EBIT) of the firm is smaller than the minimum of required interest payment
R∗i,t at period t
R∗i,t = rst−1BSi,t−1 +
(
1
5
5∑
j=1
rlt−j
)
BLi,t−1
where BSi,t, BLi,t are short-term, long-term loan for firm i at the end of year
t; rst, rlt are average short-term and long-term prime rate in year t. R∗i,t
measures the minimum interest payment firm has to pay when there is no
interest subsidies in the lending market. If EBIT is lower than R∗i,t, then it
implies the firm cannot make a profit if there are no interest subsidies. The
“evergreen lending criterion” requires that debt of the firm is over half of total
assets in period t − 1 and borrowings increase in period t. In Chinese data,
information on bank loan is not available, thus I use liability of the firm to
measure firm’s borrowing.
Figure 2.10 reports zombie rate across different classifications. Compared with
the benchmark measure, FN method identifies more zombie firms, and the
method proposed by Chinese government identifies fewer zombie firms. Since
R∗i,t tends to be larger than actual interest payment, FN method imposes a
higher threshold on the earning of firms and a lower requirement on the per-
sistence of financial difficulty, which results in a higher zombie rate.11
Compared with benchmark measure, the alternative measures generate similar
implications on the size and productivity gap between zombie and non-zombie
firms, but they have different implications on subsidy rate.12 The two upper
10In Figure 2.24, I also report the zombie rate when there is no age restriction in the
benchmark measure.
11I use the gross profit to measure firm earning. Thus, the “profitability criterion” would
hold if gross profit is smaller than gap between R∗i,t and actual interest payment.
12See Figure 2.25 in Appendix for the size and productivity gap between zombie and
non-zombie firms.
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Figure 2.10: Alternative measures of zombie firms
Notes: This figure plots the zombie rate for alternative measures. Two alternative measures
are considered: Chinese government’s measure and the measure proposed by Fukuda and
Nakamura (2011) (FN).
panels of Figure 2.11 show weighted subsidy rate for zombie and non-zombies
for these alternative measures. On average, zombie firms receive a higher
subsidy rate. However, the difference in subsidy rate between zombies and
non-zombies becomes smaller compared to the right panel of Figure 2.7. This
is because these two alternative measures only focus on the profit of firms
(Chinese government’s measure in particular). It will identify firms with lower
subsidy rate and productivity as zombie firms.13 The two lower panels of Figure
2.11 confirm this point by presenting the binscatter plot for the residuals of
logarithm of TFP and subsidy rate. This selection mechanism tends to reduce
the subsidy rate of zombies.
I prefer the benchmark measure over these alternative measures for two rea-
sons. Compared with profit-based measures, profit net of subsidy is a more
precise concept to identify zombies as firms that rely on government subsidies
to make profits should be counted as zombie firms. Besides, since the firm-
level data does not contain information on bank loans, using firm’s liability to
construct the minimum interest payment R∗i,t will overestimate the amount of
interest firms need to pay as some types of liabilities are not interest-bearing,
payable for instance. Huang and Chen (2017) find that, for more than 70%
firms, actual interest payment is smaller than R∗i,t.14
13FN method also relies on firm’s financing structure and interest subsidies, which con-
found the comparison with benchmark measure.
14This would imply more than 70% of firms will be classified as zombies according to
measure proposed by Caballero et al. (2008).
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Figure 2.11: Subsidy rate and zombie firms: alternative zombie measures
Notes: The two upper panels plot the weighted subsidy rate for zombie and non-zombie firms
using two alternative measures. Subsidy rate is calculated as the ratio between subsidy and
value added of the firm. The two lower panels show the binscatter plot between logarithm
of subsidy rate and TFP, where both variables are residualized by ownership, industry and
province dummies. I plot these two residualized variables separately for zombie and non-
zombie firms, where zombie firms are identified using alternative measures. Both panels are
produced by using the data in 2000.
To summarize, I document the following facts. Firstly, zombie firms are preva-
lent, but the share of zombies is diminishing between 1998 and 2007. Secondly,
zombie firms are larger in terms of inputs employed but much less productive.
Thirdly, zombie firms on average have a higher subsidy rate than non-zombies.
The difference in average subsidy rate depends on the underlying joint distri-
bution of subsidy rate and productivity, and the definition of zombies. In the
next section, I outline a model that can account for these features and then
use it to quantify the impact of zombie firms on productivity.
2.3 Model
In this section, I consider a model of firm dynamics to quantify the productivity
effects from distortion generated by zombie firms. The model builds on the
standard industry dynamics model, i.e., Restuccia and Rogerson (2008). The
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model is stationary. Each firm i draws their productivity ai and subsidy rate
si from a joint distribution G(a, s) upon entry. The individual draw of {ai, si}
is fixed during the life time of the firm. Operating firms maximize their profit
in each period and exit the market at exogenous rates.
2.3.1 Model setup
Firms are producing homogenous output, which is set to be the numeraire. In
period t, firm i with productivity ai and subsidy rate si chooses capital kit and
labor lit to maximize per-period profit
pit (ai, si) = max (1 + si)f (kit, lit)− wtlit − rtkit − κ, (2.1)
where f (kit, lit) = aikαitl
γ
it , κ is the fixed cost of operating in each period. The
production function features decreasing returns to scale, i.e., α + γ < 1. The
introduction of the subsidy rate s could increase the size of low productivity
firms and capture the fact that zombie firms are larger and less productive.
In addition, the subsidy rate s generates dispersion of marginal product of
input across firms, which would both result in resource misallocation among
operating firms and change the entry threshold for potential entrants.
The value of a firm with {ai, si} in period t is given by the flow profits of
operation in period t plus the discounted expected value of the firm in the
next period conditional on survival
Vt (ai, si) = pit (ai, si) + β (1− η(ai, si))Vt+1(ai, si). (2.2)
The continuation value of firm i depends on its exit rate. I assume the exit
rate η(ai, si) depends on the productivity-subsidy draw of the firm. At steady
state, the value of the firm is given by
V (ai, si) =
pi(ai, si)
1− β (1− η (ai, si)) . (2.3)
There is a unit measure of potential entrants in each period. To enter the
market, each potential entrant draws a pair of productivity a and subsidy rate s
from distribution G(a, s) and enters if V (a, s) ≥ 0. I denote the corresponding
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entry rule as Y (a, s) such that
Y (a, s) =
1 if V (a, s) ≥ 00 if V (a, s) < 0.
The timing within each period can be summarized as follows: (i) potential
entrants draw productivity and subsidy rate from distribution G(a, s) and
decide to enter or not; (ii) incumbent firms exit according to exogenous exit
rates; (iii) successful entrants and staying incumbents maximize their per-
period profits.
Let nt(a, s) be the measure of operating firms with the draw {a, s} at period
t. The following law of motion needs to be satisfied
nt+1(a, s) = (1− η(a, s))nt(a, s) + Yt+1(a, s)g(a, s) (2.4)
for all a and s. In period t + 1, the mass of firms with {a, s} would be those
continuing firms plus new entrants. In the steady state,
n(a, s) =
Y (a, s)g(a, s)
η(a, s)
. (2.5)
It is clear that n(a, s) = 0 if V (a, s) < 0.
Lastly, I formulate the demand side of the model. Assume there is a repre-
sentative household in the economy. They are endowed with one unit of labor
and supply inelastically. The problem for household is as follows
max
Ct,Kt+1
∞∑
t=0
βtu(Ct)
st. Ct +Kt+1 = (rt + 1− δ)Kt + wt + Πt − Tt
where Πt, Tt are the profits from all firms and net lump sum tax respectively.15
At the steady state, the Euler equation can be simplified as
1 = β(1 + r − δ) (2.6)
which pins down the rental price of capital r in the equilibrium.
The stationary equilibrium in this model is a set of prices {r, w}, choices for
15The government would impose a lump sum tax Tt on household each period and redis-
tribute it to the subsidized firms.
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household {C,K}, choices for firms {k(a, s), l(a, s), Y (a, s)}, the measure of
firms n(a, s), such that (i) household maximizes the utility; (ii) firms maximize
profits; (iii) the entry threshold Y (a, s) = 1 if it satisfies V (a, s) ≥ 0; (iv) law
of motion for the measure n(a, s) holds; (v) all markets clear.
2.3.2 Zombie firms in the model
Consistent with zombie classification in the empirical section, I classify a firm
as a zombie firm if its profit net of subsidy is negative
piNetSt (ai, si) = pit (ai, si)− sif (ai, si) < 0. (2.7)
In steady state, the above equation can be simplified as
piNetS (ai, si) = ((1− α− γ) (1 + si)− si) a
1
1−α−γ
i (1 + si)
α+γ
1−α−γ φ(r, w)− κ < 0
(2.8)
where φ(r, w) is a function of steady state rental rate of capital and wage.
Equation 2.8 shows that firms with low productivity and high subsidy rate are
more likely to be zombie firms.16
This definition is motivated by the method used to identify zombies in the
data. But it differs from the one in the empirical section in two aspects.
Firstly, as there is no firm-level productivity shock in the model, an operating
firm with a negative profit net of subsidy cannot be “recovered”. However, in
the data, I restrict the zombie firms to have a negative profit net of subsidy
for two consecutive periods to rule out the temporary shock to firms’ earnings.
Secondly, the model abstracts away the learning dynamics at the start of a
firm’s life cycle. Thus, I do not require the firms to be older than five years as
in the empirical section.17
Figure 2.12 contrasts the zombie classification based on profit net of subsidy
and profit alone. The grey area in the left panel illustrates the distribution
of zombie firms based on equation 2.8 and entry rule Y (a, s). Thus, zombie
firms tend to be those with high subsidy rate. In addition, a firm with high
productivity could also be counted as a zombie if it receives a large subsidy.
This is consistent with the fact that there is an overlap in the productivity
distribution of zombie and non-zombie firms as shown in the right panel of
16Firms with negative subsidy rate cannot be classified as zombies.
17In Appendix, I consider an alternative calibration of the model to match the moments
in the sample where all the firms with age smaller than five years are dropped.
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Figure 2.12: Zombie classification
(a) Profit net of subsidy (b) Profit
Figure 2.6. The right panel of Figure 2.12 plots the distribution of zombie
firms when we classify firms based on profit alone.18 Based on profit alone, it
is less clear whether zombie firms would have higher subsidy rates or not. This
is consistent with the pattern in Figure 2.11. Classifying zombie firms using
profit-based measures, the difference in average subsidy rate between zombie
and non-zombie firms is lower.19
The exit rate of zombies is of particular interest since they are usually charac-
terized as low productivity firms that are not exiting the market due to various
distortions. I assume the exit rate depends on the zombie status of the firm
η (ai, si) =
ηz if i is a zombie firmηn if i is a non-zombie firm.
In section 2.5.3, I explore the productivity gains from policies that increase
zombie exit rate ηz.
To evaluate the impact of zombie firms on the economy, I aggregate the firm-
level output and input choices to derive an aggregate production function
Y =
(ˆ
a
1
1−α−γ
(
1 + s
(1 + s)
) α+γ
1−α−γ
n(a, s)
)1−α−γ
Kα = AKα (2.9)
18In the model, only firms with positive profit will enter the market. We can think of
firms with profit smaller than a constant as zombies.
19In a model-based environment, Yang (2019) classifies the firms with low-productivity
that should exit when there is no friction as zombie firms. It implies a vertical “zombie”
selection line in Figure 2.12.
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where aggregate productivity A is a subsidy-weighted average of firm-level
productivity which converts aggregate capital stock K to aggregate output Y ;
s is the output-weighted average of firm-level subsidy rate.20
With the expression for A, we could find the gain in aggregate productivity if
firm-level distortions are removed
A?
A
=
(´
a
1
1−α−γn?(a, s)
)1−α−γ
(´
a
1
1−α−γ
(
1+s
(1+s)
) α+γ
1−α−γ
n(a, s)
)1−α−γ (2.10)
=
E
[
a
1
1−α−γ |Ω
]1−α−γ
E
[
a
1
1−α−γ
(
1+s
(1+s)
) α+γ
1−α−γ |Ω
]1−α−γ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Intensive-margin
E
[
a
1
1−α−γ |Ω?
]1−α−γ
E
[
a
1
1−α−γ |Ω
]1−α−γ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Selection
(
N?
N
)1−α−γ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Variety
(2.11)
where A? is the aggregate productivity in the frictionless economy, Ω (Ω?)
denotes the set of operating firms in the economy with (without) frictions and
N (N?) is the total measure of operating firms in the economy with (without)
frictions.21
The gain in aggregate productivity can be decomposed into three components:
Intensive-margin, Selection and Variety component. The Intensive-margin
component shows the increase in average productivity if we remove the disper-
sion in subsidy rates across firms without changing the composition of firms.
Next, the Selection component captures the gain in average productivity if
we allow composition of firms to change. Last, the Variety component illus-
trates the change in total mass of operating firms if we move to the frictionless
economy. Despite firms are producing a homogeneous product, the technology
that features decreasing returns to scale effectively makes firms become im-
perfect substitutes in production. Each additional firm is valuable as it helps
to overcome the decreasing returns to scale faced by other firms. In section
2.5.1, I evaluate the productivity gain from removing distortions using this
decomposition result.
20(1 + s) =
´
(1 + s)y(a,s)Y n(a, s). In addition, there is no aggregate labor input in the
production function as I assume total labor supply equals to one.
21N =
´
n(a, s) and N? =
´
n?(a, s).
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2.4 Calibration
In this section, I outline the choices of model parameters and calibration pro-
cedure. The strategy is to first set a number of generic parameters using the
values in the existing literature, which include capital and labor output elas-
ticity α, γ, discount rate β and capital depreciation rate δ. Then I calibrate
the remaining parameters to match the moments from data in 1999.
For the generic parameters, I first set α + γ = 0.85 following Restuccia and
Rogerson (2008). α + γ is the returns to scale of the production function.
The introduction of the curvature in the production function is necessary to
generate profits and firm dynamics in our model. Next, I set α = γ = 0.425
since aggregate labor share in the national account of Chinese data is roughly
50%. Then, β = 0.96 implies that the real interest rate is approximately four
percent, which is consistent with Chinese data during the sample period. I
choose annual depreciation rate δ = 0.1 according to Bai et al. (2006).
For the parameters specific to our setting, I first set exogenous exit rates for
zombie and non-zombie firms to match the data in 1999, i.e., ηn = 0.15 and
ηz = 0.18. The exit rate is calculated as the fraction of zombie and non-zombie
firms exiting the sample between 1999 and 2000. Despite the poor performance
of zombie firms, the exit rate for zombie firms is only three percentage points
higher than that of non-zombies.22
In terms of the joint distribution G(a, s), I follow Yang (2019) and assume that
ln(a) and ln(1 + s) are jointly normally distributed as(
ln(a)
ln(1 + s)
)
∼ N
((
µa
µs
)
,
(
σa ρas
√
σaσs
ρas
√
σaσs σs
))
.
I normalize µa = 1 and then calibrate the five remaining parameters {µs, σa, ρas, σs, κ}
to match a set of moment conditions using the Method of Simulated Mo-
ments. Table 2.1 and 2.2 report the calibrated parameters and corresponding
moments, where firm size is measured by employment.
The calibration jointly estimates five parameters to match the five moments
in the data, I outline the intuition for the choices of parameters. Firstly, since
firms with higher subsidy rates are more likely to be classified as zombies, the
mean of subsidy distribution µs should be relatively low to match the zombie
22Figure 2.26 in Appendix plots the measured exit rate for zombie and non-zombie firms
between 1999 and 2007.
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Table 2.1: Parameterization
Parameter Definition Value
α Capital output elasticity 0.43
γ Labor output elasticity 0.43
β Discount rate 0.96
δ Depreciation rate 0.10
µa Mean of productivity distr. 1.00
µs Mean of subsidy distr. -0.40
σa Variance of productivity distr. 0.91
ρas Correlation coefficient -0.69
σs Variance of subsidy distr. 0.48
κ Operating cost 23.09
ηz Exit rate for zombie firms 0.18
ηn Exit rate for non-zombie firms 0.15
Table 2.2: Moments
Moment Data Model
Zombie rate 0.16 0.16
Relative mean size of zombie and non-zombie 1.41 1.41
S.D. of (log) size 1.26 1.26
Relative S.D. of (log) size of zombie and non-zombie 1.04 1.01
Profit share of output 0.11 0.09
Exit rate of non-zombie firms 0.15 0.15
Exit rate of zombie firms 0.18 0.18
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Figure 2.13: Productivity distribution: zombies vs non-zombies
Figure 2.14: Productivity and subsidy rate: zombies vs non-zombies
rate in the data. Secondly, zombie firms are less productive and yet larger
than the non-zombies, it requires the correlation coefficient ρas to be negative
such that low productivity firms are more likely to receive more subsidies.
Thirdly, the variance of productivity and subsidy distribution allow us to match
both the overall dispersion of firm size and relative dispersion of zombie firms.
Lastly, fixed cost κ drives the overall profit share of output. The model matches
the moments on zombie rate, relative size of zombie firms and overall dispersion
of firm size perfectly. It slightly underestimates the relative size dispersion of
zombie firms and overall profit share of output. One thing to note is that the
zombie definition in the data rules out young firms. Since the model is not well
suited to study the strong learning dynamics at the beginning of the firm’s life
cycle, in the Appendix, I re-calibrate the model to match the relevant moments
in the sample where all the firms with age smaller than five years are dropped.
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Figure 2.13 shows the productivity distribution of zombie and non-zombie firms
in the model. As in the data, I find the zombie firms are less productive than
non-zombies. In the left panel of Figure 2.14, I compare the average productiv-
ity and different quartiles in the output-weighted distribution of productivity
for zombie and non-zombie firms. The productivity gap between non-zombies
and zombies is somewhat larger compared with data in Figure 2.6.23 Given
the fact that zombie firms are much less productive and yet larger than the
non-zombies, we would expect they receive much more subsidies. The right
panel of Figure 2.14 reports the average subsidy rate and different quartiles
in the output-weighted distribution of subsidy rate. On average, zombie firms
would receive a subsidy rate of 80%, and non-zombie firms would receive a
negative subsidy rate of about 50%. This figure is larger than the subsidy rate
I find in the data in Figure 2.7 and 2.8. As a small subsidy rate difference can
not be reconciled with the fact that zombie firms are much less productive and
yet larger in size. I interpret the subsidy in the model as a generic distortion
wedge that increases the size of zombie firms. It is clear that the government
can give various forms of subsidies including cheap credit and land. The sub-
sidy information in the data would significantly underestimate the true extent
of support from the government.
2.5 Results
This section conducts three quantitative exercises using the calibrated model.
Section 2.5.1 reports the productivity gain from removing distortions com-
pletely and compares the magnitude of productivity gain with the existing
literature. Section 2.5.2 shows that rising private sector in the Chinese econ-
omy induces a reduction in the dispersion of subsidy rate. This reduction
could generate sizable productivity gain even the private firms have no pro-
ductivity advantage over SOEs. In section 2.5.3, I explore the effectiveness of
government policies that increase the zombie exit rate.
2.5.1 Productivity gain from removing distortions
In this section, I use the calibrated model to evaluate productivity gains from
removing dispersion in subsidy rate completely. Table 2.3 reports the decompo-
23I use the index approach to estimate firm productivity in the data. The productivity
gap between zombies and non-zombies is what matters for the resource misallocation.
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Table 2.3: Productivity gain from removing distortions
Intensive-margin Selection Variety Total
Benchmark 283.47% 25.25% -19.69% 285.74%
σs = 0.24 97.54% 23.53% -19.02% 97.60%
σs = 0.048 14.58% 16.60% -14.24% 14.58%
Notes: The table reports the percentage change in aggregate productivity and its decom-
position from removing dispersion of subsidy rate completely. Each cell is calculated as
100 (C − 1), where C stands for either individual components in equation 2.11 or A?A . As a
result, last column is not the sum of first three columns.
sition of productivity gain. The first row shows that, for the benchmark econ-
omy, the aggregate productivity can increase by more than 280% if removing
the resource misallocation completely. The Intensive-margin component alone
contributes to nearly 100% in the productivity gain.
The gain in aggregate productivity tends to be larger than the estimates in the
literature. Hsieh and Klenow (2009) equalize the marginal products within the
four-digit industry and find the aggregate productivity can increase by about
115% using the same Chinese firm-level data.24 Yang (2019) emphasizes the
importance of selection and finds the aggregate productivity losses can be
40% higher than the estimate in Hsieh and Klenow (2009). The underlying
reason that drives the difference between my estimate and these studies is the
returns to scale in the production function, which is effectively the elasticity
of substitution between firms in Hsieh and Klenow (2009).
Higher substitutability between firms would induce a larger gain if distortions
are removed. In the benchmark result of Hsieh and Klenow (2009), they con-
servatively assume an elasticity of substitution of 3 across firms, which implies
the returns to scale α+ γ = 0.5.25 This is in contrast with values around 0.85
in models with heterogeneous firms, e.g., Restuccia and Rogerson (2008). In
fact, Yang (2019) also illustrates that productivity gain is more than 200% if
using a scale parameter of 0.8.
The first row of Table 2.3 shows that the contribution of Selection component
is almost fully counteracted by a negative Variety component. As emphasized
by Fattal Jaef (2018) and Yang (2019), in a model with entry and exit, it is un-
clear whether the magnitude of total gains in TFP from removing distortions
will be larger than the Intensive-margin component or not. The entry and exit
of firms will induce a change in the composition of operating firms (Selection
24The figure is for 1998. See table IV in Hsieh and Klenow (2009).
25It also implies that each firm has a markup of 50%.
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component) and a change in the mass of operating firms (Variety component).
Whether the Variety component counteracts the Selection component depends
on the underlying distribution of productivity and distortion. In the calibrated
model, if we remove the dispersion of subsidy rate across firms completely, the
mass of operating firms will be smaller, offsetting the gain due to selection.
Since the subsidy rate is negatively correlated with productivity in the bench-
mark economy, high productivity firms will have low subsidy rates, which will
reduce their labor demand and hence wage rate in the economy, making it
profitable for more firms to enter.
The last two rows in Table 2.3 show that the dispersion of subsidy rate is
crucial in driving the productivity gain. The second (third) row reduces the
dispersion of subsidy rate to be half (one-tenth) of the benchmark economy.
Total productivity gain will reduce to 97.6% and 14.58%. This reduction is
primarily driven by the Intensive-margin component alone. The Selection and
Variety components still offset each other.
2.5.2 Productivity gain from rising private firms
In the model, the dispersion of subsidy rate is the key in driving the loss
in aggregate productivity. The left panel of Figure 2.16 plots the aggregate
productivity against the dispersion of subsidy σs. I normalize the aggregate
productivity in the benchmark economy to be one. By decreasing the disper-
sion σs, the aggregate productivity increases significantly. A 10% decrease in
the dispersion from the benchmark estimate increases aggregate productivity
by 14%.26 The decline of subsidy dispersion would also reduce the fraction of
firms receiving a high subsidy rate, which contributes to a lower zombie rate
as shown in the right panel of Figure 2.16.
I then ask the question whether the decline in zombie rate observed in the data
can be driven by a change in the dispersion of subsidy rate. Figure 2.15 shows
the dispersion of subsidy rate in the data. Between 1999 and 2007, there is a
strong decline in dispersion in subsidy rates. Besides, the decline in the full
sample is driven by the rise of private firms in the economy as the dispersion
within SOEs and non-SOEs exhibit little variation over time.
Figure 2.2 in the empirical section shows that, between 1999 and 2007, the
decline in zombie rate explained by the rise of non-SOEs is about 5%. If I
26The gain is more significant as dispersion approaches zero. The extreme case σs = 0
corresponds to the total gain in aggregate productivity in the first row of Table 2.3.
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Figure 2.15: Subsidy dispersion in the data
Notes: The figure plots the dispersion of subsidy rate in the data for SOEs, non-SOEs and
full sample.
Figure 2.16: Aggregate productivity, zombie rate and dispersion of subsidy
reduce the dispersion of subsidy to match the 5% decline in zombie rate, the
aggregate productivity increases by about 40%. This quantitative exercise
illustrates that the rise of the private sector can induce a large productivity
gain even when there is no productivity gap between private firms and SOEs.
2.5.3 How effective is the policies that increase the exit
rate of zombies?
Zombie firms are usually characterized as the low productivity firms that do
not exit the market due to various frictions. In this section, I explore the
importance of zombie exit rate in driving the aggregate productivity of the
economy.
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Figure 2.17: Aggregate productivity and exit rate of zombie firms
The right panel of Figure 2.17 plots zombie rate in the economy if we increase
zombie exit rate ηz. A higher zombie exit rate reduces zombie rate significantly.
The left panel of Figure 2.17 shows the corresponding gain in aggregate pro-
ductivity. Increasing zombie exit rate by 50% from the benchmark level raises
aggregate productivity by 4%. The gain in aggregate productivity is concave
in the zombie exit rate. In the extreme case where we force zombie firms to
have a 100% exit rate, aggregate productivity only increases by 11%.27 The
result implies that, without changing the underlying frictions in the economy
(dispersion of subsidy rate across firms), a higher exit rate of zombie firms only
generates modest effects on productivity.
This exercise shows that the recent policies of the Chinese government that
aim to address zombie firms by closing them will be effective in reducing the
zombie rate. However, its productivity effect is relatively limited. I calibrate
the benchmark economy to match data in 1999. If the extent of distortions
diminishes over time, the productivity effects of a higher zombie exit rate would
be even smaller. This is in contrast with the result in section 2.5.2, where I
find that the rise of private firms tends to reduce the dispersion of subsidy rate
in the economy and induces a large productivity gain. Therefore, policies that
attempt to solve the zombie problem should directly tackle the distortion in
the economy that helps zombie firms survive. One caveat of the result is that
I focus on the steady state comparison of models with different zombie exit
rates and neglect the transition dynamics. Increasing the zombie exit rate may
induce a larger productivity effect when transition is taken into consideration,
which I reserve for future research.
27A 100% exit rate implies that each zombie firm operates for one period.
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2.6 Conclusion
This chapter studies the distorting effects of zombie firms on the economy.
Using the firm-level data from the manufacturing sector in China between 1998
and 2007, I document that zombie firms are larger in terms of inputs employed
but less productive. Zombie firms are more likely to receive a positive subsidy
from the government, and the average subsidy rate for zombie firms is higher
than that of non-zombie firms. This difference in average subsidy rate between
zombie and non-zombie firms depends on both the underlying joint distribution
of subsidy rate and productivity and the definition of zombies.
I outline a model with heterogeneous firms to account for the features of zom-
bies, and then use the calibrated version of the model to quantify the impact of
zombies on aggregate productivity. Quantitative exercise highlights the impor-
tance of returns to scale in production technology in driving the productivity
gain from removing distortions. In addition, I show that the rise of private
sector tends to reduce the dispersion of subsidy rate, which can lead to a siz-
able productivity gain even when there is no productivity difference between
private firms and SOEs. Lastly, while the policies that increase the exit rate
of zombies can substantially reduce the zombie rate, its productivity effect is
relatively limited.
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2.7 Appendix
2.7.1 Firm-level data from China
The firm-level data used in this paper is from the annual surveys conducted by
China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). It includes all state-owned en-
terprises (SOEs) and non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs) with more than
5 million RMB in revenue from 1998 to 2007.28 The sample is a representa-
tive summary of the whole industrial sector in China. Compared with 2004
industrial census for all firms, it covers more than 90% of gross output of the
industrial sector. The industry sector contains mining, manufacturing, and
public utilities. This paper focuses on the manufacturing sector. The raw
data is presented annually. Following Brandt et al. (2012), I convert the data
to a panel by linking the firms over time using identifying information such as
firm ID, firm name and address.29
The data reports extensive firm-level information on balance sheet variables
and operating characteristics, such as short-term and long-term assets and
liabilities, output, input and taxes. The benchmark measure of zombie firms
requires firm-level data on profit, subsidy, and age. I measure the firm’s profit
using the accounting profit reported by the firm directly. I construct firm age
using the information on the year of birth of the firm.
The unique feature of Chinese data is that it contains firm-level information
on the amount of subsidies firms receive from the government. Following the
accounting standard, the subsidy information mainly involves the transfer of
monetary assets from the government to firms. The subsidy information in the
data contains support from the government for many production activities. It
could reflect subsidies towards capital expenses, labor expenses, and expenses
on other activities such as R&D. The subsidies that do not involve direct
transfer of assets from the government to firms are not included, such as tax-
breaks and low-interest loans.
For the alternative zombie measure, I extract information on a firm’s short-
term and long-term liability to construct the minimum required interest that
28The 5 million RMB is not a “hard” rule, and firms with sales below the threshold
for a year are not automatically removed from the sample. See Brandt et al. (2014) for a
discussion of the data set.
29See https://feb.kuleuven.be/public/N07057/CHINA/appendix/ for the algorithm
to match firms over time.
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firms need to pay when there are no interest subsidies. The implied minimum
interest payment tends to overestimate the amount of interest firms need to
pay since there are types of liability that are not interest-bearing, payable for
instance.
To compare the size of zombie and non-zombie firms, I use employment and
real capital stock. The measurement of employment is directly observable in
the data. I construct the real capital stock using the method outlined by
Brandt et al. (2012), in which I infer each firm’s initial capital stock and
calculate annual investment as the change in nominal capital stock between
years. Together with price deflator for investment, the real capital stock is
then calculated using the perpetual inventory method.30 Using the two-digit
output and input deflator provided by Brandt et al. (2012), I calculate the
firm-level real value added as the real output net of real intermediate inputs
and indirect taxes.
I classify firms into SOEs and non-SOEs using a two-stage approach. In the
first stage, I classify firms using the information on registration types. Fol-
lowing Nie et al. (2016), I categorize the state-owned and collective firms as
SOEs, and classify private and two types of foreign firms as non-SOEs.31,32 For
the firms that cannot be assigned in the first stage, I use the additional infor-
mation on paid-in capital to categorize firms as SOEs if the state or collective
capital comprises the largest share in a firm’s paid-in capital.33 I extract a
firm’s location information using the geographic code in the data.
2.7.2 Alternative calibration
The zombie definition in the model does not involve any age restriction since
our model is not suitable to explain the strong learning dynamics at the begin-
ning of a firm’s life cycle. I consider an alternative calibration where I jointly
choose five parameters {µs, σa, ρas, σs, κ} to match the relevant moments in the
sample where all firms with age smaller than 5 years are dropped. Table 2.4
and 2.5 report the choices of parameters and moments I use in the estimation.
30See https://feb.kuleuven.be/public/N07057/CHINA/appendix/ for the algorithm
to construct firm-level real capital stock.
31State-owned firms at the township level are usually registered as collective firms. See
Lu et al. (2010) for the detailed discussion of collective firms in China.
32Foreign firms include those from Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan, and those from
foreign countries.
33Only firms with registration type 159 (other limited liability companies), 160 (joint-
stock companies), and 190 (other companies) are classified in the second stage.
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Table 2.4: Alternative calibration: parameterization
Parameter Definition Value
µs Mean of subsidy distr. -0.69
σa Variance of productivity distr. 0.91
ρas Correlation coefficient -0.69
σs Variance of subsidy distr. 0.56
κ Operating cost 17.53
Table 2.5: Alternative calibration: moments
Moment Data Model
Zombie rate 0.21 0.20
Relative mean size of zombie and non-zombie 1.26 1.26
S.D. of (log) firm size 1.29 1.29
Relative S.D. of (log) size of zombie and non-zombie 1.01 1.02
Profit share of output 0.11 0.09
Table 2.6: Decomposition of productivity gain from removing distortions:
alternative calibration
Intensive-margin Selection Variety Total
σs = 0.56 378.56% 22.65% -16.92% 387.65%
σs = 0.28 121.53% 23.35% -18.87% 121.69%
σs = 0.056 17.19% 12.51% -11.12% 17.19%
Notes: The table reports the percentage change in aggregate productivity and its decompo-
sition from removing dispersion of subsidy rate completely for alternative calibration. Each
cell is calculated as 100 (C − 1), where C stands for either individual components in equation
2.11 or A
?
A . As a result, last column is not the sum of first three columns.
Figure 2.18: Aggregate productivity, zombie rate and dispersion of subsidy:
alternative calibration
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Figure 2.19: Aggregate productivity and exit rate of zombie firms: alterna-
tive calibration
Restricting the sample to older firms results in a larger zombie rate and smaller
relative size of zombies, which leads to a lower mean and larger dispersion of
subsidy distribution.
Table 2.6 reports the productivity gain from removing subsidy dispersion com-
pletely. Since calibrated dispersion in subsidy rate is larger than the benchmark
economy, removing dispersion of subsidy induces an even larger productivity
gain, and it is primarily driven by the Intensive-margin component. The left
panel of Figure 2.18 depicts the relation between aggregate productivity and
dispersion of subsidy. After decomposing the zombie rate by SOE status in
the restricted sample, I find that the decline of zombie rate explained by the
rise of the private sector is still around 5%. Reducing the dispersion to match
the 5% decline in zombie rate will induce a 12% increase in aggregate produc-
tivity. Lastly, I explore the effectiveness of policies that increase the zombie
exit rate. Figure 2.19 shows that increasing zombie exit rate will significantly
reduce the amount of zombie firms in the economy while its productivity effect
is relatively limited.
2.7.3 Supplementary figures
This section provides supplementary figures. Figure 2.20 illustrates the rapid
rise of private sector in the economy. The share of non-SOEs increases from
33% in 1999 to more than 90% in 2007. Figure 2.21 conducts the between-
within decomposition for the aggregate zombie rate across provinces and in-
dustries. In both decompositions, the decline of the zombie rate is driven by
the within-group component. Figure 2.22 and 2.23 report the average size and
productivity gap between zombie and non-zombie firms after controlling for
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Figure 2.20: Rising share of non-SOE firms
Notes: This figure plots the fraction of non-SOEs in the sample. Ownership is determined
by using information on registry type and paid-in capital.
Figure 2.21: Decomposing the decline of zombie rate by industries and
provinces
Notes: The figure shows the between-within decomposition of the aggregate zombie rate by
industries (left panel) and provinces (right panel).
ownership, industries and provinces. The general pattern that zombie firms
are larger yet mush less productive remains. Figure 2.24 reports the zombie
rate if no age restriction is imposed in the benchmark measure. Figure 2.25
shows the regression-based average size and productivity differences between
zombie and non-zombie firms when I use two alternative measures to identify
zombies. Zombie firms are still much larger in terms of inputs employed yet
much less productive. Figure 2.26 plots the annual exit rate from the sample
for zombie and non-zombie firms.
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Figure 2.22: Regression-based size gap between zombies and non-zombies
Notes: This figure reports the regression-based average size differences between zombie and
non-zombie firms. I obtain the estimates as β1 from the regression yi = β1DZi + FEs+ i,
where yi is the logarithm of firm size measures and DZi is the dummy for zombie firm.
Fixed effects are included to control for ownership, industries and provinces. Both the point
estimate and its 95% confidence interval are reported.
Figure 2.23: Regression-based productivity gap between zombies and non-
zombies
Notes: This figure reports the regression-based average productivity differences between
zombie and non-zombie firms. I obtain the estimates as β1 from the regression log(TFPi) =
β1D
Z
i + FEs + i, where DZi is the dummy for zombie firm. Fixed effects are included
to control for ownership, industries and provinces. Both the point estimate and its 95%
confidence interval are reported.
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Figure 2.24: Zombie rate and age restriction
Notes: This figure compares the benchmark zombie rate with two alternatives. The first
alternative is the zombie rate in the subsample where all firms with age smaller than 5 years
are dropped. The second alternative is to identify zombie firms without age restriction.
Figure 2.25: Size and productivity gap between zombies and non-zombies:
alternative zombie measures
Notes: This figure reports the regression-based average size and productivity differences
between zombie and non-zombie firms for two alternative zombie measures. I obtain the
estimates as β1 from the regression yi = β1DZi +FEs+ i, where yi is the logarithm of firm
size and productivity measure, and DZi is the dummy for zombie firm. Fixed effects are
included to control for ownership, industries and provinces. Both the point estimate and its
95% confidence interval are reported.
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Figure 2.26: Measured exit rate
Notes: This figure plots the annual exit rate from the sample for zombie and non-zombies.
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Chapter 3
The Rise of Information Inputs in
Production
3.1 Introduction
The last few decades witnessed the rapid development of information technol-
ogy. This chapter documents the concurrent rises in wage premium of infor-
mation workers and information intermediate input, and tries to understand
the forces that drive these changes.
It is reasonable to think that advances in information technology benefit work-
ers who work with information more intensively. We classify occupations into
info and non-info occupations based on an info score (information score) ob-
tained from O*NET. The occupation-level info score indicates the degree of
data and information analyzing activities needed in an occupation. Using data
from IPUMS CPS, we show that the average hourly wage is higher for occupa-
tions with higher info score, and that wage premium related to info score have
been increasing since 1980. In particular, the relative wage of info workers to
non-info workers increases by about 30% from 1980 to 2010. Together with
the wage rise, the employment size of info workers also increases relative to
that of non-info workers.
The rise of information technology reduces the transaction cost, which could
induce firms to outsource more intermediate inputs (Abramovsky and Griffith,
2006). We group industries into info sector (information sector) and non-info
sector (non-information sector) based on the median info score of each indus-
try’s workforce. Industries with median info score higher than the national
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median are classified as info sector, and the rest are in the non-info sector. We
find that there is a strong reallocation of output towards info sector. In addi-
tion, intermediate shares on output from info sector increase in both sectors,
while intermediate shares associated with output from non-info sector decline.
Motivated by the rising importance of information-intensive inputs, we propose
an accounting framework to understand the drivers of these phenomena. The
model features two sectors, info and non-info sectors, and two types of workers,
info and non-info workers. Each sector uses capital stock, info and non-info
workers, and info and non-info intermediate inputs to produce. We allow
technical changes to be sector-factor specific, and we interpret the productivity
associated with intermediate input as outsourcing efficiency.
Drawing on the estimates of elasticities in the literature, we infer the pro-
ductivity changes between 1980 and 2014. We find that, for both sectors,
the technologies associated with non-info labor grow fastest, with an annual
growth rate of 2.8 percent in info sector and 2.3 percent in non-info sector.
In addition, the technologies augmenting info inputs do not exhibit sizeable
growth over time.
To understand the role of differential rates of technical change, we examine
two partial-equilibrium counterfactual experiments. In the first experiment,
we isolate the contribution of different sources of technical change to the ob-
served intermediate shares by allowing one set of technologies to vary over time
and keeping the other technologies and prices fixed at the 1980 level. From this
experiment, we find that, for three out of four intermediate shares we study,
labor-augmenting technical change contributes to the observed change in in-
termediate shares. On the other hand, outsourcing-specific technical change
can only explain one of the changes.
In our second experiment, we fix the labor-augmenting technologies at the
1980 values and allow factor output shares to evolve as in the data. The result
shows that without these technical changes, the wage premium of info workers
would have increased more in both sectors. Since info inputs and non-info
inputs are complements, the technical change that is biased towards non-info
inputs increases the demand and expenditure share for info inputs. In the
absence of such technical change, the rising expenditure share on info input
can only be explained with a stronger increase in factor prices of info inputs.
Our paper is related to the literature that studies the impact of technical
change on labor market outcomes. Several recent papers document that the
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rise in skill premium has progressively slowed since the 1990s, where skill pre-
mium is measured as the relative wage rate of college graduates over high school
graduates (Valletta, 2016; Autor, 2017). Autor (2017) argues that the flatten-
ing of skill premium is driven by deceleration of skill demand commencing from
1992. Our results suggest deceleration does not happen for the workers in info
occupations. In fact, the majority of the rise in info worker wage premium
happens after the mid-1990s. Besides, rising returns to info occupations re-
main even after controlling for education. We also compare our info score with
routine-nonroutine measures from Acemoglu and Autor (2011) in explaining
the residual wage variation. Although our info score has limited explanatory
power in 1980, it explains more variation than the routine and non-routine
measures combined in recent years.
In a closely related paper, Gallipoli and Makridis (2018) construct a similar IT
intensity measure and show that the relative wage rate of IT-intensive occupa-
tions is increasing. Different from our info score, they combine 12 scores from
the O*NET dataset to measure IT intensity, including the one we use for our
info score. We view our measure captures the meaning of information-intensive
activities more precisely. In addition, the wage premium of info workers using
our measure exhibits faster growth over time. Gallipoli and Makridis (2018)
also link the rise of IT-intensive jobs with structural change towards the service
sector, while we study the evolution of input-output structure over time.
Our accounting exercise resembles the one in Barany and Siegel (2019). Fol-
lowing Autor et al. (2003), they infer sector-factor specific technical changes
in an environment where ICT capital substitutes routine workers. They find
that technologies augmenting routine labor grow fastest, and it explains a large
fraction of the differential growth rates of labor productivity across industries.
This is consistent with our finding that non-info labor augmenting technology
has the strongest growth since non-info occupations have a large overlap with
routine occupations. We differ by also incorporating intermediate input into
this framework, and study the role of outsourcing-specific technical change in
explaining the observed change in intermediate shares.
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 presents the empirical facts.
Section 3.3 develops the accounting framework which we use to infer the sector-
factor specific technical change. Section 3.4 presents the quantitative results.
Section 3.5 concludes.
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3.2 Empirical facts
3.2.1 Data and measurement
First, we measure occupational information intensity by directly taking the
score on “Analyzing data or information” from O*NET database.1 This score
is reported for each occupation on a scale of 0 to 7.2 A higher score indicates
that a higher degree of data and information analyzing skill is required or
needed for the occupation.
Our info score is related to IT intensity measure in Gallipoli and Makridis
(2018), where they combine 12 scales in Work Activity, Skills, and Knowledge
Scales to measure occupation-level IT intensity. However, among 12 scales,
many of them are vaguely defined, such as “Updating and using relevant knowl-
edge”, “Quality control analysis”, and “Management of material resources”. We
view our particular scale captures the meaning of information-intensive activ-
ities more precisely.
We then assign each industry an info score using 1980 data. We first rank all
workers in a given industry based on their occupational info scores, taking into
account the appropriate weights.3 Then we assign the info score of the median
worker to be the info score of the industry. Table 3.3 in Appendix presents the
result. We classify industries with info score above the national median as info
sector, and the rest as non-info sector. Based on this classification, the infor-
mation sector includes Wholesale; Utilities; Information; Finance, Insurance
and Real Estate; Professional Business Service; Educational Services, Health
Care and Social Assistance; and Government.
3.2.2 Intermediate input from information sector
To calculate intermediate input shares, we use the Annual Input-Output Table
from BEA. Using an expenditure-side approach, we decompose the aggregate
1O*NET database V15.1. “Analyzing data or information” is the only overlap scale
between IT-intensity measure in Gallipoli and Makridis (2018) and non-routine analytical
task measure in Acemoglu and Autor (2011).
2For each question, an importance score and a level score are reported. See the data
appendix for details.
3The weights are individual weights multiplied by hours of work.
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Figure 3.1: Aggregate intermediate share
Notes: This figure plots the aggregate intermediate share and its sectoral decomposition in
U.S. Source: BEA Input-Output Table, and authors’ calculations.
intermediate share I
G
as:
I
G
=
II + IN
G
=
II
GI
GI
G
+
IN
GN
GN
G
(3.1)
where I and G are total intermediate inputs and gross output. II and IN are
the intermediate input produced by info sector and non-info sector, GI and
GN are the corresponding sectoral gross output. IIGI (
IN
GN
) denotes the fraction
of info (non-info) sector’s output used as intermediates.
Figure 3.1 presents aggregate share ( I
G
) and its sectoral decomposition ( II
G
and
IN
G
). The solid line, depicting I
G
, shows that about 45% of gross output is
used as intermediate input, and this ratio is roughly constant over time. The
constant ratio masks important sectoral heterogeneity. The intermediate input
from info sector ( II
G
) increases from about 13% in 1980 to more than 21% in
2014, while the intermediate input from non-info sector ( IN
G
) declines.
As in equation 3.1, this rise in II
G
could be due to either a larger output share of
info sector (larger GI
G
) or a more intensive use of info sector’s output as inter-
mediate inputs (higher II
GI
). Hence, Figure 3.2 plots each sector’s output share
(GI
G
and GN
G
) and the fraction of its output used as intermediate input ( II
GI
and
IN
GN
). During the sample period, info sector’s output share GI
G
increases from
40% in 1980 to 58% in 2014, and the fraction of its output used as intermediate
inputs II
GI
also increases albeit with a smaller magnitude. Therefore, both the
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Figure 3.2: Aggregate intermediate share decomposition
Notes: This figure shows the expenditure-side decomposition of aggregate intermediate
share. Two solid line plot the output share of info and non-info sector in the gross out-
put. Two dashed line show the fraction of sectoral output used as intermediate input for
info and non-info sector. Source: BEA Input-Output Table, and authors’ calculations.
rising GI
G
and II
GI
contribute to the higher II
G
.
To understand the usage of info intermediate inputs, we also present a production-
side decomposition:
I
G
=
III + IIN
GI
GI
G
+
INI + INN
GN
GN
G
(3.2)
where IJI and IJN are the info and non-info intermediate inputs used by sector
J ∈ {I,N}. III+IIN
GI
and INI+INN
GN
are the total intermediate shares in info and
non-info sector. Figure 3.3 plots these two total shares, as well as its individual
components, IJI
GJ
and IJN
GJ
where J ∈ {I,N}. In both info and non-info sectors,
the intermediate share of info goods ( IJI
GJ
) increases, and the intermediate share
of non-info goods ( IJN
GJ
) declines. Therefore, both sectors are using more info
intermediate inputs over time.
3.2.3 Rise of info labor
During the same period, the return to occupations with higher info score has
been increasing. For each occupation, we calculate the mean of real hourly
wage by year. Figure 3.4 shows the binscatter plot of this occupational mean
against the info score for 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2010. Obviously, the return to
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Figure 3.3: Intermediate share by sector
Notes: This figure shows the intermediate share as well as its decomposition for both info
and non-info sector. Source: BEA Input-Output Table, and authors’ calculations.
Table 3.1: Regression of income on info score
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1980 1990 2000 2010
info score 0.102*** 0.131*** 0.157*** 0.177***
(31.366) (48.708) (52.620) (63.924)
experience Yes Yes Yes Yes
experience squared Yes Yes Yes Yes
race Yes Yes Yes Yes
edu Yes Yes Yes Yes
sex Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 47960 46728 42907 61462
Notes: This table reports the coefficients from regressing logarithm of individual real hourly
wage on info score, controlling for race, gender, education, experience. Results are reported
for 1980, 1990, 2000 and 2010. t statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, ***
p < 0.001. Source: CPS ASEC from IPUMS, and authors’ calculations.
info score has grown. In addition to this occupational level result, we regress
the logarithm of individual real hourly wage on info score, controlling for race,
gender, education, and experience. Table 3.1 summarizes the results. The
coefficient on info score is also increasing over time, which implies the wage
premium associated with information-intensive occupations becomes larger.
To illustrate the magnitude of this rise, we classify workers into two types,
info workers and non-info workers. Workers in occupations with info score
higher than the 1980 national median are classified as info workers and the
rest are classified as non-info workers. Figure 3.5 plots the wage premium
of info workers over time. The solid line depicts the raw wage premium in
the data, while the dashed line shows the wage premium when we control
for the composition change of info workers and non-info workers. For both
measures, the wage premium of info workers increases by about 30% between
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Figure 3.4: Returns to info occupations
Notes: This figure shows the binscatter plot between occupational average real hourly wage
and info score for 1980, 1990, 2000 and 2010. Source: CPS ASEC from IPUMS, and authors’
calculations.
1980 and 2010. Besides, the post-mid-1990s period explains more than 50% of
the increase, and the wage premium stagnates around 2008.
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Figure 3.5: Wage premium of info worker
Notes: Raw data refers to the average hourly wage of info workers relative to that of non-info
workers. We can express this relative wage rate as wi,twn,t =
∑
c si,c,twi,c,t∑
c sn,c,twn,c,t
where
∑
c si,c,t = 1
and
∑
c sn,c,t = 1. Here c represents demographic cells. si,c,t means the share of occupation
i and demographic cell c at time t. For both info and non-info labor, we have twelve
education categories, two race categories, six age categories and two sex categories. The fixed
composition relative wage is calculated by replacing si,c,t with time average si,c. Source:
CPS ASEC from IPUMS, and authors’ calculations.
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Figure 3.6: Employment and hours worked: info worker and non-info worker
Notes: This figure plots the trend of employment and hours worked for info and non-info
worker. We normalize the 1980 values to unity. Source: CPS ASEC from IPUMS, and
authors’ calculations.
Apart from the increase in relative wage, we also observe a rise in the em-
ployment of info workers relative to non-info workers. Figure 3.6 shows the
employment and hours worked of info workers and non-info workers. Nor-
malizing the 1980 values to unity, both employment and hours worked of info
worker increase by almost 80% since 1980 whereas they only increase by 40%
for non-info worker.
Our info score captures an important dimension of wage distribution for the
following reasons. Firstly, recent papers document that the growth of col-
lege premium has slowed since the 1990s and almost stagnated in the 2000s
(Valletta, 2016; Autor, 2017). In contrast, our result shows that the post-
mid-1990s period explains the majority of the rise in wage premium of info
workers. Secondly, we also compare the info score with the routine and non-
routine measures used by Acemoglu and Autor (2011) in explaining residual
wage variation. We first regress logarithm of real hourly wage on experience,
education, gender and race, collect the residuals, and then regress the residuals
on our info score and the routine-non-routine measures. Figure 3.7 presents
the R-squared of these residual regressions. The left panel shows that the ris-
ing explanatory power of routine and non-routine measures is mostly driven
by the non-routine analytical content of the occupations. The right panel con-
trasts our info score with the five measures in Acemoglu and Autor (2011).
The explanatory power of the info score increases over time, and it explains
more wage dispersion than the routine and non-routine measures combined in
recent years. Lastly, we compare our info score with IT intensity measure in
Gallipoli and Makridis (2018). Using a different measure of IT intensity, they
find that between 1980 and 2015, the wage premium of IT worker increases
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Figure 3.7: Partial R2 net of experience, education, race and gender
Notes: This figure compares info score with routine-nonroutine measures in Acemoglu and
Autor (2011) (AA) in terms of explaining the residual wage variation. The partial R2 values
presented above are calculated as follows. First, we regress logarithm of real hourly wages on
a quadratic in experience, and dummies of race, gender and education. The wage residual
are then regressed separately on the variable groups of interest. R2 from each residual
regression is plotted. Source: IPUMS CPS ASEC and O*NET, authors’ calculations.
by 23%.4 Compared to their results, the wage premium using our info score
measure displays a larger increase over time (Figure 3.5).
Motivated by the two facts (i) the output from info sector is used more in-
tensively as an intermediate input in the production; (ii) there is a sharp in-
crease of the employment and wage premium of info worker relative to non-info
worker, we develop an accounting framework with factor-augmenting technical
changes to understand the drivers of these observations.
3.3 Theoretical framework
In this section, we present a partial-equilibrium accounting framework with
factor-augmenting technical change. Sectoral gross output is produced by
combining capital stock, info and non-info labor inputs, and info and non-
info intermediate inputs. Under this specification, we then infer the series of
factor-augmenting productivities using data on sectoral output growth, quan-
tities and prices of various factor inputs and factor shares. Since we observe
the sectoral gross output, this approach does not require a specification on
demand side.
4See Table 1 in Gallipoli and Makridis (2018).
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3.3.1 Sectoral production
We consider two aggregate sectors: info sector (I) and non-info sector (N).
Each sector J ∈ {I,N} has the following nested CES production function for
gross output:
QJ =
(AJKJ)σk−1σk +([C σC−1σCJi + C σC−1σCJn ]
σC
σC−1
)σk−1
σk

σk
σk−1
(3.3)
CJi =
[
(AJiLJi)
σI−1
σI + (λJIMJI)
σI−1
σI
] σI
σI−1 (3.4)
CJn =
[
(AJnLJn)
σN−1
σN + (λJNMJN)
σN−1
σN
] σN
σN−1
. (3.5)
The set of sector-factor specific technical changes is {AJ , AJi, AJn, λJI , λJN}.
The upper case I and N refer to sector, and the lower case i and n refer to
worker type. MJI and MJN are info and non-info output used by sector J as
intermediate input. We interpret the corresponding factor-augmenting tech-
nologies λJI and λJN as outsourcing-specific technical changes. LJi and LJn
denote the info and non-info labor employed in sector J with labor-augmenting
technologies AJi and AJn. Finally, KJ is sectoral capital stock with capital-
augmenting technology AJ .
Our nested CES specification is a generalization of the production technol-
ogy in Chan (2017).5 Info labor LJi and info intermediate input MJI are
combined to produce info input aggregate CJi with elasticity σI .6 Similarly,
non-info labor LJn and non-info intermediate input MJN form the non-info
input aggregate CJn, with elasticity σN . Then the info aggregate CJi and
non-info aggregate CJn form a labor-intermediate aggregate with elasticity
σC . Finally, output in sector J is the CES combination of capital KJ and the
labor-intermediate aggregate that contains all other inputs.
5Chan (2017) consider a production function with σk = σC = 1.
6For example, firms which need marketing services can combine their own marketing
labor and purchased marketing services.
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3.3.2 Inferring technologies
In this section, we discuss how we infer the sector-factor specific productivities.
Each sector solves the following profit maximization problem
max
KJ ,LJi,LJn,MJI ,MJN
PJQJ −WJiLJi −WJnLJn − PIMJI − PNMJN −RKJ
(3.6)
subject to equation 3.3 to 3.5. WJi and WJn are sector-specific wages of info
and non-info labor. PJ is price of sector-J output.7
Solving the above problem, we express the relative technologies in relative
prices and relative factor shares:
AJi
λJI
=
WJi
PI
[
WJiLJi
PIMJI
] 1
σI−1
(3.7)
AJn
λJN
=
WJn
PN
[
WJnLJn
PNMJN
] 1
σN−1
(3.8)
AJi
AJn
=
[
WJiLJi
WJnLJn
] 1
σC−1
[
1 + PNMJN
WJnLJn
] σC−σN
(σN−1)(σC−1)[
1 + PIMJI
WJiLJi
] σC−σI
(σI−1)(σC−1)
WJi
WJn
(3.9)
AJ
AJi
=
R
WJi
[
RKJ
WJiLJi
] 1
σk−1
[
1 +
PIMJI
WJiLJi
] σk−σI
(σI−1)(σk−1)
[
1 +
WJnLJn + PNMJN
WJiLJi + PIMJI
] σk−σC
(σC−1)(σk−1)
.
(3.10)
Equation 3.7 and 3.8 write the productivity of a worker type (i and n) relative
to the corresponding intermediate input as a function of relative prices and
expenditure ratios. Similarly, relative technologies of info worker and non-
info worker can be calculated from equation 3.9 using wage premium of info
workers, output share of both types of labor and intermediate inputs. Finally
equation 3.10, given a series of capital-augmenting technologies AJ , delivers the
series of factor-augmenting technologies of info labor and hence all remaining
technologies.
Using the optimality conditions, sectoral gross output is given by:
QJ = AJKJ
[
1 +
WJiLJi + PJMJI +WJnLJn + PNMJN
RKJ
] σk
σk−1
. (3.11)
7Since sectors could use different combinations of intermediate goods within MJI and
MJN , we consider a case where intermediate prices are sector-factor specific in the robustness
check section.
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This delivers the series of capital-augmenting technology AJ , given the series
of sectoral real output QJ , capital stock KJ and factor shares.8
3.3.3 Data and implementation
This subsection outlines the data and methods we use to measure the relative
factor prices and factor output shares. Without loss of generality, we normal-
ize all the quantity measures by the Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) labor force
following Barany and Siegel (2019).
We extract industry level nominal and real gross output and its decomposition
from World KLEMS data.9 We group industries into info and non-info sector,
and calculate the total labor output share for each sector:
θLJ =
Compensation of employees in sector J
Gross output in sector J
. (3.12)
The left panel of Figure 3.8 plots the labor output shares. It is higher in
info sector. Since the mid-1980s, labor output share is on a decreasing trend,
especially for non-info sector. What we measure here is not exactly the labor
income share in the literature, but this result is consistent with the recent
decline of labor income share (e.g., Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014), Autor
et al. (2017)).10
KLEMS data does not provide labor compensation by occupations. Thus, we
turn to IPUMS CPS data. As explained in section 3.2, we classify occupations
into info and non-info occupations, with the corresponding workers being info
and non-info workers. The labor income share of occupation o in sector J is
8We can infer the initial technologies from initial sectoral prices
AJt=0 =
RJt=0
PJt=0
[
1 +
WJiLJi + PJMJI +WJnLJn + PNMJN
RKJ
]− 1σk−1
.
Since we are concerned with the growth rate of the technologies, without loss of generality,
we could also normalize AJt=0 for both sectors.
9Data is available at http://www.worldklems.net/data.htm.
10Similarly, we calculate the total intermediate share of each sector J as
θIntJ =
Intermediate inputs used by sector J
Gross output in sector J
. (3.13)
Besides, to get the intermediate share by each sector, we use the data from the Annual Input-
Output Table as in section 3.2. Note there is a small discrepancy between intermediate shares
reported by World KLEMS and Input-Output Table published by BEA. We harmonize the
two data sources by scaling the intermediate shares reported by BEA such that they add
up to the one reported by World KLEMS.
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Figure 3.8: Labor share
Notes: The left panel plots the fraction of labor income in gross output for both info and
non-info sector using data from World KLEMS. The right panel plots the ratio between info
worker’s income and total labor income for both info and non-info sector using data from
IPUMS CPS.
calculated as
θJo =
Earnings of occupation o workers in sector J
Earnings of all sector J workers
. (3.14)
Then the output share of info and non-info labor in sector J are θLJ θJi and
θLJ θJn. The right panel of Figure 3.8 plots θJi for both sectors. Info workers
account for about 80% of all the labor income in info sector and 50% in non-
info sector. In both sectors, income share of info worker is on an increasing
trend.
To infer the sector-specific wage for info and non-info workers, we first calcu-
late the share of hours worked by occupation o in sector J , LJo. Then the
sector-occupation specific wage rateWJo can be obtained using the accounting
identity11
WJoLJo = P̂JQJθ
L
J θJo. (3.15)
Figure 3.9 illustrates the implied wage premium of info labor in two sectors.
As in the Figure 3.5, the wage premium increases in both sectors and the
post-mid-1990s period explains the majority of the rise.
Next, we calculate the real quantity and price for sectoral output using the
cyclical expansion approach in Herrendorf et al. (2013).12 Figure 3.10 plots
the evolution of quantity and price indices for both sectors, where info sector
grows faster than the non-info sector in terms of both measures.
11The right-hand side gross output is normalized by FTE workers, i.e., P̂JQJ = PJQJLFTE .
12See the data appendix for details.
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Figure 3.9: Inferred wage premium of info labor by sector
Notes: This figure plots the inferred wage premium for both info and non-info sector. The
wage rate is inferred by using the accounting identity in equation 3.15. Source: CPS ASEC
from IPUMS, World KLEMS, and authors’ calculations.
Figure 3.10: Quantity and price indices by sector
Notes: The quantity and price indices of info and non-info sector are calculated using cyclical
expansion approach as in Herrendorf et al. (2013). Source: World KLEMS, and authors’
calculations.
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Finally, we calculate the rental price of capital and real capital stock in each
sector. From the fixed asset account of BEA, we extract quantity index of net
stock of fixed assets. We use the following accounting identity to get the rental
price of capital:
RK = PQ
∑
j
PJQJ
PQ
(
1− θLJ − θIntJ
)
. (3.16)
We back out KJ in each sector using the industry-level accounting identity.
3.3.4 Elasticities
We need to parameterize four elasticities. First, we parameterize σI and σN ,
the elasticity between a given type of labor and its corresponding intermedi-
ate input. Chan (2017) estimates that elasticity between task-specific labor
and intermediate input, where he considers both detailed task classes and one
aggregate task class.13 Across different specifications, the average elasticity of
substitution is about 2.3. We use this as the benchmark estimate for σI and
σN .14
Second, we choose σC , the elasticity of substitution between info aggregate
and non-info aggregate. Gallipoli and Makridis (2018) estimate elasticity of
substitution between IT and non-IT intensive labor and find values of 1.3 in
services and 1.6 in manufacturing. However, this does not map directly into
the elasticity between info and non-info aggregate. We can infer σC using
the information on σI , elasticity between info and non-info labor and factor
shares.15 We set the benchmark value for σC to be 0.5.
13Detailed task classes contain thirteen input types: ICT, Legal & Accounting, Engineer-
ing, Marketing, Employment & Training, Transportation, Security, Cleaning, Other services,
Food, Wood & Paper, Heavy Industry and Tools, Machinery, Goods.
14In the specification with detailed input classes, we can classify the input types into info
input and non-info input. For example, input types, ICT, Legal & Accounting, Engineering,
Marketing, Employment & Training, are classified as info input. The remaining types are
classified as non-info input. In both groups, the average elasticity is around 2.3.
15If we substitute equation 3.7 and 3.8 into 3.9, we express the ratio between info and
non-info labor in terms of prices and technologies. Differentiating the equation with respect
to log (WJi) holding other prices fixed yields
σC = −
∂log
(
LJi
LJn
)
∂log (WJi)
+
−∂log
(
LJi
LJn
)
∂log (WJi)
− σI
[ PIMJI
WJiLJi
]
where −∂log
(
LJi
LJn
)
∂log(WJi)
measures the elasticity of substitution between info and non-info labor
and PIMJIWJiLJi is around 0.9 for info sector and 1.1 for non-info sector.
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Lastly, we set σk, the elasticity between capital and labor-intermediate aggre-
gate. Barnes et al. (2008) estimate the firm-level elasticity between capital and
other inputs to be 0.4. However, as pointed by Oberfield and Raval (2014),
macro-level elasticity tends to be larger than micro-level elasticity.16 We set
σk = 0.6 as the benchmark value. In section 3.4.3.1, we conduct a battery of
robustness checks regarding these elasticities.
3.4 Quantitative results
Table 3.2 reports the inferred annual growth rate of sector-factor specific tech-
nologies from 1980 to 2014 and two sub-periods, 1980-1995 and 1995-2014.
Several patterns emerge. First, over the entire sample period, the productiv-
ity of non-info labor grows faster in both sectors, with an annual growth rate
of 2.8 percent in info sector and 2.3 percent in non-info sector. Technologies
augmenting info labor grows less significantly, with a negative growth rate in
info sector. In terms of outsourcing-specific technologies, the increase is also
more pronounced for non-info intermediate. Outsourcing-specific technologies
for info intermediate do not exhibit strong growth with an annual growth rate
of 0.4 percent in non-info sector and a negative growth rate in info sector.
Finally, the capital-augmenting technology increases at 1.6 percent annually
in info sector, while falls in non-info sector.17
The average growth rate over the entire period masks interesting heterogeneity
over time. Comparing the two sub-periods, in both sectors, the growth of
technology augmenting non-info labor is primarily driven by the rise during
1980-1995. On the other hand, technologies augmenting info input tend to
grow faster in the post-1995 era. The results suggest that the advent of the
Internet era has unequal impacts across factors.
In an environment without intermediate inputs, Barany and Siegel (2019) con-
duct a similar accounting exercise to study the drivers of the difference in labor
productivity growth across industries.18 They find that sector-specific routine
labor augmenting technical change is the most important driver of sectoral
differences. Similar to their findings, we find that non-info labor augmenting
16Oberfield and Raval (2014) find that within-plant substitution between capital and
labor accounts for about 60% of overall substitution for the manufacturing sector.
17The negative growth rate of capital-augmenting technology is consistent with the liter-
ature. See Antras (2004) and Barany and Siegel (2019) for example.
18They classify occupations into three groups: routine, manual and abstract. They con-
sider three sectors: low-skilled service, goods and high-skilled service sectors.
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Table 3.2: Annual growth rate of technologies
Info L Info M Non-info L Non-info M Capital K
AJi λJI AJn λJN AJ
1980-2014
Info sector 0.993 0.989 1.028 1.010 1.016
Non-info sector 1.007 1.004 1.023 1.012 0.977
1980-1995
Info sector 0.983 0.984 1.042 0.995 1.019
Non-info sector 1.003 1.004 1.041 1.015 0.987
1995-2014
Info sector 1.001 0.992 1.017 1.023 1.014
Non-info sector 1.010 1.004 1.009 1.010 0.970
Notes: This table reports the inferred growth rate of sector-factor specific technical change,
where growth rate refers to At+1At . A number smaller the one means the corresponding
productivity is declining.
technology has strongest growth over time since most of non-info occupations
belong to the group of routine workers.19
In the data, we observe a rise in wage premium of info workers and an increase
in intermediate share from info sector. These patterns could be driven by the
sector-factor specific technical changes documented in Table 3.2. In the follow-
ing sections, we study the role of factor-augmenting technologies in driving the
observed patterns. We focus on the role of labor-augmenting technical changes
and outsourcing-specific technical changes.
3.4.1 Intermediate shares and technical changes
The evolution of intermediate share depends on both the productivity growth
and price changes. To see how each factor contributes to the observed changes
in intermediate shares, we perform four counterfactual exercises. In each ex-
ercise, we allow one set of factors to vary over time and keep the others fixed
at the 1980 level, and then compute the implied intermediate shares. Fig-
ure 3.11 shows the cumulative percentage change in intermediate shares for
the four exercises: (i) varying capital-augmenting technology AJ ; (ii) varying
labor-augmenting technologies AJi and AJn; (iii) varying outsourcing-specific
technologies λJi and λJn; and (iv) varying all prices R, W and P . The two
upper panels of Figure 3.11 represent the change of info and non-info inter-
mediate shares in info sector. The two lower panels show the change of the
19More than 70% non-info occupations belong to routine occupations. See Table 3.8 in
Appendix.
139
Figure 3.11: Technical changes and intermediate shares
Notes: This figure shows the cumulative percentage change of intermediate shares since 1980,
including the observed data and four counterfactual cases. The evolution of intermediate
share depends on both the productivity growth and price changes. In each counterfactual
experiment, we allow one set of variables to change while fixing others at the 1980 level
and then compute the implied intermediate share. For example, the first case allows capital
augmenting technology to evolve over time while fixing all prices and other productivities
at the 1980 level.
corresponding intermediate shares in non-info sector.
Figure 3.11 shows that, among four intermediate shares, outsourcing-specifc
technical change can only explain the rising info intermediate share in non-info
sector. On the other hand, labor-augmenting technical change contributes to
the changes in the rest three intermediate shares.
These results depend on the elasticity of substitution between different inputs
and the pace of technical changes. For example, in non-info sector, Table 3.2
shows that non-info labor augmenting technology grows faster than the one
augments info labor. This unbalanced growth increases the demand and ex-
penditure share on info input due to the complementarity between info and
non-info inputs. However, within info inputs, technology augmenting info-
labor grows over time, which substitutes expenditure away from info inter-
mediates. Between 1980 and 1990, the complementarity effect dominates the
substitution effect, resulting in a rise of info intermediate share. As info labor’s
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productivity grows faster since 1990, substitution effect prevails, which leads
to a decline in the info intermediate share.
Figure 3.11 also suggests that capital-augmenting technical change does not
play an important role in explaining the observed changes in intermediate
shares. The implied intermediate shares exhibit little variation over time when
we only allow capital-augmenting technology to change while fixing other pro-
ductivities and prices at the 1980 level. Besides, change in prices contributes
to the rising info intermediate share but cannot explain the declining non-info
intermediate share.
The above results are based on a partial-equilibrium framework where we keep
prices constant while changing productivities. Leaving the demand side un-
specified gives us flexibility in accounting for the evolution of sector-factor
technologies. However, it loses the general equilibrium effect that changes in
technologies generate variations in intermediate shares through affecting equi-
librium relative prices. The general equilibrium effect of outsourcing-specific
technical change could be important in explaining the sector reallocation. We
leave this for future research.
3.4.2 Wage premium and labor-augmenting technical change
Here we explore the role of labor-augmenting technologies in driving the wage
premium of info workers. To calculate the implied wage premium in the ab-
sence of labor-augmenting technologies, we fix the labor-augmenting technolo-
gies as in the 1980’s level and allow the intermediate shares and labor output
shares to evolve as in the data. Figure 3.12 plots the cumulative percentage
change for the observed and counterfactual wage premium in both sectors.
Without labor-augmenting technical changes, the wage premium of info work-
ers increases much more dramatically in both sectors. Intuitively, since info
inputs and non-info inputs are complements, technical change that is biased
towards non-info inputs would increase the demand and expenditure share for
info inputs. In the absence of such technical change, the rising expenditure
share on info input can only be explained with a stronger increase in info factor
prices.
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Figure 3.12: Wage premium and labor-augmenting technical change
Notes: This figure shows cumulative percentage change in observed and counterfactual wage
premium for info and non-info sector since 1980. Counterfactual wage premium is calculated
by fixing labor-augmenting technical change at its 1980 level.
3.4.3 Robustness check
3.4.3.1 Alternative elasticity of substitution
In the benchmark calibration, we set the elasticities σI = σN = 2.3, σC =
0.5 and σk = 0.6. In this section, we examine the robustness of our results
regarding these elasticities.
Elasticity between labor and intermediate input. Here we consider
three alternative sets of values: (i) σI = σN = 1.8; (ii) σI = σN = 2.8;
(iii) σI = 2.2 and σN = 2.20 In Table 3.4 and Figure 3.13 to 3.15, we report
both the annual growth rate of factor-augmenting technologies and cumulative
percentage change in counterfactual intermediate shares for alternative sets of
values. Panel (a)-(c) in Figure 3.21 plot the corresponding counterfactual wage
premium. Across different parameterizations, the general pattern remains un-
changed as non-info input augmenting technologies grow faster. In addition,
apart from the info intermediate share in non-info sector, labor-augmenting
technical change contributes to the observed change in intermediate shares.
Elasticity between info aggregate and non-info aggregate. In our base-
line results, we set σC = 0.5. Here we use alternative values of σC , 0.4 and
20The last set of values is the median elasticity for info input and non-info input in Chan
(2017) given the classification in footnote 14.
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0.8. In Table 3.5, we report the implied growth rates. Compared with Table
3.2, a greater substitutability between info and non-info aggregate enlarges
the gap in growth rates between technologies augmenting info and non-info in-
puts, and technologies augmenting non-info inputs grow even faster compared
with benchmark calibration. Figure 3.16 and 3.17 show the change in coun-
terfactual intermediate shares for these alternative values. When σC = 0.8,
labor-augmenting technical change contributes to the observed changes for all
four intermediate shares. Panel (d) in Figure 3.21 and panel (a) in Figure 3.22
plot the counterfactual wage premium. One thing to note is that, with a larger
σC , wage premium would increase much more than the benchmark calibration
if we fix the labor augmenting technologies at the 1980 level.
Elasticity between capital and labor-intermediate aggregate. We con-
sider two alternative values of σk, 0.4 and 0.8. Table 3.6 shows that alternative
values of σk change the level of growth rate for capital-augmenting technolo-
gies. The implied growth rates remain similar for technologies augmenting
info and non-info inputs. Counterfactual intermediate shares are reported in
Figure 3.18 and 3.19, and wage premium is reported in Figure 3.22.
3.4.3.2 Sector-specific price for intermediate inputs
In the benchmark framework, we assume that the intermediate input price is
the corresponding price of sectoral output. However, since two sectors could
use different compositions of intermediate goods within info input MJI and
non-info input MJN , the corresponding price indices may not exhibit the same
pattern over time. Thus we construct intermediate input price indices that
are sector-specific. First, we use the BEA Input-Output Table to estimate the
intermediate purchase of info and non-info sector from 65 KLEMS industries.
We then construct the sector-factor specific price index using the cyclical ex-
pansion approach. With the new series of prices of intermediate input, we redo
the accounting exercise. Table 3.7 presents the inferred growth rate of tech-
nologies when we allow for sector-factor specific prices of intermediate inputs.
Compared with Table 3.2, there are minor changes in the growth rate of tech-
nologies augmenting info and non-info inputs. Figure 3.20 and 3.22 depict the
resulting counterfactual intermediate shares and wage premium. The general
patterns remain unchanged.
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3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we document the rise of information inputs in production.
Specifically, we find (i) output from info sector is used more intensively as an
intermediate input and (ii) there is a sharp rise of returns and employment for
info workers relative to non-info workers. We develop an accounting framework
to understand the nature of technical change that drives these patterns. The
accounting exercise shows that technologies augmenting non-info inputs tend
to grow faster. The partial-equilibrium counterfactual analysis indicates that
labor-augmenting technical change is important in explaining the observed
change in wage premium and intermediate shares.
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3.6 Appendix
3.6.1 Data appendix
In this section, we discuss the data sources and variables we use in detail.
Occupational info score. We first obtain an occupational information task
intensity from O*NET database V15.1. O*NET database provides occupa-
tional information on worker attributes and job characteristics. We measure
occupational information intensity by directly taking the score on “Analyzing
data or information” from the O*NET database. For the question, an impor-
tance score and a level score are reported. Acemoglu and Autor (2011) use
the importance score, but we view the level score is more appropriate for our
purpose.21 The level score is reported for each occupation on a scale of 0 to 7.
A higher score indicates that a higher degree of data and information analyz-
ing skill is required or needed for the occupation. The occupation code in the
O*NET database is based on SOC2010 occupation code. We use a crosswalk
to link each SOC2010 occupation to 2010 classification in the IPUMS data.22
Individual level data on employment and wages. We use the March
ASEC sample of the CPS data downloaded from IPUMS. We only keep indi-
viduals who are between 20 to 64 years old, work for at least 40 weeks in the
past year, and work for at least 35 hours each week. This project focuses on
wage workers, so we drop all self-employed individuals. The income variable
we use is wage income.
For occupations, we use the “occ10ly” variable. According to IPUMS, this
provides consistent occupational codes for the respondents during the previous
calendar year using the 2010 Census Bureau occupational classification system.
This allows us to match the occupational info score from O*NET data.
For industry classification, we make use of the "ind90ly" variable. It provides
consistent occupational codes for the respondents during the previous calendar
year using the 1990 industrial classification system. We convert this into the
2003 industrial classification system and use the crosswalk between 2003 codes
21The O*NET website gives an example to explain the difference. See https://www.
onetonline.org/help/online/scales. Speaking skill is important to both lawyers and
paralegals, but a higher level of speaking skill is required to become a lawyer. The correlation
between level score and importance score is 0.97.
22The crosswalk is available via https://view.officeapps.live.com/op/
view.aspx?src=https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/demo/guidance/
industry-occupation/2010-occ-codes-with-crosswalk-from-2002-2011.xls.
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and NAICS two-digit sector.23 Finally, we match the NAICS code to the 15
sector classification used by BEA.
BEA Input-Output data. We classify industries into info and non-info
sector based on 15 sector classification used by BEA.24 With occupational info
score from O*NET and employment information in CPS, we first calculate the
median info score of each sector’s workforce in 1980. Industries with median
info score higher than the national median are classified as the info sector. The
rest are classified as the non-info sector. Table 3.3 presents the results.
We study the intermediate shares by constructing industry-by-industry direct
requirements table. Specifically, we first extract the annual make and use table
between 1980 and 2014.25 Annual use table shows the uses of commodities by
intermediate and final users. Annual make table shows the production of
commodities by industry.
We follow the notation of BEA, and extract the following information to con-
struct the industry-by-industry direct requirements matrix.26 q is a commodity-
by-one column vector, which reports the amount of output by commodities. g
is an industry-by-one column vector, which reports output by industries. U is a
commodity-by-industry matrix, where each column shows for a given industry
the amount of different commodities it uses. W is an industry-by-commodity
matrix, where each column shows for a given commodity the amount of out-
put produced by different industries. e is a commodity-by-one column vector,
which shows the total final demand purchases for each commodity.
Since supply and use table are reported at more disaggregated industry level,
we aggregate the matrices and vectors {g,W,U} along the industry dimension
so that they are consistent with info and non-info classification. The resulting
matrices and vectors are denoted as {g˜, W˜ , U˜}. Given the definition of those
23We use the sample where both the 1990 and the 2003 classification are available, to
construct a crosswalk between 1990 and 2003 codes. The crosswalk between 2003 industry
codes and NAICS codes can be found at the IPUMS USA webpage: https://usa.ipums.
org/usa/volii/indcross03.shtml.
24The 15 sectors are approximately at two-digit NAICS level. The crosswalk between 15
BEA industries and two-digit NAICS code is available at https://www.bea.gov/sites/
default/files/2018-04/GDPbyInd_VA_1947-2017.xlsx.
25Annual make and use table are available at https://www.bea.gov/industry/
input-output-accounts-data. For the year after 1997, we extract the version of make
and use table with 71 industries. For the year before 1997, we extract the make and use
table with 65 industries. Both industry classifications are based on NAICS code.
26See Horowitz et al. (2006) for the concepts and methods of the US Input-Output ac-
counts. The derivation of the industry-by-industry direct requirements table follows closely
with BEA’s method in Horowitz et al. (2006).
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variables, we can find the following accounting identity
q = U˜ i+ e
g˜ = W˜ i
where i is a unit vector containing only 1’s.27 Then we define D = W˜ q̂−1 and
B = U˜̂˜g−1, where D is an industry-by-commodity matrix where each column
reports the proportion of the total output of that commodity produced in each
industry and B is a commodity-by-industry matrix where each column shows
the amount of a commodity used by an industry per dollar of output of that
industry.28 Then we can express output vectors q and g˜ as
q = Bg˜ + e
g˜ = Dq.
Combining the two equations, we can find
g˜ = DBg˜ +De.
DB is the industry-by-industry (two-by-two) direct requirements matrix, where
each column shows the amount of industry-level output used by an industry
per dollar of output of that industry. We use DB as the measure of interme-
diate shares of two sector. In addition, with the information on g˜ and DB, we
can also perform the expenditure side decomposition on aggregate intermediate
share.
Additional data used in the accounting exercise. For the accounting
exercise, we use industry level nominal and real gross output and its decom-
position from World KLEMS data.29 Since World KLEMS is available at 65
NAICS industry level, we aggregate the nominal values across industries to
estimate the info and non-info sector’s labor output share and intermediate
output share.
We construct sectoral output and price indices using the cyclical expansion
approach in Herrendorf et al. (2013). We have the data of gross output
PstQst and real gross output Qst at 65 NAICS industry level. We follow
the KLEMS data to set year 2009 as the base year and normalize QIs2009 =
27The introduction of unit vector is used for summation of matrices across columns.
28q̂ and ̂˜g indicate the square matrices in which the elements of the vectors q and g˜ appear
on the main diagonal and zeros elsewhere.
29Data is available at http://www.worldklems.net/data.htm.
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Ps2009 = 1, where QIs2009 and Ps2009 refer to the chain-weighted quantity
index and chain-weighted price index for industry s in base year. By def-
inition, we can calculate the chain-weighted quantity and price index using
QIst
QIs2009
= Qst
Qs2009
and Pst
Ps2009
= PstQst
Ps2009Qs2009
Qs2009
Qst
. Then we approximate the change
of chain-weighted quantity index for broad info and non-info sector as QIJt
QIJt−1
=√ ∑
s∈J Pst−1Qst∑
s∈J Pst−1Qst−1
∑
s∈J PstQst∑
s∈J PstQst−1
. Finally, we normalize QIJ2009 = 1 and PJ2009 =
1, and it yields the real quantity QJt = QIJtQJ2009 = QIJt{
∑
s∈J Ps2009Qs2009}
and price PJt =
∑
s∈J PstQst
QIJt{
∑
s∈J Ps2009Qs2009} . To infer rental price of capital, we ex-
tract chain-type quantity index for net stock of fixed assets from BEA fixed
assets account. We obtain the Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) labor force from
BEA to normalize all quantity measures.
In the robustness check section, we construct sector-specific prices for inter-
mediate inputs in two steps. Firstly, using BEA supply and use table, we
can construct a direct requirements table of info and non-info sector from 65
KLEMS industries. The resulting direct requirements matrix can be shown as
R = D?B.30 R is a (65 × 2) matrix where the columns show the intermedi-
ate share of info and non-info sector from 65 NAICS industries. Since World
KLEMS provides the price deflator for each of the 65 industries’ output, we
use the same cyclical expansion approach to construct the intermediate prices
for each sector.
30D? = W ?q̂−1. We aggregate W along the industry dimension so that it is consistent
with 65 NAICS industry level in World KLEMS, and we denote the resulting matrix as W ?.
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3.6.2 Supplementary tables and figures
Table 3.3: Mean and median information score by sector: 1980
Industry Mean Median
1. Agriculture 2.55 1.80
2. Mining 3.04 2.76
3. Utilities 3.39 3.46
4. Construction 2.86 2.70
5. Manufacturing 3.05 2.82
6. Wholesale Trade 3.37 3.46
7. Retail Trade 3.06 2.82
8. Transportation and Warehousing 2.93 2.70
9. Information 3.57 3.91
10. Finance, Insurance, Real Estate 3.62 3.70
11. Professional Business Service 3.62 3.45
12. Educational Services, Health Care and Social
Assistance 3.48 3.63
13. Arts, Entertainment, Recreation, Accommodation
and Food Services 2.67 2.82
14. Other Services, except Government 2.93 2.82
15. Government 3.72 3.70
Notes: This table reports industry level mean and median info score weighted by the cor-
responding occupation share, with weights calculated from IPUMS CPS ASEC. We use the
weights associated with individual multiplied by hours worked. The median for the whole
sample is 3.05. Numbers are rounded to two digits. We classify industries into info sector if
median info score of the industry is larger than national median. The rest are classified as
non-info sector.
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Table 3.4: Annual growth rate of technologies with alternative σI and σN
Panel A: σI = σN = 1.8
Info L Info M Non-info L Non-info M Capital K
AJi λJI AJn λJN AJ
1980-2014
Info sector 0.990 0.992 1.029 1.010 1.016
Non-info sector 1.005 1.006 1.024 1.012 0.977
1980-1995
Info sector 0.979 0.989 1.047 0.991 1.019
Non-info sector 1.001 1.006 1.045 1.014 0.987
1995-2014
Info sector 0.999 0.994 1.014 1.025 1.014
Non-info sector 1.008 1.005 1.007 1.011 0.970
Panel B: σI = σN = 2.8
Info L Info M Non-info L Non-info M Capital K
AJi λJI AJn λJN AJ
1980-2014
Info sector 0.994 0.987 1.028 1.010 1.016
Non-info sector 1.007 1.004 1.023 1.012 0.977
1980-1995
Info sector 0.985 0.982 1.039 0.996 1.019
Non-info sector 1.004 1.004 1.040 1.016 0.987
1995-2014
Info sector 1.001 0.991 1.019 1.022 1.014
Non-info sector 1.010 1.003 1.010 1.010 0.970
Panel C: σI = 2.2, σN = 2
Info L Info M Non-info L Non-info M Capital K
AJi λJI AJn λJN AJ
1980-2014
Info sector 0.992 0.989 1.028 1.010 1.016
Non-info sector 1.006 1.004 1.024 1.012 0.977
1980-1995
Info sector 0.982 0.985 1.044 0.993 1.019
Non-info sector 1.003 1.005 1.043 1.014 0.987
1995-2014
Info sector 1.000 0.992 1.016 1.024 1.014
Non-info sector 1.009 1.004 1.008 1.011 0.970
Notes: This table reports the inferred growth rate of sector-factor specific technical change
for alternative values of σI and σN , where growth rate refers to
At+1
At
. A number smaller the
one means the corresponding productivity is declining.
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Table 3.5: Annual growth rate of technologies with alternative σC
Panel A: σC = 0.4
Info L Info M Non-info L Non-info M Capital K
AJi λJI AJn λJN AJ
1980-2014
Info sector 0.994 0.991 1.024 1.006 1.016
Non-info sector 1.009 1.006 1.022 1.011 0.977
1980-1995
Info sector 0.985 0.987 1.037 0.990 1.019
Non-info sector 1.007 1.008 1.039 1.013 0.987
1995-2014
Info sector 1.002 0.993 1.014 1.019 1.014
Non-info sector 1.010 1.005 1.009 1.010 0.970
Panel B: σC = 0.8
Info L Info M Non-info L Non-info M Capital K
AJi λJI AJn λJN AJ
1980-2014
Info sector 0.977 0.973 1.066 1.048 1.016
Non-info sector 0.989 0.986 1.033 1.022 0.977
1980-1995
Info sector 0.962 0.964 1.088 1.039 1.019
Non-info sector 0.969 0.971 1.060 1.034 0.987
1995-2014
Info sector 0.989 0.981 1.050 1.055 1.014
Non-info sector 1.004 0.999 1.013 1.014 0.970
Notes: This table reports the inferred growth rate of sector-factor specific technical change
for alternative values of σC , where growth rate refers to
At+1
At
. A number smaller the one
means the corresponding productivity is declining.
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Table 3.6: Annual growth rate of technologies with alternative σk
Panel A: σk = 0.4
Info L Info M Non-info L Non-info M Capital K
AJi λJI AJn λJN AJ
1980-2014
Info sector 0.995 0.991 1.030 1.012 1.012
Non-info sector 1.005 1.002 1.021 1.010 0.989
1980-1995
Info sector 0.986 0.987 1.045 0.998 1.013
Non-info sector 1.001 1.003 1.040 1.013 0.998
1995-2014
Info sector 1.002 0.993 1.019 1.024 1.011
Non-info sector 1.007 1.002 1.007 1.008 0.982
Panel B: σk = 0.8
Info L Info M Non-info L Non-info M Capital K
AJi λJI AJn λJN AJ
1980-2014
Info sector 0.987 0.983 1.022 1.004 1.028
Non-info sector 1.013 1.010 1.030 1.019 0.943
1980-1995
Info sector 0.974 0.976 1.032 0.986 1.037
Non-info sector 1.008 1.010 1.047 1.020 0.953
1995-2014
Info sector 0.997 0.989 1.014 1.019 1.021
Non-info sector 1.017 1.011 1.016 1.017 0.936
Notes: This table reports the inferred growth rate of sector-factor specific technical change
for alternative values of σk, where growth rate refers to
At+1
At
. A number smaller the one
means the corresponding productivity is declining.
Table 3.7: Annual growth rate of sector-factor augmenting technologies with
sector-factor specific intermediate prices
Info L Info M Non-info L Non-info M Capital K
AJi λJI AJn λJN AJ
1980-2014
Info sector 0.993 0.987 1.028 1.012 1.016
Non-info sector 1.007 1.001 1.023 1.011 0.977
1980-1995
Info sector 0.983 0.984 1.042 0.994 1.019
Non-info sector 1.003 0.998 1.041 1.012 0.987
1995-2014
Info sector 1.001 0.990 1.017 1.026 1.014
Non-info sector 1.010 1.003 1.009 1.011 0.970
Notes: This table reports the inferred growth rate of sector-factor specific technical change
for the setting with sector-factor specific prices for intermediate inputs, where growth rate
refers to At+1At . A number smaller the one means the corresponding productivity is declining.
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Table 3.8: Distribution of occupations
Abstract Routine Manual
Info 30.6% 16.5% 2.3%
Non-info 4.2% 36.2% 9.7%
Notes: The table shows the distribution of occupations in different classification cells. Info
and non-info refer to the classification in this chapter, where abstract-routine-manual refers
to the classification in Barany and Siegel (2019).
Figure 3.13: Technical changes and intermediate shares: σI = σN = 1.8
Notes: This figure shows the cumulative percentage change of intermediate shares since 1980.
Both the observed data and four counterfactual cases are reported. We consider alternative
values of σI and σN , i.e., σI = σN = 1.8.
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Figure 3.14: Technical changes and intermediate shares: σI = σN = 2.8
Notes: This figure shows the cumulative percentage change of intermediate shares since 1980.
Both the observed data and four counterfactual cases are reported. We consider alternative
values of σI and σN , i.e., σI = σN = 2.8.
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Figure 3.15: Technical changes and intermediate shares: σI = 2.2 and σN = 2
Notes: This figure shows the cumulative percentage change of intermediate shares since 1980.
Both the observed data and four counterfactual cases are reported. We consider alternative
values of σI and σN , i.e., σI = 2.2 and σN = 2.
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Figure 3.16: Technical changes and intermediate shares: σC = 0.4
Notes: This figure shows the cumulative percentage change of intermediate shares since 1980.
Both the observed data and four counterfactual cases are reported. We consider alternative
values of σC , i.e., σC = 0.4.
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Figure 3.17: Technical changes and intermediate shares: σC = 0.8
Notes: This figure shows the cumulative percentage change of intermediate shares since 1980.
Both the observed data and four counterfactual cases are reported. We consider alternative
values of σC , i.e., σC = 0.8.
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Figure 3.18: Technical changes and intermediate shares: σk = 0.4
Notes: This figure shows the cumulative percentage change of intermediate shares since 1980.
Both the observed data and four counterfactual cases are reported. We consider alternative
values of σk, i.e., σk = 0.4.
158
Figure 3.19: Technical changes and intermediate shares: σk = 0.8
Notes: This figure shows the cumulative percentage change of intermediate shares since 1980.
Both the observed data and four counterfactual cases are reported. We consider alternative
values of σk, i.e., σk = 0.8.
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Figure 3.20: Technical changes and intermediate shares: sector-factor specific
intermediate prices
Notes: This figure shows the cumulative percentage change of intermediate shares since 1980.
Both the observed data and four counterfactual cases are reported. We allow sector-factor
specific prices of intermediate inputs.
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Figure 3.21: Wage premium and labor-augmenting technical change with
alternative elasticities
(a) σI = σN = 1.8 (b) σI = σN = 2.8
(c) σI = 2.2 and σN = 2 (d) σC = 0.4
Notes: This figure shows cumulative percentage change in observed and counterfactual wage
premium since 1980 for alternative values of elasticities. Counterfactual wage premium is
calculated by fixing labor-augmenting technical change at its 1980 level.
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Figure 3.22: Wage premium and labor-augmenting technical change with
alternative elasticities (continued)
(a) σC = 0.8 (b) σk = 0.4
(c) σK = 0.8 (d) sector-factor specific int prices
Notes: This figure shows cumulative percentage change in observed and counterfactual wage
premium since 1980. Panel (a) to (c) consider alternative values of elasticities. Panel
(d) considers sector-factor specific intermediate prices. Counterfactual wage premium is
calculated by fixing labor-augmenting technical change at its 1980 level.
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